HarfangLab's alert and threat list endpoints echo, on every call, the
catalogue of every filterable field — about 50 KB, unrelated to the
results. get_security_events, get_alerts and get_threats now drop it
before printing, so a fetch carries the alerts and little else.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CXFMuDDLohs4qnL12mBJoP
Since HarfangLab merged alerts and security events, a threat's events
are the alerts whose threat_key is the threat id — the filter the
vendor's XSOAR integration uses. get_alerts could filter on it but
stops at one page of 100; the new threat_security_events command pages
through up to max_results and returns the threat's total with a
truncated flag.
threat_status, threat_level and alert_tag offer their status and level
as drop-downs, and threat_status now reads as the place to close a
threat or mark it a false positive, HarfangLab's only verdict.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The agent collection is DRF-paginated, so `count` already carries the
filtered total. endpoint_count asks for limit=1 and reads it, instead of
pulling up to 10000 agent records back through the playbook the way
endpoint_search does — and endpoint_search only filters on hostname.
Filters cover the documented agent query parameters (hostname, network,
os, version, status, isolation_state, tenant), add lastseen/firstseen
bounds over the DRF range lookups, and keep a raw `filters` escape hatch
for anything else the instance accepts.
The API silently drops a query parameter it does not recognise as a
filter, which turns a typo into a plausible-looking fleet-wide total, so
the fleet `total` is returned next to `count` to make that case visible.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
467 of the 1592 commands carried no `risk:`. An unset risk is read as
destructive by the agent approval gate, so half the catalog's write side sat
behind the same prompt — and, in HarfangLab's case, 39 pure lookups did too.
A gate that stops everything stops being read as a signal, which is the
argument already made for the toolkit and for sentinelone (df27876).
The catalog is now 1027 read, 261 safe_write, 304 destructive, with nothing
defaulted. The line follows the one sentinelone drew: impact on the estate,
not reversibility — isolate-agent is reversible and is the canonical
destructive example.
read only queries; changes nothing outside Riposte
safe_write additive or reversible inside the tool's own case/enrichment
plane: comments, tickets, tags, alert statuses, threat-intel
records, sandbox submissions, collection jobs, outbound messages
destructive changes the estate or weakens a control: containment, blocklists
and allowlists, exclusions and detection rules, every delete,
identity and credential operations, code on a host, generic
API escape hatches
Three calls that were not obvious, and are now applied throughout:
- Undoing a containment is tiered like the containment it lifts. Un-isolating
a host or un-banning an IP mid-incident is its own decision, not a return to
a neutral state. The catalog contradicted itself here — crowdstrike's
lift_containment was destructive while harfanglab's deisolate_from_threat
was safe_write — so deisolate_from_threat and unquarantine_file are
re-tiered to destructive, the only two existing tiers this pass changes.
- Retrieving a live secret is destructive: cyberark get_password, delinea
get_secret, vault read_secret, beyondtrust get_credential. It is a GET, but
the tier describes the stake, not the HTTP verb.
- Sending outward to humans stays safe_write — slack, teams, twilio, telegram,
mail. Irreversible, but it is the collaboration plane, not the estate.
An object created but not yet referenced by a rule is safe_write; editing one
a rule already reads is destructive. That is why fortigate create_address and
panos create_custom_url_category are safe_write while update_address_group and
edit_custom_url_category are not.
The template and README never documented the field, which is how 467 commands
came to omit it. Both now carry the tier table and these rules, so the next
integration declares a tier instead of inheriting one.
111 packages get a MINOR bump and a changelog entry: an instance compares
versions to offer an update, so an unbumped manifest would leave the tiers
sitting in the catalog and never reaching the estates that need them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
image_name was left unmapped because HarfangLab prefixes it with the
matched threat name — "[PUADlManager:Win32/OfferCore] C:\Windows\
explorer.exe" — and the clean path was available from the event data.
That reasoning only held for event-log alerts. On the yara, binary and
ioc subtypes there is neither a `process` object nor an `eventlog`
block, so those alerts reached the incident with no process at all.
Both halves are now pulled out, each guarded on the bracket actually
being there: $substringBefore and $substringAfter return the whole
string when the pattern is absent, so without the guard an unprefixed
path would land verbatim in malware.name.
The three entries lead the process block so the more specific sources
below — the matched process object, then the event log's own fields —
still overwrite them when present. malware.name consequently surfaces on
every subtype instead of only where Defender is the source.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replayed a real get_alerts and a real get_threats response through the
bundled mappers to see what came out.
get_alerts: a sigma alert matching a Windows event log carries the whole
record under `eventlog`, and none of it was mapped. On a Defender 1116
detection that left the malware, the file, the acting user and the
detecting product invisible — the incident indexed a hostname and
nothing else. The event data uses the provider's own field names, spaces
included, so the new entries quote them with JSONata backticks, and
Defender's "file:_" path prefix is stripped. Also added the agent IP
(placed before details_connection.SourceIp so a network alert's own
source still wins), the DNS domain, device type, agent version and
groups, the tenant, the alert subtype and threat type, the string
severity and the event time.
get_threats: `level` had no entry at all, so a threat's severity never
reached the OCSF document even though field_mappings derived the
incident's 1-5 from it. Added it, the event time, and the top agent's
reachability — whether the endpoint is online decides what response is
possible, and it was excluded without a reason.
Both trailers now record why each remaining field is left out, and the
event log's own SYSTEM writer and FQDN spelling are called out: indexing
them would create a junk user entity and a second spelling of one host.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
cortex-xdr, crowdstrike, harfanglab and splunk now ship an `ingestion` block
(fetch command + bundled mapper + default incident type) and a bundled default
incident type under incident-types/, so the instance Collect section is pre-filled
on first configuration and the default type is created on install.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rename every command 'name' in the official integrations to a
<technology>-<command> slug (e.g. sentinelone-isolate-agent,
harfanglab-isolate-endpoint) so they group together when searching the
toolbox. Command IDs (and thus script files and action refs) are unchanged.
Bump both integrations to 1.1.0.
f3nris
Guillaume BOURGEOIS