Files
riposte-marketplace/integrations/mimecast/manifest.yaml
T
f3nris 45e9cbd269 feat: declare a risk tier on every command in the catalog
467 of the 1592 commands carried no `risk:`. An unset risk is read as
destructive by the agent approval gate, so half the catalog's write side sat
behind the same prompt — and, in HarfangLab's case, 39 pure lookups did too.
A gate that stops everything stops being read as a signal, which is the
argument already made for the toolkit and for sentinelone (df27876).

The catalog is now 1027 read, 261 safe_write, 304 destructive, with nothing
defaulted. The line follows the one sentinelone drew: impact on the estate,
not reversibility — isolate-agent is reversible and is the canonical
destructive example.

  read        only queries; changes nothing outside Riposte
  safe_write  additive or reversible inside the tool's own case/enrichment
              plane: comments, tickets, tags, alert statuses, threat-intel
              records, sandbox submissions, collection jobs, outbound messages
  destructive changes the estate or weakens a control: containment, blocklists
              and allowlists, exclusions and detection rules, every delete,
              identity and credential operations, code on a host, generic
              API escape hatches

Three calls that were not obvious, and are now applied throughout:

- Undoing a containment is tiered like the containment it lifts. Un-isolating
  a host or un-banning an IP mid-incident is its own decision, not a return to
  a neutral state. The catalog contradicted itself here — crowdstrike's
  lift_containment was destructive while harfanglab's deisolate_from_threat
  was safe_write — so deisolate_from_threat and unquarantine_file are
  re-tiered to destructive, the only two existing tiers this pass changes.
- Retrieving a live secret is destructive: cyberark get_password, delinea
  get_secret, vault read_secret, beyondtrust get_credential. It is a GET, but
  the tier describes the stake, not the HTTP verb.
- Sending outward to humans stays safe_write — slack, teams, twilio, telegram,
  mail. Irreversible, but it is the collaboration plane, not the estate.

An object created but not yet referenced by a rule is safe_write; editing one
a rule already reads is destructive. That is why fortigate create_address and
panos create_custom_url_category are safe_write while update_address_group and
edit_custom_url_category are not.

The template and README never documented the field, which is how 467 commands
came to omit it. Both now carry the tier table and these rules, so the next
integration declares a tier instead of inheriting one.

111 packages get a MINOR bump and a changelog entry: an instance compares
versions to offer an update, so an unbumped manifest would leave the tiers
sitting in the catalog and never reaching the estates that need them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 12:55:20 +02:00

149 lines
5.9 KiB
YAML

id: mimecast
name: Mimecast
version: 1.1.0
description: "Mimecast (Email Security API) — anti-phishing containment: list/release/reject held messages, search messages and get message info, block URLs (managed URLs), block senders, create remediation incidents, and decode rewritten URLs. HMAC-SHA1 signed authentication; stdlib-only, no extra Python dependencies."
changelog: "1.1.0 — Declare the risk tier on the 5 commands that carried none, all of them destructive. An unset risk was already gated as destructive, so the approval prompt does not move; what changes is that the tier is a stated decision rather than a default, and a command added later cannot inherit it by omission. | 1.0.0 — Initial release: held-message list/release/reject, message search + info, managed URL create/list, block sender, create remediation, URL decode."
category: email
# Per-instance configuration. Requests are signed (HMAC-SHA1) with the
# application + access/secret keys.
config_schema:
properties:
base_url:
type: string
description: "Mimecast API base URL (e.g. https://eu-api.mimecast.com)"
app_id:
type: string
description: "Application ID"
app_key:
type: string
description: "Application Key"
x-soar-sensitive: true
access_key:
type: string
description: "Access Key"
x-soar-sensitive: true
secret_key:
type: string
description: "Secret Key (base64)"
x-soar-sensitive: true
required:
- base_url
- app_id
- app_key
- access_key
- secret_key
commands:
- id: list_held_messages
name: mimecast-list-held-messages
description: "List messages currently held for review."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
admin: { type: boolean, description: "List all held messages (admin view) vs. the account's own (default true)" }
limit: { type: number, description: "Max messages (default 100)" }
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: release_held_message
name: mimecast-release-held-message
description: "Release a held message for delivery."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
message_id: { type: string, description: "Held message ID" }
required: [message_id]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: reject_held_message
name: mimecast-reject-held-message
description: "Reject a held message."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
message_id: { type: string, description: "Held message ID" }
reason: { type: string, description: "Optional rejection reason" }
required: [message_id]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: search_messages
name: mimecast-search-messages
description: "Search tracked messages by sender, recipient, or subject."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
from: { type: string, description: "Sender address filter" }
to: { type: string, description: "Recipient address filter" }
subject: { type: string, description: "Subject filter" }
start: { type: string, description: "ISO-8601 start time" }
end: { type: string, description: "ISO-8601 end time" }
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: get_message_info
name: mimecast-get-message-info
description: "Get delivery and processing details for a tracked message."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
message_id: { type: string, description: "Message ID" }
required: [message_id]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: create_managed_url
name: mimecast-create-managed-url
description: "Add a URL to the managed URL list (block or permit)."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
url: { type: string, description: "URL to manage" }
action: { type: string, description: "block or permit (default block)" }
match_type: { type: string, description: "explicit or domain (default explicit)" }
comment: { type: string, description: "Optional comment" }
required: [url]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: list_managed_urls
name: mimecast-list-managed-urls
description: "List managed URLs (block/permit list)."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties: {}
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: block_sender
name: mimecast-block-sender
description: "Block (or permit) a sender for a recipient."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
sender: { type: string, description: "Sender address to block/permit" }
recipient: { type: string, description: "Recipient address the rule applies to" }
action: { type: string, description: "block or permit (default block)" }
required: [sender, recipient]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: create_remediation
name: mimecast-create-remediation
description: "Create a remediation incident to pull malicious messages from mailboxes."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
message_hash: { type: string, description: "File hash to remediate (provide this or message_id)" }
message_id: { type: string, description: "Message ID / internet message ID to remediate" }
reason: { type: string, description: "Reason for remediation" }
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: decode_url
name: mimecast-decode-url
description: "Decode a Mimecast-rewritten URL back to its original form."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
url: { type: string, description: "Rewritten URL to decode" }
required: [url]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: test_connection
name: mimecast-test-connection
description: "Verify connectivity and the signed credentials (used by the Test button)."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties: {}
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }