Running the command on an alert reports `{"error": "HTTP 404", "detail": ""}`.
The API returns 404 with an empty body, so the operator is told a number and
nothing else — and cannot tell a normal answer from a fault.
It is usually normal, and the URL is not at fault: it is built exactly as
get_alert_evidence builds its own, which works. Rapid7 uses the same 404 for
three unrelated situations and does not distinguish them:
- the alert is not an endpoint detection, so no tree exists. This is the
common case on a feed of ingress_auth, asset_auth or firewall events;
- the tree exists in principle but was never generated. The endpoint returns
the CACHED tree unless force_refresh is set, so an ungenerated tree answers
404 while its data is there. Retrying with force_refresh=true is the first
thing to try on an endpoint detection;
- the key lacks the privilege.
All three are now named in the error, and the force_refresh input says what it
is really for rather than describing it only as a staleness control.
The ingestion path already handled this correctly — it treats 404 as "no tree"
and counts only other statuses as errors — so nothing changes there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rapid7 exposes a process tree per alert; the layout renderer has a block that
draws one. They do not speak the same shape.
The block reads ctx.process_tree as N FLAT chains, root first, each
{alert_id, rule, host, user, nodes[]} — it merges shared ancestors itself.
Rapid7 answers with a NESTED tree: one root entity and children[]. So the
command walks each root-to-leaf path into its own chain, maps the node fields
(cmdline -> cmd_line, hashes.md5 -> md5, start_time -> started_at, pid coerced
from the string Rapid7 sends), and rolls every alert's chains up onto the
investigation, since the block reads the key at the top level and no mapper
expression reaches past alerts[0].
Verified through the block's own reader: a tree of explorer -> cmd ->
{bcdedit, vssadmin} flattens to two chains and comes back as one tree with the
ancestors shared and both leaves marked.
That mark is worth stating plainly. The block marks the last node of a chain as
the target, and Rapid7 flags no node as the one the alert fired on — so here it
means "end of this branch" and nothing stronger. Naming a target would assert
something the sensor never said.
Gated, because this is a third call per alert on top of the evidence one:
include_process_tree=auto (the default) asks only for the event types an
endpoint sensor produces a tree for, true asks for every alert, false never.
An authentication or firewall alert never has one, and on a feed where those
dominate the default saves a call per alert. 404 is treated as "no tree", which
is what it means, and only other statuses are recorded as errors. Bounded at 12
chains and 24 levels so an unexpected shape cannot expand without limit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
An alert names what fired. The evidence is what happened, and until now it was
never fetched — which is why an incident could show a rule name and nothing
else. On a Fortigate admin login the alert carried an empty
rule_keys_of_interest; the evidence carried the whole event.
It cannot be reached by mapping alone. The evidence's `data` is a
JSON-ENCODED STRING holding {source_data, custom_data}, and JSONata does not
deserialise, so no mapper expression can ever see inside it. The parsing has to
happen in the command, and that is the reason for this change more than the
extra call is.
Once parsed, two views of the same event:
custom_data the vendor's normalised fields, prefixed per source
(Forti_user, Forti_srcip) — 6 keys on the sample
source_data the raw line in key="value" form — 25 keys
Both are merged into evidence_fields with the vendor prefix stripped, so a
mapper names `user` once instead of once per vendor, and source_data is overlaid
last because it carries more and is not affected by the quoting artefact below.
Values are cleaned, and that is not cosmetic: custom_data returns
'10.70.20.66"' with a trailing quote left by the vendor parser. Kept as-is it
yields an address matching no regex — an observable nobody can pivot on, and no
error to say why.
The line itself lands on raw_data and the source's own sentence on message,
both of which the layout builder offers. The Fortigate login now maps to
src_endpoint.ip, dst_endpoint.ip, actor.user.name, device.hostname/name/uid,
activity_name "login" and status_detail "success", and indexes four entities
where it indexed none.
Optional (include_evidence, default true) and capped (max_evidence_per_alert,
default 5), one call per alert under the run's existing time budget. An alert
whose evidence cannot be read keeps an evidence_error and still arrives;
evidence_calls and evidence_errors are reported in the run metadata.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
An RRN states its region — rrn:alerts:eu:<org>:alert:… — while the base URL is
built from the instance's configured `region`. Following that thread found a
gap that matters more than the naming.
The Alert Triage API is multi-region behind one gateway, and eleven of its
endpoints can answer HTTP 200 with a region_failures list. The spec is explicit:
the presence of items in that field IS the partial failure. Three of the
commands here call such endpoints and all three read only the payload, so a
region the gateway could not reach produced fewer alerts and nothing else — no
error, no count, no log line. For an ingestion feed that is indistinguishable
from a quiet period, which is the one failure mode this integration has now hit
three separate times.
So region_failures is carried into the run metadata by every command that can
receive it, alongside the regions actually seen in the collected RRNs, the
configured region, and any mismatch between them.
The mismatch report is deliberately a report and not a correction. On a
single-region tenant the two always agree. On a multi-customer key, which spans
organizations, they need not — and rewriting the host per resource would be a
guess about how Rapid7 routes these calls, made without a tenant to verify it
against. Naming the discrepancy is what can be done honestly today; if it ever
fires, the metadata says so instead of the alerts silently going missing.
list_alert_fields already passed region_failures through untouched, since it
returns the API response as it stands.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The run died with HTTP 400 and eight "The provided RRN: [...] is invalid",
every one a plain UUID. Two mistakes compounded.
The alert list under an investigation is not consistent about where the RRN
sits. On the ABA alert this work was built against, `id` held the RRN. On
others it holds a bare UUID. The code read `id` first and `rrn` only as a
fallback, so it picked the UUID whenever both were present.
Worse, the failure was total rather than partial. /alerts/ops/rrns validates the
whole list and rejects the entire request when one entry is malformed, so a
single bad identifier costs every alert in that batch — and with one batch, the
whole run. An investigation feed that stops dead because one alert is shaped
differently is not an acceptable failure mode.
So: read `rrn` first, and drop anything that is not RRN-shaped before the batch
is sent, counting it as alert_ids_without_rrn in the run metadata. The
investigation still arrives, its retrievable alerts still arrive, and what could
not be fetched is a number an operator can see rather than an absence nobody
would notice.
Both commands that walk this list are fixed; the selector is shared and was
checked against the two real shapes plus the empty and null cases.
This turns a total failure into a partial one. It does NOT establish that those
eight alerts are reachable at all: if they carry no RRN anywhere, they are not
in the Alert Triage system and no field_ids or batch call will produce them.
That needs the raw shape of one, which the next run of list_investigation_alerts
on the failing investigation will show.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous command returned the alerts as its result rows, which quietly
changed the unit: an investigation holding three alerts would have become three
incidents. The investigation is what an analyst opens and what the SOC tracks —
it stays the incident, and the alerts are its content.
get_investigations_full walks the same three hops and inverts the shape:
investigations under `data`, each carrying its alerts under `alerts` plus an
alert_count. results_path=data and dedup_key=rrn, so it is a drop-in replacement
for list_investigations in an existing ingestion rule — only the command name
and the mapper change.
A few first-alert values are also lifted to the top level, and that is not
cosmetic. MapFields resolves dotted paths only and cannot index an array, so
`alerts[0].ai_suggested_disposition` in a field_mappings entry reads as nothing
— silently, leaving the custom field empty with no error anywhere. Three custom
fields were empty for exactly that reason until an end-to-end run showed it. The
ocsf section has no such limit: it is evaluated by full JSONata and indexes
freely, which is why the host and process mappings worked while the custom
fields did not.
The mapper maps the investigation first and the first alert after, so the alert
wins wherever the container says nothing. It also lands every alert — not just
alerts[0] — as OCSF-shaped objects under `evidences`, because the extractor
walks arrays and classifies on the path suffix: an investigation aggregating
two alerts on two machines now indexes both hosts, where reading alerts[0]
alone would have indexed one and silently dropped the other.
Verified end to end against the investigation that started this, with a second
alert added on another host: field mapping, OCSF mapping and entity extraction.
Both hosts are indexed. With the incident type's extraction policy set to
selected/host,ip,user, the entity set is exactly those two — the alert RRN's
32-hex suffix, which the IOC regex cannot tell from an MD5, is filtered out
there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ingesting from search_alerts brings back every alert the tenant produces,
including the operational noise — two of the first three sampled were an agent
reporting it lacked Full Disk Access. What is worth an incident is what Rapid7
or the analyst folded into an investigation.
Filtering search_alerts on investigation_rrn does not work. The term is accepted
— no validation error, HTTP 200 — and matches nothing: zero alerts over fifteen
days, on a tenant where an alert carrying an investigation_rrn provably exists
in that window. The field is not searchable, and the API says so by returning an
empty page rather than by refusing the term. That failure mode is the reason not
to build an ingestion feed on it: a filter that silently stops matching drains
the feed to zero with no error anywhere, and nothing would ever say why.
search_investigation_alerts is guaranteed by construction instead:
1. the investigations in the window (incremental on their created_time)
2. their alert RRNs, one call per investigation — there is no bulk form
3. the alerts themselves via /alerts/ops/rrns, batched 100 at a time
So 1+N+1 calls, and an alert with no investigation is never even named. Its
failure modes are loud: an unreadable investigation is skipped and counted, and
HTTP errors surface as themselves.
Step 2 is the one that grows with the window, so it runs under a time budget
(60s, against the server's 90s ceiling) and reports truncated=true rather than
being killed with the whole run's alerts lost. A partial fetch that says it is
partial beats a silent zero — the same reasoning that rules out the filter.
The output shape matches search_alerts exactly, so the mapper committed in 1.2.0
serves both. It gains five entries for the parent investigation, which resolve
to nothing on the search_alerts feed and are skipped there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
json.loads answers a bad value with "Expecting value: line 1 column 1 (char 0)",
which names neither the input at fault nor what it actually received. The
command has three string inputs; nothing in that message says which one broke,
so the operator is left guessing.
The mistake it hides is the obvious one. Documentation shows the input name and
the value together, so `terms_json: [{...}]` gets pasted whole into the value
field, and the parser then chokes on the field name it was handed. Echoing the
first 80 characters back makes that visible immediately.
Also carry a worked example in the manifest — the term that keeps only alerts
attached to an investigation, which is the filter this input mainly exists for —
and say explicitly to paste the array alone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bare call answered HTTP 400:
root path with path depth greater than 1 is not supported for V2
without a search filter
Sending neither path nor path_depth asks the V2 fields endpoint to walk the
whole hierarchy from the root, which it refuses. That is exactly the call an
operator makes first — open the command, run it, see what the tenant exposes —
so the one entry point into this API failed on its most obvious use.
Default path_depth to 1 when neither path nor search is given: the top-level
nodes come back, and `path` drills down from there. Also expose the `search`
query parameter, which was missing from the command entirely and which lifts
the depth restriction — it is the way to look through the whole tree at once
for a field whose branch you do not know yet (search=hostname).
Found by running the command against a live tenant. The 400 also settles the
open question from v1.1.0: the API answered a validation error rather than
403, so the Alert Triage API is reachable with this key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
An ingested investigation carried almost nothing: title, priority, status,
assignee and timestamps. Not a host, not an account, not a command line — so
no entity was ever indexed, and neither the pivot graph nor the AI analysis
had anything to read. Fetching the investigation's alerts did not help: that
endpoint answers with the rule name (already the investigation's title), the
alert source and an alert RRN, and nothing else.
The detection content lives in a different API. The Alert Triage API is served
under /idr/at — its own base, next to /idr/v1 and /idr/v2 — and it is where
the evidence, the actors, the MITRE T-codes and the process trees actually
are. It was missing from this package entirely.
Six read commands:
search_alerts POST /alerts/ops/search
get_alert GET /alerts/{rrn}
get_alert_evidence GET /alerts/{rrn}/evidences
get_alert_actors GET /alerts/{rrn}/actors
get_alert_process_trees POST /alerts/{rrn}/process_trees/latest
list_alert_fields GET /alerts/2/fields
search_alerts is the one that changes the shape of the feed. It returns full
alert objects — rule with its mitre_tcodes, rule_keys_of_interest, the
AI-suggested disposition, the parent investigation RRN, the status transition
timings and the log entries behind the alert — and its start_time is required
by the API, which makes it a natural incremental watermark. So the alerts can
be read directly, paginated, with no per-investigation fan-out.
Two things worth knowing before using them:
- field_ids is not optional in practice. The API returns no additional
fields when it is empty, and those additional fields are where the
hostnames, accounts and command lines are. Their ids are per-tenant dotted
paths (process.cmd_line, …), which is what list_alert_fields is for.
/alerts/fields is deprecated, hence /alerts/2/fields.
- the whole API is gated on Managed Detection and Response with access to
the Alerts experience. A key that works on every investigation endpoint
can still be refused here, so 401 and 403 are reported with that named
explanation rather than as a bare status code — a licence boundary should
not read as a bug.
Written against the published OpenAPI spec (SIEM Alerts API 39.10.0); not yet
exercised against a live tenant.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
REST API integration for Rapid7 InsightIDR. Investigation ingestion
(list_investigations) with an exhaustive OCSF mapper and a bundled default
incident type, plus 18 commands across investigations (list/get/search/
create/update/assign/set-status/bulk-close), investigation alerts and Rapid7
product alerts, custom threat indicators (add/replace), log management and
LEQL log/log-set queries with downloads, and user directory search.
API v1/v2 selectable per instance (is_v2) and per command (api_version);
multi-customer query parameter supported on v2 calls.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
f3nris
Guillaume BOURGEOIS