f3nris 45e9cbd269 feat: declare a risk tier on every command in the catalog
467 of the 1592 commands carried no `risk:`. An unset risk is read as
destructive by the agent approval gate, so half the catalog's write side sat
behind the same prompt — and, in HarfangLab's case, 39 pure lookups did too.
A gate that stops everything stops being read as a signal, which is the
argument already made for the toolkit and for sentinelone (df27876).

The catalog is now 1027 read, 261 safe_write, 304 destructive, with nothing
defaulted. The line follows the one sentinelone drew: impact on the estate,
not reversibility — isolate-agent is reversible and is the canonical
destructive example.

  read        only queries; changes nothing outside Riposte
  safe_write  additive or reversible inside the tool's own case/enrichment
              plane: comments, tickets, tags, alert statuses, threat-intel
              records, sandbox submissions, collection jobs, outbound messages
  destructive changes the estate or weakens a control: containment, blocklists
              and allowlists, exclusions and detection rules, every delete,
              identity and credential operations, code on a host, generic
              API escape hatches

Three calls that were not obvious, and are now applied throughout:

- Undoing a containment is tiered like the containment it lifts. Un-isolating
  a host or un-banning an IP mid-incident is its own decision, not a return to
  a neutral state. The catalog contradicted itself here — crowdstrike's
  lift_containment was destructive while harfanglab's deisolate_from_threat
  was safe_write — so deisolate_from_threat and unquarantine_file are
  re-tiered to destructive, the only two existing tiers this pass changes.
- Retrieving a live secret is destructive: cyberark get_password, delinea
  get_secret, vault read_secret, beyondtrust get_credential. It is a GET, but
  the tier describes the stake, not the HTTP verb.
- Sending outward to humans stays safe_write — slack, teams, twilio, telegram,
  mail. Irreversible, but it is the collaboration plane, not the estate.

An object created but not yet referenced by a rule is safe_write; editing one
a rule already reads is destructive. That is why fortigate create_address and
panos create_custom_url_category are safe_write while update_address_group and
edit_custom_url_category are not.

The template and README never documented the field, which is how 467 commands
came to omit it. Both now carry the tier table and these rules, so the next
integration declares a tier instead of inheriting one.

111 packages get a MINOR bump and a changelog entry: an instance compares
versions to offer an update, so an unbumped manifest would leave the tiers
sitting in the catalog and never reaching the estates that need them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 12:55:20 +02:00

Riposte Marketplace

Official catalog of integrations for the Riposte SOAR platform.

Riposte syncs this repository (a "git source") and lists every integration it finds so operators can install them in one click. Nothing here is executed at sync time — Riposte only reads manifests and scripts.


How discovery works

When Riposte syncs a source it does a shallow git clone of the selected branch and walks the whole tree looking for files named exactly manifest.yaml.

  • Each manifest.yaml is one integration. Its containing directory is the package root. Put one integration per directory.
  • Scripts are collected from the package directory and its scripts/ subdirectory: every *.py file becomes a command implementation, keyed by filename without the extension. So a command with id: get_ip_report is backed by get_ip_report.py.
  • Files not named manifest.yaml are ignored as integration roots, so templates like manifest.example.yaml are never ingested.
integrations/
└── <integration-id>/
    ├── manifest.yaml          # required — the integration definition
    └── scripts/               # optional — only for script-based commands
        └── <command-id>.py

Manifest schema (manifest.yaml)

id: my_integration            # required, unique, slug
name: My Integration          # required, human name
version: 1.0.0                # semver
description: What it does.
changelog: "1.1.0 — notes"   # optional: shown on update so operators can assess risk
category: enrichment          # free text (enrichment, containment, ticketing…)

# Per-instance configuration the operator fills when creating an instance.
# JSON-Schema shape: { properties: {...}, required: [...] }.
config_schema:
  properties:
    base_url:
      type: string            # string | number | boolean
      description: API base URL
      default: https://api.example.com/v1
    api_key:
      type: string
      description: API key
      x-soar-sensitive: true  # stored encrypted in the vault, never returned
  required:
    - api_key

# Authentication methods, referenced by commands via `auth_ref`.
auth:
  - id: apikey
    type: api_key             # api_key | bearer | basic | oauth2_client_credentials
    in: header                # header | query
    name: x-apikey            # header/query parameter name
    value_template: "{{secret}}"   # {{secret}} is replaced by the secret_field value
    secret_field: api_key     # which config_schema field holds the secret

commands:
  # --- Request-based command (recommended, no code) -----------------------
  - id: get_ip_report
    name: Get IP report
    description: Reputation for an IP address.
    risk: read                # read | safe_write | destructive — see below
    inputs_schema:
      properties:
        ip:
          type: string
          description: IP address to look up
      required:
        - ip
    outputs_schema:
      properties: {}
    request:
      method: GET             # GET | POST | PUT | PATCH | DELETE
      path: /ip/{ip}          # {ip} is filled from inputs
      query: []               # input names sent as query params
      body: []                # input names sent as JSON body fields
      auth_ref: apikey

  # --- Script-based command -----------------------------------------------
  # Omit `request` and provide scripts/<id>.py instead. The script receives the
  # resolved inputs + instance config and MUST print one JSON object to stdout.
  - id: enrich_custom
    name: Custom enrichment
    description: Runs scripts/enrich_custom.py in a sandbox.
    risk: read
    inputs_schema:
      properties:
        indicator:
          type: string
      required:
        - indicator
    outputs_schema:
      properties: {}

A command is request-based when it has a request: block, or script-based when a matching scripts/<command-id>.py exists. Prefer request-based commands: they need no sandbox and are easier to audit.

risk: — the agent approval gate

Every command declares a tier. It is what Riposte's agent approval gate reads: read runs unattended, safe_write and destructive sit behind the operator's configured threshold. An omitted risk is treated as destructive — safe, but it makes a lookup as noisy as an isolation, so declare it rather than default it.

Tier What belongs there
read Only queries. Changes nothing outside Riposte: lookups, searches, telemetry, fetching a job's result.
safe_write Additive or reversible, inside the tool's own case/enrichment plane: comments, notes, tags, tickets, alert statuses, threat-intel records, sandbox submissions, collection jobs, outbound messages.
destructive Changes the estate or weakens a control: containment and its removal, blocklists and allowlists, exclusions and detection rules, every delete, identity and credential operations, running code on a host, generic API escape hatches.

Two rules the catalog applies consistently, because they are not obvious:

  • Undoing a containment is tiered like the containment it lifts. Un-isolating a host or un-banning an IP mid-incident is its own decision, not a return to a neutral state.
  • Retrieving a live secret is destructive. It is a GET, but the tier describes the stake, not the HTTP verb.

Adding this catalog to Riposte

In Riposte → Integrations → Marketplace → Add source:

Field Value
Name Official marketplace
Git URL https://gitea.riposte-labs.com/f3nris/riposte-marketplace.git
Branch main
Provider Gitea (sets the right auth scheme for private repos)
Token a read-only token if the repo is private; leave empty if public

Then Sync. Discovered integrations appear in the marketplace, ready to install.


Contributing an integration

  1. Create integrations/<id>/manifest.yaml (one directory per integration).
  2. Add scripts/<command-id>.py only for script-based commands.
  3. Bump version (semver) on every change — Riposte tracks versions per source.
  4. Validate the YAML parses and id/name are set.
  5. Open a merge request.

See templates/manifest.example.yaml for a fully-commented starting point (that file is intentionally not ingested).

S
Description
No description provided
Readme 6.1 MiB
Languages
Python 100%