Files
riposte-marketplace/integrations/slack/manifest.yaml
T
f3nris 45e9cbd269 feat: declare a risk tier on every command in the catalog
467 of the 1592 commands carried no `risk:`. An unset risk is read as
destructive by the agent approval gate, so half the catalog's write side sat
behind the same prompt — and, in HarfangLab's case, 39 pure lookups did too.
A gate that stops everything stops being read as a signal, which is the
argument already made for the toolkit and for sentinelone (df27876).

The catalog is now 1027 read, 261 safe_write, 304 destructive, with nothing
defaulted. The line follows the one sentinelone drew: impact on the estate,
not reversibility — isolate-agent is reversible and is the canonical
destructive example.

  read        only queries; changes nothing outside Riposte
  safe_write  additive or reversible inside the tool's own case/enrichment
              plane: comments, tickets, tags, alert statuses, threat-intel
              records, sandbox submissions, collection jobs, outbound messages
  destructive changes the estate or weakens a control: containment, blocklists
              and allowlists, exclusions and detection rules, every delete,
              identity and credential operations, code on a host, generic
              API escape hatches

Three calls that were not obvious, and are now applied throughout:

- Undoing a containment is tiered like the containment it lifts. Un-isolating
  a host or un-banning an IP mid-incident is its own decision, not a return to
  a neutral state. The catalog contradicted itself here — crowdstrike's
  lift_containment was destructive while harfanglab's deisolate_from_threat
  was safe_write — so deisolate_from_threat and unquarantine_file are
  re-tiered to destructive, the only two existing tiers this pass changes.
- Retrieving a live secret is destructive: cyberark get_password, delinea
  get_secret, vault read_secret, beyondtrust get_credential. It is a GET, but
  the tier describes the stake, not the HTTP verb.
- Sending outward to humans stays safe_write — slack, teams, twilio, telegram,
  mail. Irreversible, but it is the collaboration plane, not the estate.

An object created but not yet referenced by a rule is safe_write; editing one
a rule already reads is destructive. That is why fortigate create_address and
panos create_custom_url_category are safe_write while update_address_group and
edit_custom_url_category are not.

The template and README never documented the field, which is how 467 commands
came to omit it. Both now carry the tier table and these rules, so the next
integration declares a tier instead of inheriting one.

111 packages get a MINOR bump and a changelog entry: an instance compares
versions to offer an update, so an unbumped manifest would leave the tiers
sitting in the catalog and never reaching the estates that need them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 12:55:20 +02:00

103 lines
4.3 KiB
YAML

id: slack
name: Slack
version: 1.1.0
description: "Slack (Web API) — SOC notification and ChatOps: post messages (text or Block Kit), list/create channels, invite users, set channel topics, look up users, and add reactions. Bot-token authentication; stdlib-only, no extra Python dependencies."
changelog: "1.1.0 — Declare the risk tier on the 5 commands that carried none: 5 safe_write. An unset risk is read as destructive by the agent approval gate, so the 5 that only annotate sat behind the same prompt as the ones that change the estate. | 1.0.0 — Initial release: send message, list/create channel, invite to channel, set topic, get user, add reaction."
category: notification
# Per-instance configuration. The bot token (xoxb-...) is sent as
# 'Authorization: Bearer <bot_token>'. Needs scopes such as chat:write,
# channels:read, channels:manage, users:read, users:read.email, reactions:write.
config_schema:
properties:
bot_token:
type: string
description: "Slack bot token (xoxb-...)"
x-soar-sensitive: true
required:
- bot_token
commands:
- id: send_message
name: slack-send-message
description: "Post a message to a channel or user (text and/or Block Kit blocks)."
risk: safe_write
inputs_schema:
properties:
channel: { type: string, description: "Channel ID, channel name (#alerts), or user ID for a DM" }
text: { type: string, description: "Message text (fallback text when blocks are used)" }
blocks: { type: string, description: "Optional Block Kit blocks as a JSON array string" }
thread_ts: { type: string, description: "Optional parent message ts to reply in a thread" }
required: [channel]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: list_channels
name: slack-list-channels
description: "List channels (public and private the bot can see)."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
types: { type: string, description: "Comma-separated channel types (default 'public_channel,private_channel')" }
limit: { type: number, description: "Max channels (default 200)" }
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: create_channel
name: slack-create-channel
description: "Create a new channel."
risk: safe_write
inputs_schema:
properties:
name: { type: string, description: "Channel name (lowercase, no spaces)" }
is_private: { type: boolean, description: "Create a private channel (default false)" }
required: [name]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: invite_to_channel
name: slack-invite-to-channel
description: "Invite one or more users to a channel."
risk: safe_write
inputs_schema:
properties:
channel: { type: string, description: "Channel ID" }
users: { type: string, description: "Comma-separated user IDs to invite" }
required: [channel, users]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: set_channel_topic
name: slack-set-channel-topic
description: "Set a channel's topic."
risk: safe_write
inputs_schema:
properties:
channel: { type: string, description: "Channel ID" }
topic: { type: string, description: "New topic text" }
required: [channel, topic]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: get_user
name: slack-get-user
description: "Look up a user by ID or email address."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties:
user_id: { type: string, description: "User ID (provide this or email)" }
email: { type: string, description: "Email address (provide this or user_id)" }
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: add_reaction
name: slack-add-reaction
description: "Add an emoji reaction to a message."
risk: safe_write
inputs_schema:
properties:
channel: { type: string, description: "Channel ID of the message" }
timestamp: { type: string, description: "Message ts" }
emoji: { type: string, description: "Emoji name without colons (e.g. eyes)" }
required: [channel, timestamp, emoji]
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
- id: test_connection
name: slack-test-connection
description: "Verify connectivity and the bot token (used by the Test button)."
risk: read
inputs_schema:
properties: {}
required: []
outputs_schema: { properties: {} }