Ingesting from search_alerts brings back every alert the tenant produces,
including the operational noise — two of the first three sampled were an agent
reporting it lacked Full Disk Access. What is worth an incident is what Rapid7
or the analyst folded into an investigation.
Filtering search_alerts on investigation_rrn does not work. The term is accepted
— no validation error, HTTP 200 — and matches nothing: zero alerts over fifteen
days, on a tenant where an alert carrying an investigation_rrn provably exists
in that window. The field is not searchable, and the API says so by returning an
empty page rather than by refusing the term. That failure mode is the reason not
to build an ingestion feed on it: a filter that silently stops matching drains
the feed to zero with no error anywhere, and nothing would ever say why.
search_investigation_alerts is guaranteed by construction instead:
1. the investigations in the window (incremental on their created_time)
2. their alert RRNs, one call per investigation — there is no bulk form
3. the alerts themselves via /alerts/ops/rrns, batched 100 at a time
So 1+N+1 calls, and an alert with no investigation is never even named. Its
failure modes are loud: an unreadable investigation is skipped and counted, and
HTTP errors surface as themselves.
Step 2 is the one that grows with the window, so it runs under a time budget
(60s, against the server's 90s ceiling) and reports truncated=true rather than
being killed with the whole run's alerts lost. A partial fetch that says it is
partial beats a silent zero — the same reasoning that rules out the filter.
The output shape matches search_alerts exactly, so the mapper committed in 1.2.0
serves both. It gains five entries for the parent investigation, which resolve
to nothing on the search_alerts feed and are skipped there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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