Files
riposte-marketplace/integrations/checkpoint/manifest.yaml
T
f3nris 45e9cbd269 feat: declare a risk tier on every command in the catalog
467 of the 1592 commands carried no `risk:`. An unset risk is read as
destructive by the agent approval gate, so half the catalog's write side sat
behind the same prompt — and, in HarfangLab's case, 39 pure lookups did too.
A gate that stops everything stops being read as a signal, which is the
argument already made for the toolkit and for sentinelone (df27876).

The catalog is now 1027 read, 261 safe_write, 304 destructive, with nothing
defaulted. The line follows the one sentinelone drew: impact on the estate,
not reversibility — isolate-agent is reversible and is the canonical
destructive example.

  read        only queries; changes nothing outside Riposte
  safe_write  additive or reversible inside the tool's own case/enrichment
              plane: comments, tickets, tags, alert statuses, threat-intel
              records, sandbox submissions, collection jobs, outbound messages
  destructive changes the estate or weakens a control: containment, blocklists
              and allowlists, exclusions and detection rules, every delete,
              identity and credential operations, code on a host, generic
              API escape hatches

Three calls that were not obvious, and are now applied throughout:

- Undoing a containment is tiered like the containment it lifts. Un-isolating
  a host or un-banning an IP mid-incident is its own decision, not a return to
  a neutral state. The catalog contradicted itself here — crowdstrike's
  lift_containment was destructive while harfanglab's deisolate_from_threat
  was safe_write — so deisolate_from_threat and unquarantine_file are
  re-tiered to destructive, the only two existing tiers this pass changes.
- Retrieving a live secret is destructive: cyberark get_password, delinea
  get_secret, vault read_secret, beyondtrust get_credential. It is a GET, but
  the tier describes the stake, not the HTTP verb.
- Sending outward to humans stays safe_write — slack, teams, twilio, telegram,
  mail. Irreversible, but it is the collaboration plane, not the estate.

An object created but not yet referenced by a rule is safe_write; editing one
a rule already reads is destructive. That is why fortigate create_address and
panos create_custom_url_category are safe_write while update_address_group and
edit_custom_url_category are not.

The template and README never documented the field, which is how 467 commands
came to omit it. Both now carry the tier table and these rules, so the next
integration declares a tier instead of inheriting one.

111 packages get a MINOR bump and a changelog entry: an instance compares
versions to offer an update, so an unbumped manifest would leave the tiers
sitting in the catalog and never reaching the estates that need them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 12:55:20 +02:00

106 lines
4.2 KiB
YAML

id: checkpoint
name: Check Point
version: 1.1.0
description: "Check Point Management (Web API) — firewall containment: list and add host objects, view the access rulebase, add a drop rule (block), publish changes, and install policy. Session (login) authentication; stdlib-only, no extra Python dependencies."
changelog: "1.1.0 — Declare the risk tier on the 4 commands that carried none: 1 safe_write, 3 destructive. An unset risk is read as destructive by the agent approval gate, so the 1 that only annotate sat behind the same prompt as the ones that change the estate. | 1.0.0 — Initial release: show/add hosts, show access rulebase, add access rule (drop), publish, install policy."
category: network
# Per-instance configuration. Each command logs in to the Management API
# (returns a session id used as the X-chkp-sid header), performs the action,
# then logs out. Publishing/installing is explicit (separate commands).
config_schema:
properties:
server_url:
type: string
description: "Management server URL (e.g. https://mgmt.example.com)"
username:
type: string
description: "Management API username"
password:
type: string
description: "Management API password"
x-soar-sensitive: true
domain:
type: string
description: "Domain (for Multi-Domain Management; leave empty otherwise)"
insecure:
type: boolean
description: "Trust any TLS certificate (not secure)"
default: false
required:
- server_url
- username
- password
commands:
- id: show_hosts
name: checkpoint-show-hosts
description: "List host objects."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
limit: { type: number, description: "Max hosts (default 50)" }
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: add_host
name: checkpoint-add-host
description: "Create a host object."
risk: safe_write
inputs_schema:
properties:
name: { type: string, description: "Host object name" }
ip_address: { type: string, description: "Host IP address" }
required: [name, ip_address]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: show_access_rulebase
name: checkpoint-show-access-rulebase
description: "Show the access rulebase of a policy layer."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
layer: { type: string, description: "Access layer name (e.g. Network)" }
limit: { type: number, description: "Max rules (default 50)" }
required: [layer]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: add_access_rule
name: checkpoint-add-access-rule
description: "Add an access rule to a layer (e.g. a Drop rule to block a source)."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
layer: { type: string, description: "Access layer name" }
name: { type: string, description: "Rule name" }
position: { type: string, description: "Position (e.g. top, bottom, or a number; default top)" }
source: { type: string, description: "Source object name (e.g. a host)" }
destination: { type: string, description: "Destination object name (default Any)" }
action: { type: string, description: "Accept, Drop, or Reject (default Drop)" }
required: [layer, name]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: publish
name: checkpoint-publish
description: "Publish the current session's changes."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties: {}
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: install_policy
name: checkpoint-install-policy
description: "Install a policy package on gateway targets."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
policy_package: { type: string, description: "Policy package name" }
targets: { type: string, description: "Comma-separated gateway target names" }
required: [policy_package, targets]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: test_connection
name: checkpoint-test-connection
description: "Verify connectivity and credentials by logging in (used by the Test button)."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties: {}
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }