f3nris
1888648930
Rapid7 exposes a process tree per alert; the layout renderer has a block that
draws one. They do not speak the same shape.
The block reads ctx.process_tree as N FLAT chains, root first, each
{alert_id, rule, host, user, nodes[]} — it merges shared ancestors itself.
Rapid7 answers with a NESTED tree: one root entity and children[]. So the
command walks each root-to-leaf path into its own chain, maps the node fields
(cmdline -> cmd_line, hashes.md5 -> md5, start_time -> started_at, pid coerced
from the string Rapid7 sends), and rolls every alert's chains up onto the
investigation, since the block reads the key at the top level and no mapper
expression reaches past alerts[0].
Verified through the block's own reader: a tree of explorer -> cmd ->
{bcdedit, vssadmin} flattens to two chains and comes back as one tree with the
ancestors shared and both leaves marked.
That mark is worth stating plainly. The block marks the last node of a chain as
the target, and Rapid7 flags no node as the one the alert fired on — so here it
means "end of this branch" and nothing stronger. Naming a target would assert
something the sensor never said.
Gated, because this is a third call per alert on top of the evidence one:
include_process_tree=auto (the default) asks only for the event types an
endpoint sensor produces a tree for, true asks for every alert, false never.
An authentication or firewall alert never has one, and on a feed where those
dominate the default saves a call per alert. 404 is treated as "no tree", which
is what it means, and only other statuses are recorded as errors. Bounded at 12
chains and 24 levels so an unexpected shape cannot expand without limit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
474 lines
20 KiB
Python
474 lines
20 KiB
Python
import json, os, sys, urllib.request, urllib.parse, urllib.error
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# The Alert Triage API lives under /idr/at, a base of its own — not /idr/v1 or
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# /idr/v2 like the investigation endpoints. Same host, same API key.
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AT = "idr/at/"
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def _cfg():
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s = json.loads(os.environ.get("INTEGRATION_SECRETS", "{}"))
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region = str(s.get("region") or "us").strip().lower()
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base = "https://" + region + ".api.insight.rapid7.com/"
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headers = {"X-Api-Key": s.get("api_key", ""), "Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"}
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multi = str(s.get("is_multi_customer") or "").strip().lower() in ("1", "true", "yes")
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return base, headers, multi
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def _cfg_region():
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return str(json.loads(os.environ.get("INTEGRATION_SECRETS", "{}")).get("region") or "us").strip().lower()
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def _inputs():
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return json.loads(os.environ.get("INTEGRATION_INPUTS", "{}"))
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def _list(v):
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if v in (None, ""):
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return []
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if isinstance(v, list):
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return [str(x).strip() for x in v if str(x).strip()]
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return [p.strip() for p in str(v).split(",") if p.strip()]
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def request(method, path, params=None, body=None):
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base, headers, _ = _cfg()
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url = base + path.lstrip("/")
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if params:
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clean = {k: v for k, v in params.items() if v not in (None, "")}
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if clean:
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url += ("&" if "?" in url else "?") + urllib.parse.urlencode(clean, doseq=True)
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data = json.dumps(body).encode("utf-8") if body is not None else None
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req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, headers=headers, method=method)
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with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=90) as r:
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raw = r.read()
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return json.loads(raw) if raw else {}
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import re
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import time
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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ISO = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ"
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RRN_BATCH = 100
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DEFAULT_BUDGET_S = 60
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# idr/v2/investigations answers with 13 fields, three of them null: a title, a
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# priority, a status, an assignee and timestamps. No host, no account, no
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# process, no MITRE code — and not one of the alerts the investigation
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# aggregates. An incident built from it indexes zero entities, so it cannot be
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# pivoted on, cannot be correlated, and gives an analyst nothing to read.
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#
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# The detection content is two hops away: the investigation's alert list gives
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# RRNs, and the Alert Triage API turns those into alerts carrying
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# rule_keys_of_interest (the host, the process, its command line, its parent,
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# the hashes) and rule.mitre_tcodes. This command walks both hops and returns
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# the investigation with its alerts inlined, so the INVESTIGATION stays the unit
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# that becomes an incident — results_path = data, dedup on rrn, exactly as the
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# plain investigation feed. Only the command changes.
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def _alert_rrn(a):
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"""The alert's RRN, or None when this alert has none.
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The investigation alert list is not consistent about where the RRN sits.
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Some entries carry it in `id` (rrn:alerts:eu:<org>:alert:1:<hex>); others put
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a plain UUID there and the RRN, if any, in `rrn`. `rrn` is therefore read
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first, and anything that is not RRN-shaped is dropped rather than sent on.
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That last part is not defensive habit. /alerts/ops/rrns validates the whole
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list and rejects the entire request when one entry is malformed, so a single
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UUID slipping through costs every alert in the batch — which is exactly how
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this failed: HTTP 400, eight invalid RRNs, zero alerts fetched, the whole run
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lost. Dropping them here means the investigation still arrives, with its
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unretrievable alerts counted rather than silently missing.
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"""
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for v in (a.get("rrn"), a.get("id")):
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if isinstance(v, str) and v.startswith("rrn:"):
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return v
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return None
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def _rrn_region(rrn):
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"""The region segment of an RRN, or None.
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An RRN is rrn:<service>:<region>:<org>:<type>:… — so a resource states which
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region it lives in, while the base URL is built from the instance's
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configured region. Those two agree on a single-region tenant and need not on
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a multi-customer key, which spans organizations.
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"""
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parts = str(rrn or "").split(":")
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return parts[2] if len(parts) > 4 and parts[0] == "rrn" and parts[2] else None
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def _collect_region_failures(out, sink):
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"""Carry a partial failure out of a response instead of dropping it.
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The Alert Triage API answers HTTP 200 with a region_failures list when it
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could not reach one of the regions behind the request — the spec says the
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presence of items there IS the partial failure. Reading only the payload
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turns that into missing alerts with no error anywhere, which for an
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ingestion feed is indistinguishable from a quiet period.
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"""
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for f in (out.get("region_failures") or []):
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sink.append(f)
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return out
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# key="value" / key=value, the shape syslog-derived log lines take. Non-matching
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# sources simply yield nothing, which is the right answer for them.
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_KV = re.compile(r'([A-Za-z_][\w.\-]*)=("(?:[^"\\]|\\.)*"|\S+)')
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def _clean(v):
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"""Strip the quoting Rapid7's parser leaves behind.
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custom_data values arrive as '10.70.20.66"' — a trailing quote from the
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vendor parser. Left alone it produces an IP that matches no regex and an
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entity nobody can pivot on, so the cleanup is not cosmetic.
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"""
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v = str(v).strip()
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if len(v) >= 2 and v[0] == '"' and v[-1] == '"':
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v = v[1:-1]
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return v.replace('\\"', '"').strip().strip('"')
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def _evidence_fields(ev):
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"""One evidence's log line as a flat, normalised dict.
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`data` is a JSON-encoded STRING holding {source_data, custom_data} — the
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actual event behind the alert. JSONata cannot deserialise, so a mapper can
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never reach into it; this is why the parsing has to happen here.
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custom_data is the vendor's normalised view, its keys prefixed per source
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(Forti_user, Forti_srcip). The prefix is stripped so a mapper can name
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`user` once rather than once per vendor. source_data is the raw line and is
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overlaid on top: it carries far more keys (25 against 6 on the sample this
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was written from) and it is not affected by the quoting artefact above.
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"""
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raw = ev.get("data")
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if not isinstance(raw, str) or not raw.strip():
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return {}, None
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try:
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blob = json.loads(raw)
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except ValueError:
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# Not JSON: keep the string itself as the raw line rather than lose it.
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return {}, raw
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if not isinstance(blob, dict):
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return {}, raw
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fields = {}
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custom = blob.get("custom_data")
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if isinstance(custom, dict):
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for k, v in custom.items():
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if not isinstance(v, (str, int, float)):
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continue
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key = k.split("_", 1)[1] if "_" in k else k
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fields[key.lower()] = _clean(v)
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source = blob.get("source_data")
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if isinstance(source, str):
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for k, v in _KV.findall(source):
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fields[k.lower()] = _clean(v)
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return fields, (source if isinstance(source, str) else raw)
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# Event types worth asking a process tree for. The endpoint sensor produces one;
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# an authentication or firewall alert never will, and on a feed where those
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# dominate, asking anyway is one wasted call per alert. include_process_tree=true
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# overrides this and asks for every alert.
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_PROCESS_EVENT_TYPES = {
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"process_start_event", "advanced_malware", "virus",
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"endpoint_activity", "file_modification", "local_service_installed",
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}
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# Guards on a tree of unknown shape: a wide one would otherwise expand into more
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# chains than anybody reads, and a cycle would not terminate at all.
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_MAX_CHAINS = 12
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_MAX_DEPTH = 24
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def _flatten_tree(root, out, path=None, depth=0):
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"""Rapid7 nests a process tree through `children`; the layout block reads a
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flat chain, root first. So each root-to-leaf path becomes one chain.
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The block marks the LAST node of a chain as the target. Rapid7 flags no node
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as the one the alert fired on, so that mark means "end of this branch" here
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and nothing stronger — inventing a target would assert something the sensor
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never said.
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"""
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if not isinstance(root, dict) or depth > _MAX_DEPTH or len(out) >= _MAX_CHAINS:
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return
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name = root.get("name")
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node = {}
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if name:
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node["name"] = str(name)
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if root.get("cmdline"):
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node["cmd_line"] = str(root["cmdline"])
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pid = root.get("pid")
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if pid not in (None, ""):
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try:
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node["pid"] = int(str(pid))
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except ValueError:
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pass
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h = root.get("hashes") or {}
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if isinstance(h, dict):
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for k in ("md5", "sha256"):
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if h.get(k):
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node[k] = str(h[k])
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if root.get("start_time") not in (None, ""):
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node["started_at"] = root["start_time"]
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if root.get("username"):
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node["_username"] = str(root["username"])
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chain = (path or []) + ([node] if node else [])
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children = [c for c in (root.get("children") or []) if isinstance(c, dict)]
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if not children:
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if chain:
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out.append(chain)
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return
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for c in children:
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_flatten_tree(c, out, chain, depth + 1)
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def _tree_chains(payload, alert):
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"""The process_tree block's own shape: N chains, each with its nodes."""
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chains = []
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for tree in (payload.get("process_trees") or []):
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if not isinstance(tree, dict):
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continue
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paths = []
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_flatten_tree(tree.get("process_tree"), paths)
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for nodes in paths:
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user = ""
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for n in nodes:
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user = n.pop("_username", user) or user
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if not nodes:
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continue
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chain = {"nodes": nodes, "alert_id": tree.get("alert_rrn") or alert.get("rrn")}
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if user:
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chain["user"] = user
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if alert.get("type"):
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chain["rule"] = alert["type"]
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host = (alert.get("evidence_fields") or {}).get("devname") or (alert.get("evidence_fields") or {}).get("hostname")
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if not host:
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for kv in (alert.get("rule_keys_of_interest") or []):
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if kv.get("key") == "hostname" and kv.get("values"):
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host = kv["values"][0]
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if host:
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chain["host"] = host
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chains.append(chain)
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if len(chains) >= _MAX_CHAINS:
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return chains
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return chains
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def run():
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_, _, multi = _cfg()
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inp = _inputs()
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limit = int(inp.get("limit") or 50)
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max_alerts = int(inp.get("max_alerts") or 500)
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budget = float(inp.get("time_budget_seconds") or DEFAULT_BUDGET_S)
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started = time.monotonic()
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start_time = inp.get("start_time")
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if not start_time:
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days = int(inp.get("default_days") or 1)
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start_time = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=days)).strftime(ISO)
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inv_page = request("GET", "idr/v2/investigations", params={
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"index": inp.get("index") or "0",
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"size": inp.get("page_size") or limit,
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"statuses": inp.get("statuses"),
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"priorities": inp.get("priorities"),
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"start_time": start_time,
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"end_time": inp.get("end_time"),
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"sort_field": "Created time",
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"sort_direction": "ASC",
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"multi-customer": "true" if multi else None,
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})
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investigations = (inv_page.get("data") or [])[:limit]
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# Alert RRNs per investigation. One call each — there is no bulk form — so
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# this is the step that grows with the window, and the one the time budget
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# guards. An investigation whose alerts cannot be read keeps its place in the
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# output with an alerts_error: losing the whole run over one of them, or
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# dropping it silently, would both be worse.
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rrns_by_inv, order, truncated, skipped = {}, [], False, 0
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region_failures, regions_seen = [], set()
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for inv in investigations:
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inv_rrn = inv.get("rrn") or ""
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if not inv_rrn:
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continue
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if time.monotonic() - started > budget or len(order) >= max_alerts:
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truncated = True
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break
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try:
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page = request("GET", "idr/v2/investigations/" + urllib.parse.quote(inv_rrn, safe="") + "/alerts",
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params={"multi-customer": "true" if multi else None})
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except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
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inv["alerts_error"] = "HTTP " + str(e.code)
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continue
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got = []
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for a in (page.get("data") or []):
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rrn = _alert_rrn(a)
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if rrn is None:
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skipped += 1
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continue
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got.append(rrn)
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r = _rrn_region(rrn)
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if r:
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regions_seen.add(r)
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if rrn not in order:
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order.append(rrn)
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rrns_by_inv[inv_rrn] = got
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# The alerts themselves, batched, then indexed so each investigation can be
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# handed its own.
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field_ids = _list(inp.get("field_ids"))
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by_rrn = {}
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for i in range(0, len(order), RRN_BATCH):
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body = {"rrns": order[i:i + RRN_BATCH]}
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if field_ids:
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body["field_ids"] = field_ids
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out = _collect_region_failures(request("POST", AT + "alerts/ops/rrns", body=body), region_failures)
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for a in (out.get("alerts") or []):
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if a.get("rrn"):
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by_rrn[a["rrn"]] = a
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# ④ The evidence behind each alert: the actual log line. An alert names what
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# fired; the evidence is what happened. One call per alert — there is no
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# bulk form — so it is optional, capped, and under the same time budget.
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evidence_calls, evidence_errors = 0, 0
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if str(inp.get("include_evidence") or "true").strip().lower() in ("1", "true", "yes"):
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per_alert = int(inp.get("max_evidence_per_alert") or 5)
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for rrn, a in by_rrn.items():
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if time.monotonic() - started > budget:
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truncated = True
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break
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try:
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page = request("GET", AT + "alerts/" + urllib.parse.quote(rrn, safe="") + "/evidences",
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params={"index": "0", "size": per_alert})
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evidence_calls += 1
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except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
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a["evidence_error"] = "HTTP " + str(e.code)
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evidence_errors += 1
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continue
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evs = (page.get("evidences") or [])[:per_alert]
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for ev in evs:
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ev["fields"], ev["raw_line"] = _evidence_fields(ev)
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a["evidences"] = evs
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if evs:
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# Lifted for the mapper: MapFields cannot index an array, and the
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# ocsf section reads alerts[0] only.
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a["evidence_fields"] = evs[0].get("fields") or {}
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a["evidence_raw_line"] = evs[0].get("raw_line")
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# ⑤ Process trees. A third call per alert, so it is gated: "auto" asks only
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# for the event types an endpoint sensor produces one for, "true" asks
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# always, "false" never. Chains are attached to the alert AND to the
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# investigation, because the layout block reads ctx.process_tree at the
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# top level.
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tree_mode = str(inp.get("include_process_tree") or "auto").strip().lower()
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tree_calls, tree_errors = 0, 0
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if tree_mode != "false":
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for rrn, a in by_rrn.items():
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if time.monotonic() - started > budget:
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truncated = True
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break
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if tree_mode == "auto" and str(a.get("triggering_event_type") or "") not in _PROCESS_EVENT_TYPES:
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continue
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try:
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page = request("POST", AT + "alerts/" + urllib.parse.quote(rrn, safe="") + "/process_trees/latest",
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params={"index": "0", "size": "5"})
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tree_calls += 1
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except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
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# 404 is the normal answer for an alert that has no tree, not a
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# fault: recorded only when it is something else.
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if e.code != 404:
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a["process_tree_error"] = "HTTP " + str(e.code)
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tree_errors += 1
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continue
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chains = _tree_chains(page, a)
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if chains:
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a["process_tree"] = chains
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fetched = 0
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for inv in investigations:
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rrns = rrns_by_inv.get(inv.get("rrn") or "", [])
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alerts = [by_rrn[r] for r in rrns if r in by_rrn]
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inv["alerts"] = alerts
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inv["alert_count"] = len(rrns)
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# The block reads ctx.process_tree at the top level and draws one chain
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# per alert, so every alert's chains are gathered here rather than left
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# nested where no mapper expression could reach past alerts[0].
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rolled = []
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for a in alerts:
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rolled.extend(a.get("process_tree") or [])
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if rolled:
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inv["process_tree"] = rolled[:_MAX_CHAINS]
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# Say it when the alert list is a sample: alert_count is what the
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# investigation actually has, len(alerts) what this run retrieved.
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if len(alerts) < len(rrns):
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inv["alerts_truncated"] = True
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fetched += len(alerts)
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# Lift a few first-alert values to the top level. The incident-field
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# mapper resolves dotted paths only — it cannot index an array — so
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# `alerts[0].ai_suggested_disposition` in a field_mappings entry reads as
|
|
# nothing, silently, and the custom field arrives empty with no error
|
|
# anywhere. The OCSF entries are evaluated by full JSONata and do not
|
|
# need this; only field_mappings does.
|
|
if alerts:
|
|
a = alerts[0]
|
|
log = (a.get("log_details") or [{}])[0]
|
|
inv.update({
|
|
"first_alert_rrn": a.get("rrn"),
|
|
"first_alert_type": a.get("type"),
|
|
"first_alert_source": a.get("external_source"),
|
|
"first_alert_status": a.get("status"),
|
|
"first_alert_disposition": a.get("disposition"),
|
|
"first_alert_ai_disposition": a.get("ai_suggested_disposition"),
|
|
"first_alert_event_type": a.get("triggering_event_type"),
|
|
"first_alert_rule_rrn": (a.get("rule") or {}).get("rrn"),
|
|
"first_alert_log_id": log.get("log_id"),
|
|
"first_alert_logset_id": log.get("logset_id"),
|
|
"first_alert_log_entry_id": log.get("log_entry_id"),
|
|
})
|
|
ef = a.get("evidence_fields") or {}
|
|
if ef:
|
|
inv["first_evidence_message"] = ef.get("msg") or ef.get("logdesc") or ef.get("message")
|
|
inv["first_evidence_raw_line"] = a.get("evidence_raw_line")
|
|
|
|
print(json.dumps({
|
|
"data": investigations,
|
|
"metadata": {
|
|
"investigations_returned": len(investigations),
|
|
"alert_rrns_collected": len(order),
|
|
"alerts_fetched": fetched,
|
|
"evidence_calls": evidence_calls,
|
|
"evidence_errors": evidence_errors,
|
|
"process_tree_calls": tree_calls,
|
|
"process_tree_errors": tree_errors,
|
|
"alert_ids_without_rrn": skipped,
|
|
"truncated": truncated,
|
|
# HTTP 200 with a non-empty region_failures is a PARTIAL result:
|
|
# alerts from that region are simply absent. Surfaced so a shrinking
|
|
# feed has a cause attached to it.
|
|
"region_failures": region_failures,
|
|
"regions_seen": sorted(regions_seen),
|
|
"configured_region": _cfg_region(),
|
|
"region_mismatch": sorted(r for r in regions_seen if r != _cfg_region()),
|
|
"elapsed_seconds": round(time.monotonic() - started, 1),
|
|
},
|
|
}))
|
|
|
|
|
|
try:
|
|
run()
|
|
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
|
|
detail = e.read().decode("utf-8", "replace")
|
|
if e.code in (401, 403):
|
|
detail += (" — the Alert Triage API (/idr/at) is only available to Managed Detection and"
|
|
" Response customers with access to the Alerts experience; a key that works on"
|
|
" the investigation endpoints can still be refused here")
|
|
print(json.dumps({"error": "HTTP " + str(e.code), "detail": detail}))
|
|
sys.exit(1)
|
|
except Exception as e:
|
|
print(json.dumps({"error": str(e)}))
|
|
sys.exit(1)
|