42032e576e
1.2.0 rewrote /1.0 to /v1 whenever a service account was in use, reasoning from a documentation example that showed OAuth2 against a /v1 path. It was wrong, and it was the cause of the 404s and the 500 that followed: OVH's own API console issues Bearer requests against /1.0, while /v1 — which exists, and answers 401 unauthenticated like any live route — answers 500 with an empty body for a token on the telephony routes. A failure with no message at all, produced by a helpful rewrite nobody asked for. The endpoint is now whatever was typed, for both authentication schemes. The config field says where to copy it from. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TN1R4EnNFUV2Xwtd9q98tj
156 lines
6.3 KiB
Python
156 lines
6.3 KiB
Python
import json, os, sys, hashlib, time, urllib.parse, urllib.request, urllib.error
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _cfg():
|
|
return json.loads(os.environ.get("INTEGRATION_SECRETS", "{}"))
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _inputs():
|
|
return json.loads(os.environ.get("INTEGRATION_INPUTS", "{}"))
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ── authentication ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
#
|
|
# TWO SCHEMES, because OVHcloud now offers two and an operator does not always get
|
|
# to choose. The historical one signs each request with an application key/secret
|
|
# plus a consumer key. The newer SERVICE ACCOUNT is OAuth2 client-credentials, and
|
|
# it is what the control panel offers when application keys are not available on
|
|
# the account.
|
|
#
|
|
# Which one is in use is decided by what was filled in, not by a mode selector:
|
|
# a client_id and a client_secret mean the service account, anything else falls
|
|
# back to the signed scheme. One less field to get wrong, and an instance created
|
|
# before service accounts existed keeps working untouched.
|
|
_TOKEN_HOSTS = {
|
|
"eu": "https://www.ovh.com",
|
|
"ca": "https://ca.ovh.com",
|
|
"us": "https://us.ovhcloud.com",
|
|
}
|
|
_CACHE = {}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _oauth(cfg):
|
|
return bool(str(cfg.get("client_id") or "").strip() and str(cfg.get("client_secret") or "").strip())
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _endpoint(cfg):
|
|
"""The API base, exactly as configured.
|
|
|
|
IT USED TO REWRITE /1.0 TO /v1 FOR A SERVICE ACCOUNT, on the strength of a
|
|
documentation example that showed OAuth2 against a /v1 path. That was wrong and
|
|
cost two rounds of debugging: OVH's own API console issues Bearer requests
|
|
against /1.0, and /v1 — which exists, and answers 401 unauthenticated like any
|
|
live route — answers 500 with an empty body for a token on the telephony
|
|
routes. A failure with no message, produced by a helpful rewrite nobody asked
|
|
for.
|
|
|
|
So the endpoint is now whatever was typed, for both schemes. Both spellings
|
|
work for the signed scheme; only the configured one is used, and OVH's console
|
|
is the place to copy it from.
|
|
"""
|
|
return (str(cfg.get("endpoint") or "https://eu.api.ovh.com/1.0")).rstrip("/")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _token_url(cfg):
|
|
explicit = str(cfg.get("oauth_token_url") or "").strip()
|
|
if explicit:
|
|
return explicit
|
|
host = urllib.parse.urlparse(_endpoint(cfg)).netloc
|
|
region = host.split(".")[0] if host else "eu"
|
|
return _TOKEN_HOSTS.get(region, _TOKEN_HOSTS["eu"]) + "/auth/oauth2/token"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _bearer(cfg):
|
|
"""The service account's access token.
|
|
|
|
CACHED FOR THE LIFE OF THE PROCESS, which is not a micro-optimisation: publishing
|
|
an on-call ladder makes a dozen or more API calls, and a token request in front
|
|
of each one would triple the traffic and the time — on the path that runs every
|
|
time the rota turns.
|
|
"""
|
|
if _CACHE.get("token"):
|
|
return _CACHE["token"]
|
|
data = urllib.parse.urlencode({
|
|
"grant_type": "client_credentials",
|
|
"client_id": str(cfg.get("client_id", "")).strip(),
|
|
"client_secret": str(cfg.get("client_secret", "")).strip(),
|
|
# The scope the service account was granted in the control panel is what
|
|
# actually bounds it; "all" here asks for everything that account may do.
|
|
# Narrow the SERVICE ACCOUNT's own IAM policy rather than this value.
|
|
"scope": "all",
|
|
}).encode("utf-8")
|
|
req = urllib.request.Request(
|
|
_token_url(cfg), data=data, method="POST",
|
|
headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "Accept": "application/json"})
|
|
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as r:
|
|
payload = json.loads(r.read() or b"{}")
|
|
token = payload.get("access_token")
|
|
if not token:
|
|
raise Exception("the service account returned no access token: " + json.dumps(payload)[:200])
|
|
_CACHE["token"] = token
|
|
return token
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _time_offset(cfg):
|
|
"""Seconds between this clock and OVH's, read once.
|
|
|
|
The signature carries a timestamp and OVH refuses one that has drifted, so the
|
|
server's own time is the safe source. Read ONCE and applied as an offset rather
|
|
than fetched per request: the ladder makes many calls, and an extra round trip
|
|
in front of each was doubling them.
|
|
"""
|
|
if "offset" not in _CACHE:
|
|
req = urllib.request.Request(_endpoint(cfg) + "/auth/time", method="GET")
|
|
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as r:
|
|
server = int(r.read().decode("utf-8", "replace").strip())
|
|
_CACHE["offset"] = server - int(time.time())
|
|
return _CACHE["offset"]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def request(method, path, cfg, body=None):
|
|
url = _endpoint(cfg) + path
|
|
body_str = json.dumps(body) if body is not None else ""
|
|
headers = {"Accept": "application/json"}
|
|
if _oauth(cfg):
|
|
headers["Authorization"] = "Bearer " + _bearer(cfg)
|
|
else:
|
|
app_key = str(cfg.get("application_key", "")).strip()
|
|
app_secret = str(cfg.get("application_secret", "")).strip()
|
|
consumer = str(cfg.get("consumer_key", "")).strip()
|
|
if not (app_key and app_secret and consumer):
|
|
raise Exception(
|
|
"this instance has no credentials: fill in either a service account "
|
|
"(client_id + client_secret) or the application key, secret and consumer key")
|
|
ts = str(int(time.time()) + _time_offset(cfg))
|
|
to_sign = app_secret + "+" + consumer + "+" + method.upper() + "+" + url + "+" + body_str + "+" + ts
|
|
headers["X-Ovh-Application"] = app_key
|
|
headers["X-Ovh-Consumer"] = consumer
|
|
headers["X-Ovh-Timestamp"] = ts
|
|
headers["X-Ovh-Signature"] = "$1$" + hashlib.sha1(to_sign.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
|
|
data = None
|
|
if body is not None:
|
|
data = body_str.encode("utf-8")
|
|
headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
|
|
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, headers=headers, method=method)
|
|
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=60) as r:
|
|
raw = r.read()
|
|
return json.loads(raw) if raw else {}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _run(fn):
|
|
try:
|
|
print(json.dumps(fn(_cfg(), _inputs())))
|
|
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
|
|
print(json.dumps({"error": "HTTP " + str(e.code), "detail": e.read().decode("utf-8", "replace")}))
|
|
sys.exit(1)
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
print(json.dumps({"error": str(e)}))
|
|
sys.exit(1)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def main(cfg, inputs):
|
|
return request("GET", "/me", cfg)
|
|
|
|
|
|
_run(main)
|