An "Multiple User Accounts Were Disabled" investigation came back with one entity — the actor — while the layout stayed nearly empty. Four separate reasons, and the last one is why the first three keep recurring. evidences was an OBJECT, not an array. JSONata returns a bare object when the path yields one item, so the key had one shape on an investigation with a single alert and another with two. Bracketed to force an array. Only the actor was mapped. An ad_admin rule names who acted AND who it was done to, and on this alert the disabled accounts are the point of it. Target account, target user and both domains now map to the OCSF Target User group, the actor to Actor — the distinction that lets the sentence be read in one line. The domain controller was nowhere. A Windows event puts it in source_json.computerName and nowhere else, and source_json was skipped whole because the Azure AD one runs to kilobytes. Its top-level SCALARS are now read — bounded, and where computerName, osVersion and callerIpAddress live — while its nested part stays skipped. source_asset was the string "unknown". Mapped as-is it becomes an asset named "unknown" in the entity index, shared by every incident that had no asset: a pivot that groups things by the absence of a fact. Placeholders are dropped, and a key whose value cleans away to nothing is removed rather than kept empty, since "" is not nil and would still be written to its OCSF field. Five entities now, from one: both accounts, both display names, the DC. And the reason this kept happening. The layout builder's field picker is a closed <select> over the OCSF catalogue in web/src/lib/ocsf.ts, so a path absent from it cannot be placed on a layout at all — which is what `detection` and `evidence` are, and what every unanticipated key will be. Mapping each one to a real OCSF field is right where a field exists, but rule_keys_of_interest is an open vocabulary: four spellings turned up in as many days. So the whole of it is also rendered as a Markdown table into custom:rapid7_summary — keys of interest first, since the rule itself says those are what matter, then the evidence fields. Declare a custom field of type markdown with that name, put it on the layout, and a new rule type is readable the day it appears instead of after another mapping round. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Riposte Marketplace
Official catalog of integrations for the Riposte SOAR platform.
Riposte syncs this repository (a "git source") and lists every integration it finds so operators can install them in one click. Nothing here is executed at sync time — Riposte only reads manifests and scripts.
How discovery works
When Riposte syncs a source it does a shallow git clone of the selected branch
and walks the whole tree looking for files named exactly manifest.yaml.
- Each
manifest.yamlis one integration. Its containing directory is the package root. Put one integration per directory. - Scripts are collected from the package directory and its
scripts/subdirectory: every*.pyfile becomes a command implementation, keyed by filename without the extension. So a command withid: get_ip_reportis backed byget_ip_report.py. - Files not named
manifest.yamlare ignored as integration roots, so templates likemanifest.example.yamlare never ingested.
integrations/
└── <integration-id>/
├── manifest.yaml # required — the integration definition
└── scripts/ # optional — only for script-based commands
└── <command-id>.py
Manifest schema (manifest.yaml)
id: my_integration # required, unique, slug
name: My Integration # required, human name
version: 1.0.0 # semver
description: What it does.
changelog: "1.1.0 — notes" # optional: shown on update so operators can assess risk
category: enrichment # free text (enrichment, containment, ticketing…)
# Per-instance configuration the operator fills when creating an instance.
# JSON-Schema shape: { properties: {...}, required: [...] }.
config_schema:
properties:
base_url:
type: string # string | number | boolean
description: API base URL
default: https://api.example.com/v1
api_key:
type: string
description: API key
x-soar-sensitive: true # stored encrypted in the vault, never returned
required:
- api_key
# Authentication methods, referenced by commands via `auth_ref`.
auth:
- id: apikey
type: api_key # api_key | bearer | basic | oauth2_client_credentials
in: header # header | query
name: x-apikey # header/query parameter name
value_template: "{{secret}}" # {{secret}} is replaced by the secret_field value
secret_field: api_key # which config_schema field holds the secret
commands:
# --- Request-based command (recommended, no code) -----------------------
- id: get_ip_report
name: Get IP report
description: Reputation for an IP address.
risk: read # read | safe_write | destructive — see below
inputs_schema:
properties:
ip:
type: string
description: IP address to look up
required:
- ip
outputs_schema:
properties: {}
request:
method: GET # GET | POST | PUT | PATCH | DELETE
path: /ip/{ip} # {ip} is filled from inputs
query: [] # input names sent as query params
body: [] # input names sent as JSON body fields
auth_ref: apikey
# --- Script-based command -----------------------------------------------
# Omit `request` and provide scripts/<id>.py instead. The script receives the
# resolved inputs + instance config and MUST print one JSON object to stdout.
- id: enrich_custom
name: Custom enrichment
description: Runs scripts/enrich_custom.py in a sandbox.
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
indicator:
type: string
required:
- indicator
outputs_schema:
properties: {}
A command is request-based when it has a request: block, or
script-based when a matching scripts/<command-id>.py exists. Prefer
request-based commands: they need no sandbox and are easier to audit.
risk: — the agent approval gate
Every command declares a tier. It is what Riposte's agent approval gate reads:
read runs unattended, safe_write and destructive sit behind the operator's
configured threshold. An omitted risk is treated as destructive — safe, but
it makes a lookup as noisy as an isolation, so declare it rather than default it.
| Tier | What belongs there |
|---|---|
read |
Only queries. Changes nothing outside Riposte: lookups, searches, telemetry, fetching a job's result. |
safe_write |
Additive or reversible, inside the tool's own case/enrichment plane: comments, notes, tags, tickets, alert statuses, threat-intel records, sandbox submissions, collection jobs, outbound messages. |
destructive |
Changes the estate or weakens a control: containment and its removal, blocklists and allowlists, exclusions and detection rules, every delete, identity and credential operations, running code on a host, generic API escape hatches. |
Two rules the catalog applies consistently, because they are not obvious:
- Undoing a containment is tiered like the containment it lifts. Un-isolating a host or un-banning an IP mid-incident is its own decision, not a return to a neutral state.
- Retrieving a live secret is
destructive. It is aGET, but the tier describes the stake, not the HTTP verb.
Adding this catalog to Riposte
In Riposte → Integrations → Marketplace → Add source:
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Name | Official marketplace |
| Git URL | https://gitea.riposte-labs.com/f3nris/riposte-marketplace.git |
| Branch | main |
| Provider | Gitea (sets the right auth scheme for private repos) |
| Token | a read-only token if the repo is private; leave empty if public |
Then Sync. Discovered integrations appear in the marketplace, ready to install.
Contributing an integration
- Create
integrations/<id>/manifest.yaml(one directory per integration). - Add
scripts/<command-id>.pyonly for script-based commands. - Bump
version(semver) on every change — Riposte tracks versions per source. - Validate the YAML parses and
id/nameare set. - Open a merge request.
See templates/manifest.example.yaml for a
fully-commented starting point (that file is intentionally not ingested).