Files
riposte-marketplace/integrations/cisco-fmc/manifest.yaml
T
f3nris 45e9cbd269 feat: declare a risk tier on every command in the catalog
467 of the 1592 commands carried no `risk:`. An unset risk is read as
destructive by the agent approval gate, so half the catalog's write side sat
behind the same prompt — and, in HarfangLab's case, 39 pure lookups did too.
A gate that stops everything stops being read as a signal, which is the
argument already made for the toolkit and for sentinelone (df27876).

The catalog is now 1027 read, 261 safe_write, 304 destructive, with nothing
defaulted. The line follows the one sentinelone drew: impact on the estate,
not reversibility — isolate-agent is reversible and is the canonical
destructive example.

  read        only queries; changes nothing outside Riposte
  safe_write  additive or reversible inside the tool's own case/enrichment
              plane: comments, tickets, tags, alert statuses, threat-intel
              records, sandbox submissions, collection jobs, outbound messages
  destructive changes the estate or weakens a control: containment, blocklists
              and allowlists, exclusions and detection rules, every delete,
              identity and credential operations, code on a host, generic
              API escape hatches

Three calls that were not obvious, and are now applied throughout:

- Undoing a containment is tiered like the containment it lifts. Un-isolating
  a host or un-banning an IP mid-incident is its own decision, not a return to
  a neutral state. The catalog contradicted itself here — crowdstrike's
  lift_containment was destructive while harfanglab's deisolate_from_threat
  was safe_write — so deisolate_from_threat and unquarantine_file are
  re-tiered to destructive, the only two existing tiers this pass changes.
- Retrieving a live secret is destructive: cyberark get_password, delinea
  get_secret, vault read_secret, beyondtrust get_credential. It is a GET, but
  the tier describes the stake, not the HTTP verb.
- Sending outward to humans stays safe_write — slack, teams, twilio, telegram,
  mail. Irreversible, but it is the collaboration plane, not the estate.

An object created but not yet referenced by a rule is safe_write; editing one
a rule already reads is destructive. That is why fortigate create_address and
panos create_custom_url_category are safe_write while update_address_group and
edit_custom_url_category are not.

The template and README never documented the field, which is how 467 commands
came to omit it. Both now carry the tier table and these rules, so the next
integration declares a tier instead of inheriting one.

111 packages get a MINOR bump and a changelog entry: an instance compares
versions to offer an update, so an unbumped manifest would leave the tiers
sitting in the catalog and never reaching the estates that need them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 12:55:20 +02:00

103 lines
4.1 KiB
YAML

id: cisco_fmc
name: Cisco Firepower Management Center
version: 1.1.0
description: "Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC REST API) — firewall containment: list and create/delete network host objects, list access policies and rules, and add a block access rule. Token authentication (generatetoken); stdlib-only, no extra Python dependencies."
changelog: "1.1.0 — Declare the risk tier on the 3 commands that carried none: 1 safe_write, 2 destructive. An unset risk is read as destructive by the agent approval gate, so the 1 that only annotate sat behind the same prompt as the ones that change the estate. | 1.0.0 — Initial release: list/create/delete host objects, list access policies/rules, create block access rule."
category: network
# Per-instance configuration. Auth calls generatetoken with HTTP Basic and reuses
# the returned X-auth-access-token and DOMAIN_UUID (default domain).
config_schema:
properties:
base_url:
type: string
description: "FMC base URL (e.g. https://fmc.example.com)"
username:
type: string
description: "FMC username"
password:
type: string
description: "FMC password"
x-soar-sensitive: true
insecure:
type: boolean
description: "Trust any TLS certificate (not secure)"
default: false
required:
- base_url
- username
- password
commands:
- id: list_host_objects
name: fmc-list-host-objects
description: "List network host objects."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
limit: { type: number, description: "Max objects (default 50)" }
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: create_host_object
name: fmc-create-host-object
description: "Create a network host object."
risk: safe_write
inputs_schema:
properties:
name: { type: string, description: "Object name" }
value: { type: string, description: "Host IP address" }
description: { type: string, description: "Optional description" }
required: [name, value]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: delete_host_object
name: fmc-delete-host-object
description: "Delete a network host object by ID."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
object_id: { type: string, description: "Host object ID" }
required: [object_id]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: list_access_policies
name: fmc-list-access-policies
description: "List access control policies."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
limit: { type: number, description: "Max policies (default 50)" }
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: list_access_rules
name: fmc-list-access-rules
description: "List the access rules of an access control policy."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
policy_id: { type: string, description: "Access control policy ID" }
limit: { type: number, description: "Max rules (default 50)" }
required: [policy_id]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: create_access_rule
name: fmc-create-access-rule
description: "Add an access rule to a policy (e.g. a BLOCK rule for source/destination network objects)."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
policy_id: { type: string, description: "Access control policy ID" }
name: { type: string, description: "Rule name" }
action: { type: string, description: "ALLOW, TRUST, or BLOCK (default BLOCK)" }
source_object_ids: { type: string, description: "Comma-separated source network object IDs (optional)" }
destination_object_ids: { type: string, description: "Comma-separated destination network object IDs (optional)" }
enabled: { type: boolean, description: "Enable the rule (default true)" }
required: [policy_id, name]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: test_connection
name: fmc-test-connection
description: "Verify connectivity and credentials via generatetoken (used by the Test button)."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties: {}
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }