f3nris 1888648930 feat(rapid7-insightidr): feed the layout Process Tree block (v1.9.0)
Rapid7 exposes a process tree per alert; the layout renderer has a block that
draws one. They do not speak the same shape.

The block reads ctx.process_tree as N FLAT chains, root first, each
{alert_id, rule, host, user, nodes[]} — it merges shared ancestors itself.
Rapid7 answers with a NESTED tree: one root entity and children[]. So the
command walks each root-to-leaf path into its own chain, maps the node fields
(cmdline -> cmd_line, hashes.md5 -> md5, start_time -> started_at, pid coerced
from the string Rapid7 sends), and rolls every alert's chains up onto the
investigation, since the block reads the key at the top level and no mapper
expression reaches past alerts[0].

Verified through the block's own reader: a tree of explorer -> cmd ->
{bcdedit, vssadmin} flattens to two chains and comes back as one tree with the
ancestors shared and both leaves marked.

That mark is worth stating plainly. The block marks the last node of a chain as
the target, and Rapid7 flags no node as the one the alert fired on — so here it
means "end of this branch" and nothing stronger. Naming a target would assert
something the sensor never said.

Gated, because this is a third call per alert on top of the evidence one:
include_process_tree=auto (the default) asks only for the event types an
endpoint sensor produces a tree for, true asks for every alert, false never.
An authentication or firewall alert never has one, and on a feed where those
dominate the default saves a call per alert. 404 is treated as "no tree", which
is what it means, and only other statuses are recorded as errors. Bounded at 12
chains and 24 levels so an unexpected shape cannot expand without limit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 15:53:22 +02:00

Riposte Marketplace

Official catalog of integrations for the Riposte SOAR platform.

Riposte syncs this repository (a "git source") and lists every integration it finds so operators can install them in one click. Nothing here is executed at sync time — Riposte only reads manifests and scripts.


How discovery works

When Riposte syncs a source it does a shallow git clone of the selected branch and walks the whole tree looking for files named exactly manifest.yaml.

  • Each manifest.yaml is one integration. Its containing directory is the package root. Put one integration per directory.
  • Scripts are collected from the package directory and its scripts/ subdirectory: every *.py file becomes a command implementation, keyed by filename without the extension. So a command with id: get_ip_report is backed by get_ip_report.py.
  • Files not named manifest.yaml are ignored as integration roots, so templates like manifest.example.yaml are never ingested.
integrations/
└── <integration-id>/
    ├── manifest.yaml          # required — the integration definition
    └── scripts/               # optional — only for script-based commands
        └── <command-id>.py

Manifest schema (manifest.yaml)

id: my_integration            # required, unique, slug
name: My Integration          # required, human name
version: 1.0.0                # semver
description: What it does.
changelog: "1.1.0 — notes"   # optional: shown on update so operators can assess risk
category: enrichment          # free text (enrichment, containment, ticketing…)

# Per-instance configuration the operator fills when creating an instance.
# JSON-Schema shape: { properties: {...}, required: [...] }.
config_schema:
  properties:
    base_url:
      type: string            # string | number | boolean
      description: API base URL
      default: https://api.example.com/v1
    api_key:
      type: string
      description: API key
      x-soar-sensitive: true  # stored encrypted in the vault, never returned
  required:
    - api_key

# Authentication methods, referenced by commands via `auth_ref`.
auth:
  - id: apikey
    type: api_key             # api_key | bearer | basic | oauth2_client_credentials
    in: header                # header | query
    name: x-apikey            # header/query parameter name
    value_template: "{{secret}}"   # {{secret}} is replaced by the secret_field value
    secret_field: api_key     # which config_schema field holds the secret

commands:
  # --- Request-based command (recommended, no code) -----------------------
  - id: get_ip_report
    name: Get IP report
    description: Reputation for an IP address.
    risk: read                # read | safe_write | destructive — see below
    inputs_schema:
      properties:
        ip:
          type: string
          description: IP address to look up
      required:
        - ip
    outputs_schema:
      properties: {}
    request:
      method: GET             # GET | POST | PUT | PATCH | DELETE
      path: /ip/{ip}          # {ip} is filled from inputs
      query: []               # input names sent as query params
      body: []                # input names sent as JSON body fields
      auth_ref: apikey

  # --- Script-based command -----------------------------------------------
  # Omit `request` and provide scripts/<id>.py instead. The script receives the
  # resolved inputs + instance config and MUST print one JSON object to stdout.
  - id: enrich_custom
    name: Custom enrichment
    description: Runs scripts/enrich_custom.py in a sandbox.
    risk: read
    inputs_schema:
      properties:
        indicator:
          type: string
      required:
        - indicator
    outputs_schema:
      properties: {}

A command is request-based when it has a request: block, or script-based when a matching scripts/<command-id>.py exists. Prefer request-based commands: they need no sandbox and are easier to audit.

risk: — the agent approval gate

Every command declares a tier. It is what Riposte's agent approval gate reads: read runs unattended, safe_write and destructive sit behind the operator's configured threshold. An omitted risk is treated as destructive — safe, but it makes a lookup as noisy as an isolation, so declare it rather than default it.

Tier What belongs there
read Only queries. Changes nothing outside Riposte: lookups, searches, telemetry, fetching a job's result.
safe_write Additive or reversible, inside the tool's own case/enrichment plane: comments, notes, tags, tickets, alert statuses, threat-intel records, sandbox submissions, collection jobs, outbound messages.
destructive Changes the estate or weakens a control: containment and its removal, blocklists and allowlists, exclusions and detection rules, every delete, identity and credential operations, running code on a host, generic API escape hatches.

Two rules the catalog applies consistently, because they are not obvious:

  • Undoing a containment is tiered like the containment it lifts. Un-isolating a host or un-banning an IP mid-incident is its own decision, not a return to a neutral state.
  • Retrieving a live secret is destructive. It is a GET, but the tier describes the stake, not the HTTP verb.

Adding this catalog to Riposte

In Riposte → Integrations → Marketplace → Add source:

Field Value
Name Official marketplace
Git URL https://gitea.riposte-labs.com/f3nris/riposte-marketplace.git
Branch main
Provider Gitea (sets the right auth scheme for private repos)
Token a read-only token if the repo is private; leave empty if public

Then Sync. Discovered integrations appear in the marketplace, ready to install.


Contributing an integration

  1. Create integrations/<id>/manifest.yaml (one directory per integration).
  2. Add scripts/<command-id>.py only for script-based commands.
  3. Bump version (semver) on every change — Riposte tracks versions per source.
  4. Validate the YAML parses and id/name are set.
  5. Open a merge request.

See templates/manifest.example.yaml for a fully-commented starting point (that file is intentionally not ingested).

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