name: "Webhook Relay message (generic)" description: | Maps one relayed message — whatever the vendor sent — to an alert, without knowing the vendor. It is the mapper a new source starts with: the alert exists, the raw payload is readable in Riposte, and a vendor mapper is then written from it (clone this one, or pick the vendor's own when the marketplace ships it). A message is {id, source, received_at, remote_ip, content_type, headers, verified, body | body_b64, json}. `json` is the body already decoded when it is JSON, so a vendor field reads json.. The title tries the fields alert payloads most often name themselves with, and falls back to the source. Severity is left to the alert rule's default: a generic payload has no scale this mapper could trust. The OCSF side carries what has a place in the schema: the relay's message id as the finding uid, the receipt time (time and metadata.logged_time), the source as metadata.log_name, the checks the delivery passed as metadata.labels (relay:hmac…), the payload as raw_data. The sender's address goes to unmapped.relay.sender_ip and NOT src_endpoint.ip: it is the vendor's cloud, and as an entity it would tie every alert of that vendor together. The custom fields repeat what layouts and automation conditions read most easily. custom:webhook_verified is the trust level: the checks the delivery passed at the relay (path_token, header_token, hmac, ip). An alert authenticated by a URL alone is plausible, not proven — declare the field and keep destructive automation off such alerts until a playbook has confirmed them against the vendor. field_mappings: title: "jsonata: $exists(json.title) ? $string(json.title) : $exists(json.name) ? $string(json.name) : $exists(json.alert.name) ? $string(json.alert.name) : $exists(json.rule.name) ? $string(json.rule.name) : $exists(json.detection_name) ? $string(json.detection_name) : ('Webhook · ' & source)" source: "jsonata: 'Webhook relay · ' & source" description: "jsonata: body ? $substring(body, 0, 8000) : ('Binary body, ' & $string($length(body_b64)) & ' base64 characters')" "custom:webhook_source": "source" "custom:webhook_verified": "jsonata: $join(verified, ',')" "custom:webhook_message_id": "id" "custom:webhook_received_at": "received_at" "custom:webhook_sender_ip": "remote_ip" # Key/value rows of the decoded payload's top level, for a table field. "custom:webhook_payload": "jsonata: json ? $toTable(json) : body" ocsf: # ── Finding ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # The relay's message id: stable for one delivery. A vendor mapper replaces it with # the vendor's own alert id. - { source_path: "id", ocsf_field: "finding_info.uid" } - { source_path: "id", ocsf_field: "metadata.uid" } # When the relay received it — the best time a payload of unknown shape offers. # A vendor mapper puts the detection's own time in `time` and keeps this one. - { source_path: "received_at", ocsf_field: "time" } - { source_path: "received_at", ocsf_field: "metadata.logged_time" } # ── Where it came from ──────────────────────────────────────────── - { source_path: "'riposte-relay'", ocsf_field: "metadata.log_provider" } - { source_path: "source", ocsf_field: "metadata.log_name" } # The checks the delivery passed, as labels: relay:path_token, relay:hmac, relay:ip. # Kept an array even with one check (the singleton trap). - { source_path: "[verified.('relay:' & $)]", ocsf_field: "metadata.labels" } # The payload exactly as sent: what an analyst and the case synthesis read when no # vendor mapper exists yet. - { source_path: "body", ocsf_field: "raw_data" } # The sender's address is the VENDOR's (its cloud, its collector), never the # attacker's or the victim's: as src_endpoint.ip it would become an entity, and # every alert of that vendor would correlate on it. It stays out of the schema. - { source_path: "remote_ip", ocsf_field: "unmapped.relay.sender_ip" } - { source_path: "content_type", ocsf_field: "unmapped.relay.content_type" }