feat: declare a risk tier on every command in the catalog

467 of the 1592 commands carried no `risk:`. An unset risk is read as
destructive by the agent approval gate, so half the catalog's write side sat
behind the same prompt — and, in HarfangLab's case, 39 pure lookups did too.
A gate that stops everything stops being read as a signal, which is the
argument already made for the toolkit and for sentinelone (df27876).

The catalog is now 1027 read, 261 safe_write, 304 destructive, with nothing
defaulted. The line follows the one sentinelone drew: impact on the estate,
not reversibility — isolate-agent is reversible and is the canonical
destructive example.

  read        only queries; changes nothing outside Riposte
  safe_write  additive or reversible inside the tool's own case/enrichment
              plane: comments, tickets, tags, alert statuses, threat-intel
              records, sandbox submissions, collection jobs, outbound messages
  destructive changes the estate or weakens a control: containment, blocklists
              and allowlists, exclusions and detection rules, every delete,
              identity and credential operations, code on a host, generic
              API escape hatches

Three calls that were not obvious, and are now applied throughout:

- Undoing a containment is tiered like the containment it lifts. Un-isolating
  a host or un-banning an IP mid-incident is its own decision, not a return to
  a neutral state. The catalog contradicted itself here — crowdstrike's
  lift_containment was destructive while harfanglab's deisolate_from_threat
  was safe_write — so deisolate_from_threat and unquarantine_file are
  re-tiered to destructive, the only two existing tiers this pass changes.
- Retrieving a live secret is destructive: cyberark get_password, delinea
  get_secret, vault read_secret, beyondtrust get_credential. It is a GET, but
  the tier describes the stake, not the HTTP verb.
- Sending outward to humans stays safe_write — slack, teams, twilio, telegram,
  mail. Irreversible, but it is the collaboration plane, not the estate.

An object created but not yet referenced by a rule is safe_write; editing one
a rule already reads is destructive. That is why fortigate create_address and
panos create_custom_url_category are safe_write while update_address_group and
edit_custom_url_category are not.

The template and README never documented the field, which is how 467 commands
came to omit it. Both now carry the tier table and these rules, so the next
integration declares a tier instead of inheriting one.

111 packages get a MINOR bump and a changelog entry: an instance compares
versions to offer an update, so an unbumped manifest would leave the tiers
sitting in the catalog and never reaching the estates that need them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

integrations/trend-vision-one/manifest.yaml

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 id: trend_vision_one
 name: Trend Vision One
-version: 1.0.0
+version: 1.1.0
 description: "Trend Micro Vision One (XDR, API v3.0) — endpoint containment and threat response: list endpoints, isolate/restore an endpoint, terminate a process, list and read Workbench alerts, and add/remove suspicious objects (block hash/URL/IP/domain). Bearer-token authentication; stdlib-only, no extra Python dependencies."
-changelog: "1.0.0 — Initial release: list endpoints, isolate/restore endpoint, terminate process, list/get Workbench alerts, add/remove suspicious object."
+changelog: "1.1.0 — Declare the risk tier on the 5 commands that carried none, all of them destructive. An unset risk was already gated as destructive, so the approval prompt does not move; what changes is that the tier is a stated decision rather than a default, and a command added later cannot inherit it by omission. | 1.0.0 — Initial release: list endpoints, isolate/restore endpoint, terminate process, list/get Workbench alerts, add/remove suspicious object."
 category: endpoint
 
 # Per-instance configuration. The API token is sent as 'Authorization: Bearer <api_token>'.
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ commands:
   - id: isolate_endpoint
     name: tmv1-isolate-endpoint
     description: "Isolate an endpoint from the network (containment)."
+    risk: destructive
     inputs_schema:
       properties:
         endpoint_name: { type: string, description: "Endpoint hostname (provide this or agent_guid)" }
@@ -44,6 +45,7 @@ commands:
   - id: restore_endpoint
     name: tmv1-restore-endpoint
     description: "Restore (un-isolate) an endpoint's network connection."
+    risk: destructive
     inputs_schema:
       properties:
         endpoint_name: { type: string, description: "Endpoint hostname (provide this or agent_guid)" }
@@ -54,6 +56,7 @@ commands:
   - id: terminate_process
     name: tmv1-terminate-process
     description: "Terminate a process on an endpoint by file SHA-1."
+    risk: destructive
     inputs_schema:
       properties:
         endpoint_name: { type: string, description: "Endpoint hostname (provide this or agent_guid)" }
@@ -89,6 +92,7 @@ commands:
   - id: add_to_block_list
     name: tmv1-add-to-block-list
     description: "Add a suspicious object (file SHA-1, URL, IP, domain, or sender) to the block list."
+    risk: destructive
     inputs_schema:
       properties:
         object_type: { type: string, description: "One of: fileSha1, url, ip, domain, senderMailAddress" }
@@ -99,6 +103,7 @@ commands:
   - id: remove_from_block_list
     name: tmv1-remove-from-block-list
     description: "Remove a suspicious object from the block list."
+    risk: destructive
     inputs_schema:
       properties:
         object_type: { type: string, description: "One of: fileSha1, url, ip, domain, senderMailAddress" }