Files
riposte-marketplace/integrations/tenable-io/manifest.yaml
T
f3nris 45e9cbd269 feat: declare a risk tier on every command in the catalog
467 of the 1592 commands carried no `risk:`. An unset risk is read as
destructive by the agent approval gate, so half the catalog's write side sat
behind the same prompt — and, in HarfangLab's case, 39 pure lookups did too.
A gate that stops everything stops being read as a signal, which is the
argument already made for the toolkit and for sentinelone (df27876).

The catalog is now 1027 read, 261 safe_write, 304 destructive, with nothing
defaulted. The line follows the one sentinelone drew: impact on the estate,
not reversibility — isolate-agent is reversible and is the canonical
destructive example.

  read        only queries; changes nothing outside Riposte
  safe_write  additive or reversible inside the tool's own case/enrichment
              plane: comments, tickets, tags, alert statuses, threat-intel
              records, sandbox submissions, collection jobs, outbound messages
  destructive changes the estate or weakens a control: containment, blocklists
              and allowlists, exclusions and detection rules, every delete,
              identity and credential operations, code on a host, generic
              API escape hatches

Three calls that were not obvious, and are now applied throughout:

- Undoing a containment is tiered like the containment it lifts. Un-isolating
  a host or un-banning an IP mid-incident is its own decision, not a return to
  a neutral state. The catalog contradicted itself here — crowdstrike's
  lift_containment was destructive while harfanglab's deisolate_from_threat
  was safe_write — so deisolate_from_threat and unquarantine_file are
  re-tiered to destructive, the only two existing tiers this pass changes.
- Retrieving a live secret is destructive: cyberark get_password, delinea
  get_secret, vault read_secret, beyondtrust get_credential. It is a GET, but
  the tier describes the stake, not the HTTP verb.
- Sending outward to humans stays safe_write — slack, teams, twilio, telegram,
  mail. Irreversible, but it is the collaboration plane, not the estate.

An object created but not yet referenced by a rule is safe_write; editing one
a rule already reads is destructive. That is why fortigate create_address and
panos create_custom_url_category are safe_write while update_address_group and
edit_custom_url_category are not.

The template and README never documented the field, which is how 467 commands
came to omit it. Both now carry the tier table and these rules, so the next
integration declares a tier instead of inheriting one.

111 packages get a MINOR bump and a changelog entry: an instance compares
versions to offer an update, so an unbumped manifest would leave the tiers
sitting in the catalog and never reaching the estates that need them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 12:55:20 +02:00

109 lines
4.0 KiB
YAML

id: tenable_io
name: Tenable Vulnerability Management
version: 1.1.0
description: "Tenable Vulnerability Management (Tenable.io API) — asset and vulnerability context for incidents: list and read assets, list vulnerabilities and per-asset vulnerabilities, read vulnerability (plugin) details, and list/launch/status scans. API-key (access/secret) authentication; stdlib-only, no extra Python dependencies."
changelog: "1.1.0 — Declare the risk tier on the 1 command that carried none, all of them destructive. An unset risk was already gated as destructive, so the approval prompt does not move; what changes is that the tier is a stated decision rather than a default, and a command added later cannot inherit it by omission. | 1.0.0 — Initial release: list/get assets, list vulnerabilities, per-asset vulnerabilities, vulnerability details, list scans, scan status, launch scan."
category: vulnerability
# Per-instance configuration. Keys are sent as
# 'X-ApiKeys: accessKey=<access_key>; secretKey=<secret_key>'.
config_schema:
properties:
url:
type: string
description: "Tenable.io API base URL"
default: "https://cloud.tenable.com"
access_key:
type: string
description: "Tenable API access key"
x-soar-sensitive: true
secret_key:
type: string
description: "Tenable API secret key"
x-soar-sensitive: true
required:
- access_key
- secret_key
commands:
- id: list_assets
name: tenable-list-assets
description: "List assets."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties: {}
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: get_asset
name: tenable-get-asset
description: "Get a single asset's details by UUID."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
asset_uuid: { type: string, description: "Asset UUID" }
required: [asset_uuid]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: asset_vulnerabilities
name: tenable-asset-vulnerabilities
description: "List the vulnerabilities found on a single asset."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
asset_uuid: { type: string, description: "Asset UUID" }
required: [asset_uuid]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: list_vulnerabilities
name: tenable-list-vulnerabilities
description: "List vulnerabilities across the workbench (optionally filtered by severity age)."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
age: { type: number, description: "Only vulnerabilities seen in the last N days (default 30)" }
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: get_vulnerability
name: tenable-get-vulnerability
description: "Get details for a vulnerability (Nessus plugin) by plugin ID."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
plugin_id: { type: string, description: "Nessus plugin ID" }
required: [plugin_id]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: list_scans
name: tenable-list-scans
description: "List scans."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties: {}
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: get_scan_status
name: tenable-get-scan-status
description: "Get the status of a scan."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
scan_id: { type: string, description: "Scan ID" }
required: [scan_id]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: launch_scan
name: tenable-launch-scan
description: "Launch a scan."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
scan_id: { type: string, description: "Scan ID to launch" }
targets: { type: string, description: "Optional comma-separated alternate targets" }
required: [scan_id]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: test_connection
name: tenable-test-connection
description: "Verify connectivity and the API keys (used by the Test button)."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties: {}
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }