Files
riposte-marketplace/integrations/azure-security/manifest.yaml
T
f3nris 45e9cbd269 feat: declare a risk tier on every command in the catalog
467 of the 1592 commands carried no `risk:`. An unset risk is read as
destructive by the agent approval gate, so half the catalog's write side sat
behind the same prompt — and, in HarfangLab's case, 39 pure lookups did too.
A gate that stops everything stops being read as a signal, which is the
argument already made for the toolkit and for sentinelone (df27876).

The catalog is now 1027 read, 261 safe_write, 304 destructive, with nothing
defaulted. The line follows the one sentinelone drew: impact on the estate,
not reversibility — isolate-agent is reversible and is the canonical
destructive example.

  read        only queries; changes nothing outside Riposte
  safe_write  additive or reversible inside the tool's own case/enrichment
              plane: comments, tickets, tags, alert statuses, threat-intel
              records, sandbox submissions, collection jobs, outbound messages
  destructive changes the estate or weakens a control: containment, blocklists
              and allowlists, exclusions and detection rules, every delete,
              identity and credential operations, code on a host, generic
              API escape hatches

Three calls that were not obvious, and are now applied throughout:

- Undoing a containment is tiered like the containment it lifts. Un-isolating
  a host or un-banning an IP mid-incident is its own decision, not a return to
  a neutral state. The catalog contradicted itself here — crowdstrike's
  lift_containment was destructive while harfanglab's deisolate_from_threat
  was safe_write — so deisolate_from_threat and unquarantine_file are
  re-tiered to destructive, the only two existing tiers this pass changes.
- Retrieving a live secret is destructive: cyberark get_password, delinea
  get_secret, vault read_secret, beyondtrust get_credential. It is a GET, but
  the tier describes the stake, not the HTTP verb.
- Sending outward to humans stays safe_write — slack, teams, twilio, telegram,
  mail. Irreversible, but it is the collaboration plane, not the estate.

An object created but not yet referenced by a rule is safe_write; editing one
a rule already reads is destructive. That is why fortigate create_address and
panos create_custom_url_category are safe_write while update_address_group and
edit_custom_url_category are not.

The template and README never documented the field, which is how 467 commands
came to omit it. Both now carry the tier table and these rules, so the next
integration declares a tier instead of inheriting one.

111 packages get a MINOR bump and a changelog entry: an instance compares
versions to offer an update, so an unbumped manifest would leave the tiers
sitting in the catalog and never reaching the estates that need them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 12:55:20 +02:00

124 lines
5.2 KiB
YAML

id: azure_security
name: Microsoft Azure
version: 1.1.0
description: "Microsoft Azure (Resource Manager: Defender for Cloud + Network) — cloud containment: list and read Defender for Cloud security alerts and update their state, read the secure score, list/read network security groups (NSGs), and add or delete NSG security rules (deny inbound to isolate). Azure AD OAuth2 client-credentials authentication; stdlib-only, no extra Python dependencies."
changelog: "1.1.0 — Declare the risk tier on the 3 commands that carried none: 1 safe_write, 2 destructive. An unset risk is read as destructive by the agent approval gate, so the 1 that only annotate sat behind the same prompt as the ones that change the estate. | 1.0.0 — Initial release: list/get security alerts, update alert state, secure score, list/get NSGs, create/delete NSG security rules."
category: cloud
# Per-instance configuration. Uses application (client-credentials) OAuth2 with
# a service principal that has Reader + Security Admin + Network Contributor on
# the subscription.
config_schema:
properties:
tenant_id:
type: string
description: "Azure AD tenant ID"
client_id:
type: string
description: "Service principal (client) ID"
client_secret:
type: string
description: "Service principal client secret"
x-soar-sensitive: true
subscription_id:
type: string
description: "Azure subscription ID"
required:
- tenant_id
- client_id
- client_secret
- subscription_id
commands:
- id: list_alerts
name: azure-list-alerts
description: "List Microsoft Defender for Cloud security alerts in the subscription."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties: {}
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: get_alert
name: azure-get-alert
description: "Get a single security alert by its full ARM resource ID."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
alert_id: { type: string, description: "Full ARM resource ID of the alert (from azure-list-alerts)" }
required: [alert_id]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: update_alert_state
name: azure-update-alert-state
description: "Change a security alert's state (dismiss, resolve, activate, or inProgress)."
risk: safe_write
inputs_schema:
properties:
alert_id: { type: string, description: "Full ARM resource ID of the alert" }
state: { type: string, description: "dismiss | resolve | activate | inProgress" }
required: [alert_id, state]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: get_secure_score
name: azure-get-secure-score
description: "Get the subscription's Defender for Cloud secure score."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties: {}
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: list_nsgs
name: azure-list-nsgs
description: "List network security groups in the subscription."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties: {}
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: get_nsg
name: azure-get-nsg
description: "Get a single network security group."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
resource_group: { type: string, description: "Resource group name" }
nsg_name: { type: string, description: "NSG name" }
required: [resource_group, nsg_name]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: create_nsg_rule
name: azure-create-nsg-rule
description: "Create or update an NSG security rule (e.g. a Deny inbound rule to isolate a resource)."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
resource_group: { type: string, description: "Resource group name" }
nsg_name: { type: string, description: "NSG name" }
rule_name: { type: string, description: "Security rule name" }
priority: { type: number, description: "Rule priority (100-4096)" }
direction: { type: string, description: "Inbound or Outbound (default Inbound)" }
access: { type: string, description: "Allow or Deny (default Deny)" }
protocol: { type: string, description: "Tcp, Udp, or * (default *)" }
source: { type: string, description: "Source address prefix (CIDR or *, default *)" }
destination: { type: string, description: "Destination address prefix (default *)" }
destination_port: { type: string, description: "Destination port range (default *)" }
required: [resource_group, nsg_name, rule_name, priority]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: delete_nsg_rule
name: azure-delete-nsg-rule
description: "Delete an NSG security rule."
risk: destructive
inputs_schema:
properties:
resource_group: { type: string, description: "Resource group name" }
nsg_name: { type: string, description: "NSG name" }
rule_name: { type: string, description: "Security rule name" }
required: [resource_group, nsg_name, rule_name]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: test_connection
name: azure-test-connection
description: "Verify connectivity and the service-principal credentials (used by the Test button)."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties: {}
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }