Files
riposte-marketplace/integrations/cyberark-pas/manifest.yaml
T
f3nris 45e9cbd269 feat: declare a risk tier on every command in the catalog
467 of the 1592 commands carried no `risk:`. An unset risk is read as
destructive by the agent approval gate, so half the catalog's write side sat
behind the same prompt — and, in HarfangLab's case, 39 pure lookups did too.
A gate that stops everything stops being read as a signal, which is the
argument already made for the toolkit and for sentinelone (df27876).

The catalog is now 1027 read, 261 safe_write, 304 destructive, with nothing
defaulted. The line follows the one sentinelone drew: impact on the estate,
not reversibility — isolate-agent is reversible and is the canonical
destructive example.

  read        only queries; changes nothing outside Riposte
  safe_write  additive or reversible inside the tool's own case/enrichment
              plane: comments, tickets, tags, alert statuses, threat-intel
              records, sandbox submissions, collection jobs, outbound messages
  destructive changes the estate or weakens a control: containment, blocklists
              and allowlists, exclusions and detection rules, every delete,
              identity and credential operations, code on a host, generic
              API escape hatches

Three calls that were not obvious, and are now applied throughout:

- Undoing a containment is tiered like the containment it lifts. Un-isolating
  a host or un-banning an IP mid-incident is its own decision, not a return to
  a neutral state. The catalog contradicted itself here — crowdstrike's
  lift_containment was destructive while harfanglab's deisolate_from_threat
  was safe_write — so deisolate_from_threat and unquarantine_file are
  re-tiered to destructive, the only two existing tiers this pass changes.
- Retrieving a live secret is destructive: cyberark get_password, delinea
  get_secret, vault read_secret, beyondtrust get_credential. It is a GET, but
  the tier describes the stake, not the HTTP verb.
- Sending outward to humans stays safe_write — slack, teams, twilio, telegram,
  mail. Irreversible, but it is the collaboration plane, not the estate.

An object created but not yet referenced by a rule is safe_write; editing one
a rule already reads is destructive. That is why fortigate create_address and
panos create_custom_url_category are safe_write while update_address_group and
edit_custom_url_category are not.

The template and README never documented the field, which is how 467 commands
came to omit it. Both now carry the tier table and these rules, so the next
integration declares a tier instead of inheriting one.

111 packages get a MINOR bump and a changelog entry: an instance compares
versions to offer an update, so an unbumped manifest would leave the tiers
sitting in the catalog and never reaching the estates that need them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 12:55:20 +02:00

147 lines
5.9 KiB
YAML

id: cyberark_pas
name: CyberArk PAS
version: 1.1.0
description: "CyberArk Privileged Access Security (PVWA REST API) — PAM containment and IR: list and read privileged accounts, rotate/verify/reconcile credentials (CPM), retrieve a password for incident response, add/delete accounts, and list safes and vault users. Session (logon) authentication; stdlib-only, no extra Python dependencies."
changelog: "1.1.0 — Declare the risk tier on the 6 commands that carried none: 2 safe_write, 4 destructive. An unset risk is read as destructive by the agent approval gate, so the 2 that only annotate sat behind the same prompt as the ones that change the estate. | 1.0.0 — Initial release: list/get accounts, change/verify/reconcile credentials, retrieve password, add/delete account, list safes, list users."
category: identity
# Per-instance configuration. Each command logs on to PVWA (returns a session
# token used as the Authorization header), performs the action, then logs off.
config_schema:
properties:
url:
type: string
description: "PVWA base URL (e.g. https://pvwa.example.com)"
username:
type: string
description: "Vault username"
password:
type: string
description: "Vault password"
x-soar-sensitive: true
auth_method:
type: string
description: "Logon method: Cyberark, LDAP, RADIUS, or Windows (default Cyberark)"
default: "Cyberark"
insecure:
type: boolean
description: "Trust any TLS certificate (not secure)"
default: false
required:
- url
- username
- password
commands:
- id: list_accounts
name: cyberark-list-accounts
description: "List/search privileged accounts."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
search: { type: string, description: "Free-text search (username, address, name)" }
filter: { type: string, description: "Filter expression (e.g. safeName eq MySafe)" }
limit: { type: number, description: "Max accounts (default 50)" }
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: get_account_details
name: cyberark-get-account-details
description: "Get a single account's details by account ID."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
account_id: { type: string, description: "Account ID" }
required: [account_id]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: change_credentials
name: cyberark-change-credentials
description: "Rotate an account's credential immediately to a new random password (CPM change). Use to contain a compromised privileged account."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
account_id: { type: string, description: "Account ID" }
change_entire_group: { type: boolean, description: "Also change dependent accounts in the group (default false)" }
required: [account_id]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: verify_credentials
name: cyberark-verify-credentials
description: "Mark an account's credential for verification by the CPM."
risk: safe_write
inputs_schema:
properties:
account_id: { type: string, description: "Account ID" }
required: [account_id]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: reconcile_credentials
name: cyberark-reconcile-credentials
description: "Mark an account's credential for reconciliation by the CPM."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
account_id: { type: string, description: "Account ID" }
required: [account_id]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: get_password
name: cyberark-get-password
description: "Retrieve an account's current password (for incident response). Requires a reason."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
account_id: { type: string, description: "Account ID" }
reason: { type: string, description: "Reason for retrieval (audited)" }
required: [account_id]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: add_account
name: cyberark-add-account
description: "Add a new privileged account to a safe."
risk: safe_write
inputs_schema:
properties:
name: { type: string, description: "Account name" }
address: { type: string, description: "Target machine address" }
user_name: { type: string, description: "Account username" }
platform_id: { type: string, description: "Platform ID (e.g. WinServerLocal)" }
safe_name: { type: string, description: "Safe name" }
secret: { type: string, description: "The password/secret to store" }
secret_type: { type: string, description: "password or key (default password)" }
required: [name, address, user_name, platform_id, safe_name]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: delete_account
name: cyberark-delete-account
description: "Delete an account by ID."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
account_id: { type: string, description: "Account ID" }
required: [account_id]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: list_safes
name: cyberark-list-safes
description: "List safes."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
search: { type: string, description: "Optional safe-name search" }
limit: { type: number, description: "Max safes (default 50)" }
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: list_users
name: cyberark-list-users
description: "List vault users."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
search: { type: string, description: "Optional username search" }
filter: { type: string, description: "Filter (e.g. userType eq EPVUser)" }
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: test_connection
name: cyberark-test-connection
description: "Verify connectivity and logon credentials (used by the Test button)."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties: {}
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }