Files
riposte-marketplace/integrations/servicenow-iam/manifest.yaml
T
f3nris 45e9cbd269 feat: declare a risk tier on every command in the catalog
467 of the 1592 commands carried no `risk:`. An unset risk is read as
destructive by the agent approval gate, so half the catalog's write side sat
behind the same prompt — and, in HarfangLab's case, 39 pure lookups did too.
A gate that stops everything stops being read as a signal, which is the
argument already made for the toolkit and for sentinelone (df27876).

The catalog is now 1027 read, 261 safe_write, 304 destructive, with nothing
defaulted. The line follows the one sentinelone drew: impact on the estate,
not reversibility — isolate-agent is reversible and is the canonical
destructive example.

  read        only queries; changes nothing outside Riposte
  safe_write  additive or reversible inside the tool's own case/enrichment
              plane: comments, tickets, tags, alert statuses, threat-intel
              records, sandbox submissions, collection jobs, outbound messages
  destructive changes the estate or weakens a control: containment, blocklists
              and allowlists, exclusions and detection rules, every delete,
              identity and credential operations, code on a host, generic
              API escape hatches

Three calls that were not obvious, and are now applied throughout:

- Undoing a containment is tiered like the containment it lifts. Un-isolating
  a host or un-banning an IP mid-incident is its own decision, not a return to
  a neutral state. The catalog contradicted itself here — crowdstrike's
  lift_containment was destructive while harfanglab's deisolate_from_threat
  was safe_write — so deisolate_from_threat and unquarantine_file are
  re-tiered to destructive, the only two existing tiers this pass changes.
- Retrieving a live secret is destructive: cyberark get_password, delinea
  get_secret, vault read_secret, beyondtrust get_credential. It is a GET, but
  the tier describes the stake, not the HTTP verb.
- Sending outward to humans stays safe_write — slack, teams, twilio, telegram,
  mail. Irreversible, but it is the collaboration plane, not the estate.

An object created but not yet referenced by a rule is safe_write; editing one
a rule already reads is destructive. That is why fortigate create_address and
panos create_custom_url_category are safe_write while update_address_group and
edit_custom_url_category are not.

The template and README never documented the field, which is how 467 commands
came to omit it. Both now carry the tier table and these rules, so the next
integration declares a tier instead of inheriting one.

111 packages get a MINOR bump and a changelog entry: an instance compares
versions to offer an update, so an unbumped manifest would leave the tiers
sitting in the catalog and never reaching the estates that need them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 12:55:20 +02:00

145 lines
7.1 KiB
YAML

id: servicenow_iam
name: ServiceNow IAM
version: 1.1.0
description: "ServiceNow identity lifecycle (sys_user table) — look up, create and update employee accounts, enable/disable accounts (with lock-out clearing), and discover the available user fields for mapping. Basic or OAuth 2.0 (password grant) authentication."
changelog: "1.1.0 — Declare the risk tier on the 4 commands that carried none, all of them destructive. An unset risk was already gated as destructive, so the approval prompt does not move; what changes is that the tier is a stated decision rather than a default, and a command added later cannot inherit it by omission. | 1.0.0 — Initial release: get/create/update user, enable/disable user, user field discovery via sys_dictionary."
category: identity
# Per-instance configuration. The base URL is the instance root, e.g.
# https://company.service-now.com (scripts append /api/now).
config_schema:
properties:
url:
type: string
description: "ServiceNow instance URL, e.g. https://company.service-now.com"
auth_type:
type: string
description: "Authentication method: basic (username + password) or oauth (OAuth 2.0 password grant via /oauth_token.do — also requires client_id/client_secret)"
default: basic
username:
type: string
description: "ServiceNow username (needs read/write ACLs on the sys_user table)"
password:
type: string
description: "ServiceNow password"
x-soar-sensitive: true
client_id:
type: string
description: "OAuth client ID (oauth auth_type only — from an Application Registry entry)"
client_secret:
type: string
description: "OAuth client secret (oauth auth_type only)"
x-soar-sensitive: true
api_version:
type: string
description: "Optional REST API version segment (e.g. v2). Leave empty to use the unversioned endpoints."
required:
- url
- username
- password
# Documented for reference; the bundled scripts build the headers themselves.
# Basic: Authorization: Basic base64(username:password)
# OAuth: POST /oauth_token.do (grant_type=password) then Authorization: Bearer <access_token>
auth:
- id: basic
type: basic
username_field: username
password_field: password
# User resolution: every account command accepts user_id (sys_id), user_name or
# email — the first one provided wins, in that order.
commands:
- id: get_user
name: servicenow-iam-get-user
description: "Look up a user account by sys_id, username or email."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
user_id: { type: string, description: "User sys_id" }
user_name: { type: string, description: "Username (user_name field)" }
email: { type: string, description: "Email address" }
fields: { type: string, description: "Comma-separated fields to return (sys_id always included)" }
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: create_user
name: servicenow-iam-create-user
description: "Create a user account. Common fields have named inputs; anything else goes through fields/custom_fields."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
user_name: { type: string, description: "Username (user_name field)" }
email: { type: string, description: "Email address" }
first_name: { type: string, description: "First name" }
last_name: { type: string, description: "Last name" }
title: { type: string, description: "Job title" }
department: { type: string, description: "Department (sys_id or exact name)" }
manager: { type: string, description: "Manager (sys_id or exact user name)" }
phone: { type: string, description: "Business phone" }
mobile_phone: { type: string, description: "Mobile phone" }
active: { type: boolean, description: "Account active state (default true)" }
fields: { type: string, description: "Additional sys_user fields as name=value;name2=value2" }
custom_fields: { type: string, description: "Custom fields as name=value;name2=value2 (u_ prefix added when missing)" }
required: [user_name]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: update_user
name: servicenow-iam-update-user
description: "Update a user account resolved by sys_id, username or email."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
user_id: { type: string, description: "User sys_id" }
user_name: { type: string, description: "Username used to resolve the account when user_id is empty" }
email: { type: string, description: "Email used to resolve the account when user_id and user_name are empty" }
first_name: { type: string, description: "First name" }
last_name: { type: string, description: "Last name" }
title: { type: string, description: "Job title" }
department: { type: string, description: "Department (sys_id or exact name)" }
manager: { type: string, description: "Manager (sys_id or exact user name)" }
phone: { type: string, description: "Business phone" }
mobile_phone: { type: string, description: "Mobile phone" }
fields: { type: string, description: "Additional sys_user fields as name=value;name2=value2" }
custom_fields: { type: string, description: "Custom fields as name=value;name2=value2 (u_ prefix added when missing)" }
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: enable_user
name: servicenow-iam-enable-user
description: "Enable a user account (sets active=true and clears locked_out), resolved by sys_id, username or email."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
user_id: { type: string, description: "User sys_id" }
user_name: { type: string, description: "Username used to resolve the account when user_id is empty" }
email: { type: string, description: "Email used to resolve the account when user_id and user_name are empty" }
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: disable_user
name: servicenow-iam-disable-user
description: "Disable a user account (sets active=false), resolved by sys_id, username or email."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
user_id: { type: string, description: "User sys_id" }
user_name: { type: string, description: "Username used to resolve the account when user_id is empty" }
email: { type: string, description: "Email used to resolve the account when user_id and user_name are empty" }
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: list_user_fields
name: servicenow-iam-list-user-fields
description: "List the sys_user table fields (name and label) from the sys_dictionary — useful to build field mappings."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
limit: { type: number, description: "Maximum dictionary entries (default 500)" }
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: test_connection
name: servicenow-iam-test-connection
description: "Verify connectivity and credentials (used by the Test button)."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties: {}
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }