f3nris
45e9cbd269
467 of the 1592 commands carried no `risk:`. An unset risk is read as
destructive by the agent approval gate, so half the catalog's write side sat
behind the same prompt — and, in HarfangLab's case, 39 pure lookups did too.
A gate that stops everything stops being read as a signal, which is the
argument already made for the toolkit and for sentinelone (df27876).
The catalog is now 1027 read, 261 safe_write, 304 destructive, with nothing
defaulted. The line follows the one sentinelone drew: impact on the estate,
not reversibility — isolate-agent is reversible and is the canonical
destructive example.
read only queries; changes nothing outside Riposte
safe_write additive or reversible inside the tool's own case/enrichment
plane: comments, tickets, tags, alert statuses, threat-intel
records, sandbox submissions, collection jobs, outbound messages
destructive changes the estate or weakens a control: containment, blocklists
and allowlists, exclusions and detection rules, every delete,
identity and credential operations, code on a host, generic
API escape hatches
Three calls that were not obvious, and are now applied throughout:
- Undoing a containment is tiered like the containment it lifts. Un-isolating
a host or un-banning an IP mid-incident is its own decision, not a return to
a neutral state. The catalog contradicted itself here — crowdstrike's
lift_containment was destructive while harfanglab's deisolate_from_threat
was safe_write — so deisolate_from_threat and unquarantine_file are
re-tiered to destructive, the only two existing tiers this pass changes.
- Retrieving a live secret is destructive: cyberark get_password, delinea
get_secret, vault read_secret, beyondtrust get_credential. It is a GET, but
the tier describes the stake, not the HTTP verb.
- Sending outward to humans stays safe_write — slack, teams, twilio, telegram,
mail. Irreversible, but it is the collaboration plane, not the estate.
An object created but not yet referenced by a rule is safe_write; editing one
a rule already reads is destructive. That is why fortigate create_address and
panos create_custom_url_category are safe_write while update_address_group and
edit_custom_url_category are not.
The template and README never documented the field, which is how 467 commands
came to omit it. Both now carry the tier table and these rules, so the next
integration declares a tier instead of inheriting one.
111 packages get a MINOR bump and a changelog entry: an instance compares
versions to offer an update, so an unbumped manifest would leave the tiers
sitting in the catalog and never reaching the estates that need them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
99 lines
4.5 KiB
YAML
99 lines
4.5 KiB
YAML
# =============================================================================
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# Integration manifest template — copy to integrations/<id>/manifest.yaml
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# This file is named *.example.yaml on purpose so Riposte never ingests it
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# (only files named exactly "manifest.yaml" are picked up).
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# =============================================================================
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id: example_integration # required · unique slug · [a-z0-9_]
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name: Example Integration # required · shown in the UI
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version: 1.0.0 # semver · bump on every change
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description: One-line description of what this integration does.
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# changelog: shown to operators when an update is available, so they can assess
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# risk before updating. Describe notable/breaking changes for THIS version.
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changelog: "1.0.0 — Initial release."
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category: enrichment # free text: enrichment | containment | ticketing | ...
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# config_schema — per-instance settings the operator fills in when creating an
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# instance. JSON-Schema shape: { properties: {...}, required: [...] }.
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# Property fields: type (string|number|boolean), description, default,
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# and x-soar-sensitive: true for secrets (encrypted in the vault, never returned).
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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config_schema:
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properties:
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base_url:
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type: string
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description: API base URL
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default: https://api.example.com/v1
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api_key:
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type: string
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description: API key / token
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x-soar-sensitive: true
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required:
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- api_key
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# auth — authentication methods, referenced from commands via auth_ref.
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# value_template: {{secret}} is replaced by the value of secret_field.
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# api_key in header → name is the header (e.g. x-apikey, Authorization)
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# bearer → typically name: Authorization, value_template: "Bearer {{secret}}"
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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auth:
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- id: apikey
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type: api_key # api_key | bearer | basic | oauth2_client_credentials
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in: header # header | query
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name: Authorization
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value_template: "Bearer {{secret}}"
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secret_field: api_key
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commands:
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# Every command declares `risk:` — read | safe_write | destructive. It is what
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# the agent approval gate reads: `read` runs unattended, `safe_write` and
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# `destructive` sit behind the operator's configured threshold. An omitted
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# risk is treated as `destructive`, which is the safe default but makes a
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# lookup as noisy as an isolation, so declare it rather than let it default.
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# read — only queries; changes nothing outside Riposte
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# safe_write — additive or reversible: a comment, a ticket, a tag, a
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# sandbox submission, an alert status, a collection job
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# destructive — changes the estate or weakens a control: containment and
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# its removal, blocklists, exclusions, deletes, identity and
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# credential operations, running code on a host
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# --- Request-based command (recommended: declarative, no sandbox) ---------
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- id: lookup
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name: Lookup indicator
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description: Fetches a report for an indicator over HTTP.
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risk: read # required in practice · read | safe_write | destructive
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inputs_schema:
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properties:
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indicator:
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type: string
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description: The value to look up
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required:
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- indicator
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outputs_schema:
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properties: {}
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request:
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method: GET # GET | POST | PUT | PATCH | DELETE
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path: /lookup/{indicator} # {indicator} is substituted from inputs
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query: [] # input names to send as query params
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body: [] # input names to send as JSON body fields
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auth_ref: apikey
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# --- Script-based command -------------------------------------------------
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# No `request:` block. Provide scripts/<id>.py next to this manifest.
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# The script receives inputs in the global dict __inputs__ and MUST print
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# exactly one JSON object to stdout (that becomes the command output).
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# See templates/scripts/example_command.py.
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- id: example_command
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name: Example scripted command
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description: Demonstrates a Python-backed command.
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risk: read
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inputs_schema:
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properties:
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indicator:
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type: string
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required:
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- indicator
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outputs_schema:
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properties: {}
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