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a6e1245c79
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
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 f3nris
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a6e1245c79 | ||
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f3nris
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d06f8ea413 | ||
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f3nris
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17318d4225 |
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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name: "Cortex XDR Alert"
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color: "#ef8354"
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icon: "alert"
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@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
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id: cortex_xdr
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name: Cortex XDR
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version: 1.2.1
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description: "Palo Alto Cortex XDR (public API v1) — incident ingestion + write-back, endpoint isolation/scan/delete/tagging, RTR scripts, hash block/allow lists, file quarantine/restore/retrieval, alert exclusions, external alert push (parsed/CEF), device-control violations, audits, distributions and RBAC/risk."
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changelog: "1.2.1 — Connection troubleshooting: the URL is normalised to the tenant host (a pasted /public_api/v1 or console path no longer breaks the call), a non-JSON reply reports the status, content type and body instead of a bare JSON parse error, missing key/key ID is caught up front, nonce and timestamp are sent in both auth modes as the reference client does, and test_connection now probes get_incidents. 1.2.0 — Incident write-back (update_incident: status/severity/assignment/resolve comment) and external alert push (insert_parsed_alerts, insert_cef_alerts). 1.1.0 — Full command coverage: added delete/alias/tag endpoints, abort scan, original alerts, script metadata/code/snippet/exec-status, file retrieval (+details), alert exclusions, device-control violations, audits, distribution url/status/create and RBAC (users, roles, groups, risk score, risky users/hosts). 1.0.0 — Initial release: incident ingestion (get_incidents) with OCSF mapper, endpoints, isolate/unisolate, scan, hash blocklist/allowlist, quarantine/restore, run script + results, alerts retrieval, distributions and action status. Standard or Advanced API authentication."
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version: 1.3.0
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description: "Palo Alto Cortex XDR (public API v1) — incident and alert ingestion + write-back, endpoint isolation/scan/delete/tagging, RTR scripts, hash block/allow lists, file quarantine/restore/retrieval, alert exclusions, external alert push (parsed/CEF), device-control violations, audits, distributions and RBAC/risk."
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changelog: "1.3.0 — Richer incident ingestion (fetch_incidents, on get_multiple_incidents_extra_data): incidents now arrive with their alerts in full and their file/network artifacts, where get_incidents only ever answered a 21-field summary carrying neither hosts, users, MITRE nor a single alert. Alert ingestion, and the alerts endpoint answers at last: get_alerts was sending the incidents dialect ({filters, search_from, search_to, sort}) to a grid endpoint that speaks request_data.filter_data (SEARCH_FIELD/SEARCH_TYPE/SEARCH_VALUE blocks, paging.from/to, sort as a list), and every call came back HTTP 500. Body rebuilt from the reference client, rows unwrapped out of their alert_fields envelope, severity code and the dotted status.progress key derived into readable fields. Alert ingestion: get_alerts is now a fetch command (results path reply.alerts, dedup on alert_id, incremental on source_insert_ts) with a bundled OCSF mapper and a Cortex XDR Alert incident type, so detections can be ingested alongside — or instead of — incidents. The incident mapper is fixed on the way past: its severity expression compared strings, which the mapping engine cannot do, so every ingested incident silently took the rule's default severity; it also now carries a detection anchor so MTTD is measurable. It pages past the API's 100-results-per-call ceiling, and sorts oldest-first on an incremental fetch so a truncated window drops the alerts the next poll can still see. 1.2.1 — Connection troubleshooting: the URL is normalised to the tenant host (a pasted /public_api/v1 or console path no longer breaks the call), a non-JSON reply reports the status, content type and body instead of a bare JSON parse error, missing key/key ID is caught up front, nonce and timestamp are sent in both auth modes as the reference client does, and test_connection now probes get_incidents. 1.2.0 — Incident write-back (update_incident: status/severity/assignment/resolve comment) and external alert push (insert_parsed_alerts, insert_cef_alerts). 1.1.0 — Full command coverage: added delete/alias/tag endpoints, abort scan, original alerts, script metadata/code/snippet/exec-status, file retrieval (+details), alert exclusions, device-control violations, audits, distribution url/status/create and RBAC (users, roles, groups, risk score, risky users/hosts). 1.0.0 — Initial release: incident ingestion (get_incidents) with OCSF mapper, endpoints, isolate/unisolate, scan, hash blocklist/allowlist, quarantine/restore, run script + results, alerts retrieval, distributions and action status. Standard or Advanced API authentication."
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category: endpoint
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# Per-instance configuration. The base URL is the tenant API root, e.g.
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@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ commands:
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# ── Ingestion ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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- id: get_incidents
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name: cortex-xdr-get-incidents
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description: "Fetch Cortex XDR incidents for ingestion. Returns {reply:{incidents:[...]}}; use reply.incidents as the alert rule results path."
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description: "List Cortex XDR incidents as a 21-field summary (no hosts, no users, no MITRE, no alerts). Cheap to poll, but for ingestion prefer cortex-xdr-fetch-incidents, which returns the same incidents with their alerts and artifacts. Returns {reply:{incidents:[...]}}."
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risk: read
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inputs_schema:
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properties:
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@@ -57,6 +57,22 @@ commands:
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results_path: reply.incidents
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dedup_key: incident_id
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incremental_field: created_after
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- id: fetch_incidents
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name: cortex-xdr-fetch-incidents
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description: "Fetch incidents WITH their alerts and artifacts (get_multiple_incidents_extra_data) — the ingestion command to prefer. get_incidents answers with a 21-field summary carrying no hosts, no users, no MITRE and none of the alerts; this one returns 39 incident fields, every alert in full (156 fields each) and the file/network artifacts. Records are flattened, so mapping expressions written against get_incidents keep working and alerts[], file_artifacts[], network_artifacts[] sit beside them. Returns {reply:{incidents:[...]}}."
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risk: read
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inputs_schema:
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properties:
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status: { type: string, description: "Comma-separated statuses to keep (new, under_investigation, resolved_threat_handled…)" }
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created_after: { type: string, description: "Lower bound on creation_time, ISO8601 or epoch ms (incremental fetch watermark)" }
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limit: { type: number, description: "Maximum incidents to fetch (default 50, paged 50 at a time). A full incident weighs a few KB and up to a few hundred with its alerts, so raise this knowingly." }
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exclude_artifacts: { type: boolean, description: "Drop the file and network artifact blocks, keeping the alerts (lighter payload)" }
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required: []
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outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
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ingest:
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results_path: reply.incidents
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dedup_key: incident_id
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incremental_field: created_after
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- id: get_incident_extra_data
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name: cortex-xdr-get-incident-extra-data
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description: "Get full incident data including its alerts and network artifacts by incident ID."
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@@ -83,15 +99,21 @@ commands:
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outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
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- id: get_alerts
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name: cortex-xdr-get-alerts
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description: "Retrieve alerts using a custom filter (get_alerts_by_filter_data). Returns rich alert objects."
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description: "Fetch Cortex XDR alerts for ingestion (get_alerts_by_filter_data). Returns {reply:{alerts:[...]}}; use reply.alerts as the alert rule results path. Each row is unwrapped out of the API's alert_fields envelope and carries a readable severity_name and status_progress, so alerts-grid field names (internal_id, alert_name, agent_hostname) are what mapping expressions see. Alerts are the detection layer under incidents: ingest them alongside get_incidents when the SOC works detections, not only aggregates."
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risk: read
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inputs_schema:
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properties:
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severity: { type: string, description: "Comma-separated severities (low, medium, high, critical)" }
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created_after: { type: string, description: "Lower bound on alert source_insert_ts, epoch ms" }
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limit: { type: number, description: "Maximum alerts to fetch (default 100)" }
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severity: { type: string, description: "Comma-separated severities (informational, low, medium, high, critical)" }
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created_after: { type: string, description: "Lower bound on alert source_insert_ts, ISO8601 or epoch ms (incremental fetch watermark)" }
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limit: { type: number, description: "Maximum alerts to fetch (default 100). The API serves 100 per call at most; above that the script pages until the limit is reached." }
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# Left unfiltered, the call is bounded to the last 30 days: the alerts
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# grid is not meant to be asked for a tenant's whole retention.
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required: []
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outputs_schema: { properties: {} }
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ingest:
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results_path: reply.alerts
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dedup_key: internal_id
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incremental_field: created_after
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- id: insert_parsed_alerts
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name: cortex-xdr-insert-parsed-alerts
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description: "Push external alerts (parsed JSON objects) into Cortex XDR for correlation."
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@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
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name: "Cortex XDR Incidents (full) → OCSF"
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description: "Maps one Cortex XDR incident fetched with its alerts and artifacts (incidents/get_multiple_incidents_extra_data/, results_path = reply.incidents) to OCSF finding fields. The script flattens the record, so incident fields sit at the top level — every expression written against get_incidents keeps working — while alerts[], file_artifacts[] and network_artifacts[] are plain lists beside them. Incident-level values are mapped first and the first alert's equivalents last, so the alert wins wherever the aggregate says nothing."
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field_mappings:
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# incident_name is null on most tenants (it is only set when someone renames
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# the incident), and a mapping that resolves to nothing leaves the title to
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# the incident type's fallback. description is the sentence XDR itself shows.
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title: "description"
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description: "description"
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severity: "severity"
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# incident_source, not incident_sources[0]: this mapper reads dotted paths and
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# cannot index a list, so the script lifts the first sensor out for it.
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source: "incident_source"
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# results_path = reply.incidents; source_path is JSONata over ONE flattened
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# incident. Paths absent from a given incident are skipped at ingestion, so
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# entries for fields a tenant never emits are safe. Where two entries target the
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# same OCSF field, the LAST non-empty one wins.
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ocsf:
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# ── Finding ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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- { source_path: "incident_id", ocsf_field: "finding_info.uid" }
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- { source_path: "incident_name ? incident_name : description", ocsf_field: "finding_info.title" }
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- { source_path: "description", ocsf_field: "finding_info.desc" }
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- { source_path: "creation_time", ocsf_field: "finding_info.created_time" }
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- { source_path: "modification_time", ocsf_field: "finding_info.modified_time" }
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- { source_path: "xdr_url", ocsf_field: "finding_info.src_url" }
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- { source_path: "alert_categories[0]", ocsf_field: "finding_info.analytic.category" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].name", ocsf_field: "finding_info.analytic.name" }
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# ── Detection time: the MTTD anchor ───────────────────────────────
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# Weakest first, strongest last. detection_time is often null on an XDR
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# incident, and then the first alert's own detection timestamp is the honest
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# anchor; incident creation is the last resort.
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- { source_path: "creation_time", ocsf_field: "time" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].detection_timestamp", ocsf_field: "time" }
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- { source_path: "detection_time", ocsf_field: "time" }
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# ── Incident state ────────────────────────────────────────────────
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- { source_path: "severity", ocsf_field: "severity" }
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- { source_path: "status", ocsf_field: "status" }
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- { source_path: "resolve_comment", ocsf_field: "status_detail" }
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- { source_path: "alert_count", ocsf_field: "count" }
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- { source_path: "aggregated_score", ocsf_field: "risk_score" }
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- { source_path: "tags", ocsf_field: "metadata.labels" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].action_pretty", ocsf_field: "action" }
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# ── Product identity ──────────────────────────────────────────────
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- { source_path: "'Cortex XDR'", ocsf_field: "metadata.product.name" }
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- { source_path: "'Palo Alto Networks'", ocsf_field: "metadata.product.vendor_name" }
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- { source_path: "incident_sources[0]", ocsf_field: "metadata.log_source" }
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# ── MITRE ATT&CK: the aggregate, else the first alert ─────────────
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- { source_path: "mitre_tactics_ids_and_names[0]", ocsf_field: "attacks.tactic.name" }
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- { source_path: "mitre_techniques_ids_and_names[0]", ocsf_field: "attacks.technique.name" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].mitre_tactic_id_and_name[0]", ocsf_field: "attacks.tactic.name" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].mitre_technique_id_and_name[0]", ocsf_field: "attacks.technique.name" }
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# ── Affected host / user ──────────────────────────────────────────
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# An incident's hosts are 'hostname:agent_id' strings; an alert names them plainly.
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- { source_path: "$split(hosts[0], ':')[0]", ocsf_field: "src_endpoint.hostname" }
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- { source_path: "$split(hosts[0], ':')[0]", ocsf_field: "device.hostname" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].host_name", ocsf_field: "src_endpoint.hostname" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].host_name", ocsf_field: "device.hostname" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].host_ip[0]", ocsf_field: "device.ip" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].host_ip[0]", ocsf_field: "src_endpoint.ip" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].endpoint_id", ocsf_field: "device.uid" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].agent_os_type", ocsf_field: "device.os.type" }
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- { source_path: "users[0]", ocsf_field: "user.name" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].user_name", ocsf_field: "user.name" }
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# ── What the first alert actually saw ─────────────────────────────
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].actor_process_image_name", ocsf_field: "process.name" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].actor_process_command_line", ocsf_field: "process.cmd_line" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].actor_process_image_path", ocsf_field: "process.path" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].actor_process_image_sha256", ocsf_field: "process.file.hashes.sha256" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].causality_actor_process_image_name", ocsf_field: "process.parent_process.name" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].action_file_path", ocsf_field: "file.path" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].action_file_name", ocsf_field: "file.name" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].action_file_sha256", ocsf_field: "file.hashes.sha256" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].action_file_md5", ocsf_field: "file.hashes.md5" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].action_remote_ip", ocsf_field: "dst_endpoint.ip" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].action_remote_port", ocsf_field: "dst_endpoint.port" }
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- { source_path: "alerts[0].action_external_hostname", ocsf_field: "dst_endpoint.hostname" }
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# ── The artifact the incident is really about ─────────────────────
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# Last, because a file artifact is the incident's verdict on the file, where
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# the alert only reports what one detection touched.
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- { source_path: "file_artifacts[0].file_name", ocsf_field: "file.name" }
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- { source_path: "file_artifacts[0].file_sha256", ocsf_field: "file.hashes.sha256" }
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- { source_path: "file_artifacts[0].file_wildfire_verdict", ocsf_field: "malware.classifications" }
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- { source_path: "network_artifacts[0].network_remote_ip", ocsf_field: "dst_endpoint.ip" }
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- { source_path: "network_artifacts[0].network_domain", ocsf_field: "dst_endpoint.hostname" }
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@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
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name: "Cortex XDR Alerts → OCSF"
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description: "Maps one Cortex XDR alert (alerts/get_alerts_by_filter_data/, results_path = reply.alerts) to OCSF Detection Finding fields. Field names are the alerts-grid ones (internal_id, alert_name, agent_hostname…), not the incident ones; the script unwraps the API's alert_fields envelope and derives severity_name and status_progress, which the raw payload cannot express. Alerts are the detection layer under incidents: a tenant ingesting both feeds holds each detection twice, once inside an aggregate and once on its own."
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field_mappings:
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title: "alert_name"
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description: "alert_description"
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# severity_name, not severity: the API sends an enum code (SEV_040_HIGH) that
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# no severity scale can read, so the script carries the plain name alongside it.
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severity: "severity_name"
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# Which sensor fired: "XDR Agent", "PAN NGFW", "XDR Analytics"…
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source: "alert_source"
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# results_path = reply.alerts; source_path is JSONata over ONE alert object.
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# Paths absent from a given alert are skipped at ingestion, so entries for fields
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# a tenant never emits are safe. Where two entries target the same OCSF field,
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# the LAST non-empty one wins — that is how the events[] fallbacks are ordered.
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ocsf:
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# ── Finding ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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- { source_path: "internal_id", ocsf_field: "finding_info.uid" }
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- { source_path: "external_id", ocsf_field: "finding_info.uid_alt" }
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- { source_path: "alert_name", ocsf_field: "finding_info.title" }
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- { source_path: "alert_description", ocsf_field: "finding_info.desc" }
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- { source_path: "source_insert_ts", ocsf_field: "finding_info.created_time" }
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- { source_path: "local_insert_ts", ocsf_field: "finding_info.modified_time" }
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- { source_path: "alert_category", ocsf_field: "finding_info.analytic.category" }
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- { source_path: "alert_name", ocsf_field: "finding_info.analytic.name" }
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- { source_path: "matching_service_rule_id", ocsf_field: "finding_info.analytic.uid" }
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# ── Detection time: the MTTD anchor ───────────────────────────────
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# `time` is what Riposte measures detection-to-ingestion against. The grid
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# exposes when the tenant took the alert in (source_insert_ts); a sensor-side
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# detection timestamp, when the tenant sends one, is the better anchor and
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# comes last so it wins.
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- { source_path: "source_insert_ts", ocsf_field: "time" }
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- { source_path: "detection_timestamp", ocsf_field: "time" }
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# ── Alert state ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
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- { source_path: "severity_name", ocsf_field: "severity" }
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- { source_path: "alert_domain", ocsf_field: "activity_name" }
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- { source_path: "alert_action_status", ocsf_field: "action" }
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- { source_path: "status_progress", ocsf_field: "status" }
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- { source_path: "matching_status", ocsf_field: "status_detail" }
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- { source_path: "events_length", ocsf_field: "count" }
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# The XDR case this alert was folded into — the join back to the incident feed.
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- { source_path: "case_id", ocsf_field: "metadata.correlation_uid" }
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# ── Product identity ──────────────────────────────────────────────
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- { source_path: "'Cortex XDR'", ocsf_field: "metadata.product.name" }
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- { source_path: "'Palo Alto Networks'", ocsf_field: "metadata.product.vendor_name" }
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- { source_path: "alert_source", ocsf_field: "metadata.log_source" }
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# ── MITRE ATT&CK ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# Both fields arrive as a list on most tenants and as a bare string on some;
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# [0] reads the first element either way.
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- { source_path: "mitre_tactic_id_and_name[0]", ocsf_field: "attacks.tactic.name" }
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- { source_path: "mitre_technique_id_and_name[0]", ocsf_field: "attacks.technique.name" }
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# ── Affected endpoint ─────────────────────────────────────────────
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- { source_path: "agent_hostname", ocsf_field: "device.hostname" }
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- { source_path: "agent_ip_addresses[0]", ocsf_field: "device.ip" }
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- { source_path: "agent_id", ocsf_field: "device.uid" }
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- { source_path: "agent_os_type", ocsf_field: "device.os.type" }
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# Mirrored onto src_endpoint so routers and pre-processing rules written for
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# the incident feed (which maps hosts there) match alerts unchanged.
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- { source_path: "agent_hostname", ocsf_field: "src_endpoint.hostname" }
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- { source_path: "agent_ip_addresses[0]", ocsf_field: "src_endpoint.ip" }
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- { source_path: "actor_effective_username", ocsf_field: "user.name" }
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# ── What actually happened ────────────────────────────────────────
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# Grid columns first, then the same detail read off the first event, which is
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# where a tenant that does not flatten these columns puts them.
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- { source_path: "actor_process_image_name", ocsf_field: "process.name" }
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- { source_path: "actor_process_command_line", ocsf_field: "process.cmd_line" }
|
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- { source_path: "actor_process_image_sha256", ocsf_field: "process.file.hashes.sha256" }
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||||
- { source_path: "causality_actor_process_command_line", ocsf_field: "process.parent_process.cmd_line" }
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||||
- { source_path: "action_file_path", ocsf_field: "file.path" }
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||||
- { source_path: "action_file_sha256", ocsf_field: "file.hashes.sha256" }
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||||
- { source_path: "action_file_md5", ocsf_field: "file.hashes.md5" }
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||||
- { source_path: "action_registry_key_name", ocsf_field: "reg_key.path" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "action_registry_data", ocsf_field: "reg_value.data" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "action_local_ip", ocsf_field: "src_endpoint.ip" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "action_local_port", ocsf_field: "src_endpoint.port" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "action_remote_ip", ocsf_field: "dst_endpoint.ip" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "action_remote_port", ocsf_field: "dst_endpoint.port" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "dst_action_external_hostname", ocsf_field: "dst_endpoint.hostname" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "events[0].actor_process_image_name", ocsf_field: "process.name" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "events[0].actor_process_command_line", ocsf_field: "process.cmd_line" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "events[0].actor_process_image_path", ocsf_field: "process.path" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "events[0].actor_process_image_sha256", ocsf_field: "process.file.hashes.sha256" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "events[0].causality_actor_process_image_name", ocsf_field: "process.parent_process.name" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "events[0].action_file_path", ocsf_field: "file.path" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "events[0].action_file_sha256", ocsf_field: "file.hashes.sha256" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "events[0].action_remote_ip", ocsf_field: "dst_endpoint.ip" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "events[0].action_remote_port", ocsf_field: "dst_endpoint.port" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "events[0].action_external_hostname", ocsf_field: "dst_endpoint.hostname" }
|
||||
@@ -2,7 +2,10 @@ name: "Cortex XDR Incidents → OCSF"
|
||||
description: "Maps a Cortex XDR incident (incidents/get_incidents/, results_path = reply.incidents) to OCSF finding fields. Incidents are aggregates; use get_incident_extra_data for per-alert detail."
|
||||
field_mappings:
|
||||
title: "incident_name"
|
||||
severity: "severity = 'critical' ? 5 : (severity = 'high' ? 4 : (severity = 'medium' ? 3 : 2))"
|
||||
# The raw string, not a ternary: the mapping engine compares numbers only, so
|
||||
# every string test read as false and every incident landed on the rule's
|
||||
# default severity. Riposte reads critical/high/medium/low onto 1-5 itself.
|
||||
severity: "severity"
|
||||
description: "description"
|
||||
# results_path = reply.incidents; source_path is JSONata over ONE incident object.
|
||||
# Paths absent from a given incident are skipped at ingestion, so extra entries are safe.
|
||||
@@ -15,6 +18,9 @@ ocsf:
|
||||
- { source_path: "modification_time", ocsf_field: "finding_info.modified_time" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "xdr_url", ocsf_field: "finding_info.src_url" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "status", ocsf_field: "status" }
|
||||
# `time` is the MTTD anchor — when XDR opened the incident, as opposed to when
|
||||
# Riposte ingested it. Without it the detection delay column stays empty.
|
||||
- { source_path: "creation_time", ocsf_field: "time" }
|
||||
- { source_path: "alert_count", ocsf_field: "count" }
|
||||
# ── MITRE ATT&CK (first aggregated tactic/technique) ──────────────
|
||||
- { source_path: "mitre_tactics_ids_and_names[0]", ocsf_field: "attacks.tactic.name" }
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
|
||||
import json, os, sys, time, hashlib, secrets, string, urllib.request, urllib.error
|
||||
from datetime import datetime
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _client():
|
||||
s = json.loads(os.environ.get("INTEGRATION_SECRETS") or "{}")
|
||||
raw = str(s.get("url") or "").strip().rstrip("/")
|
||||
if not raw:
|
||||
raise ValueError("no url configured — paste the tenant API URL (Cortex XDR > Settings > Configurations > API Keys > Copy URL)")
|
||||
if "://" not in raw:
|
||||
raw = "https://" + raw
|
||||
# The tenant URL is a bare host. Drop whatever was pasted after it (a stray
|
||||
# /public_api/v1, a console path) so the API root is built exactly once.
|
||||
scheme, _, rest = raw.partition("://")
|
||||
base = scheme + "://" + rest.split("/")[0] + "/public_api/v1"
|
||||
key = s.get("api_key", "")
|
||||
kid = str(s.get("api_key_id", ""))
|
||||
if not key or not kid:
|
||||
raise ValueError("api_key and api_key_id are both required")
|
||||
# Nonce and timestamp ride along in both modes, as the reference client does.
|
||||
# A standard key travels as-is; an advanced one as sha256(key + nonce + ts).
|
||||
nonce = "".join(secrets.choice(string.ascii_letters + string.digits) for _ in range(64))
|
||||
ts = str(int(time.time()) * 1000)
|
||||
headers = {
|
||||
"x-xdr-auth-id": kid,
|
||||
"x-xdr-nonce": nonce,
|
||||
"x-xdr-timestamp": ts,
|
||||
"Content-Type": "application/json",
|
||||
"Accept": "application/json",
|
||||
}
|
||||
if str(s.get("auth_type") or "standard").lower() == "advanced":
|
||||
headers["Authorization"] = hashlib.sha256((key + nonce + ts).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
|
||||
else:
|
||||
headers["Authorization"] = key
|
||||
return base, headers
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _not_json(r, raw):
|
||||
"""A 2xx that is not JSON means we are not talking to the XDR API at all."""
|
||||
ctype = (r.headers.get("Content-Type") or "unknown").split(";")[0].strip()
|
||||
head = raw[:160].decode("utf-8", "replace").replace("\n", " ").strip()
|
||||
return (
|
||||
"expected JSON from " + r.geturl() + ", got " + ctype + " (HTTP " + str(r.status) + "): " + head
|
||||
+ " — check the configured url is the tenant API host"
|
||||
+ " (https://api-<tenant>.xdr.<region>.paloaltonetworks.com), not the console URL"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def post(path, request_data):
|
||||
base, headers = _client()
|
||||
data = json.dumps({"request_data": request_data}).encode("utf-8")
|
||||
req = urllib.request.Request(base + path, data=data, headers=headers, method="POST")
|
||||
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=90) as r:
|
||||
raw = r.read()
|
||||
if not raw:
|
||||
return {}
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return json.loads(raw)
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
raise ValueError(_not_json(r, raw))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def to_ms(v):
|
||||
if v in (None, ""):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
s = str(v)
|
||||
if s.isdigit():
|
||||
return int(s)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return int(datetime.fromisoformat(s.replace("Z", "+00:00")).timestamp() * 1000)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def csv(v):
|
||||
return [x.strip() for x in str(v or "").split(",") if x.strip()]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# incidents/get_incidents/ answers with a 21-field summary: no hosts, no users,
|
||||
# no MITRE, and above all not one of the alerts the incident aggregates. This
|
||||
# endpoint returns the same incident with 39 fields, its alerts in full (156
|
||||
# fields each) and its file/network artifacts — which is why the reference
|
||||
# client fetches through it and not through get_incidents (demisto/content,
|
||||
# CortexXDRIR.get_multiple_incidents_extra_data).
|
||||
PAGE = 50
|
||||
|
||||
# Artifacts are dropped by name, not by omission — the API only understands
|
||||
# being told which blocks to leave out.
|
||||
ARTIFACT_BLOCKS = ["network_artifacts", "file_artifacts"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def flatten(item):
|
||||
"""One record -> one incident.
|
||||
|
||||
Records arrive as {incident, alerts, network_artifacts, file_artifacts},
|
||||
each nested block wrapped as {total_count, data}. Flattening the incident to
|
||||
the top level keeps every expression written against get_incidents working
|
||||
unchanged — the summary's 21 fields are a subset of these 39 — while the
|
||||
alerts and artifacts land beside them as plain lists.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
incident = dict(item.get("incident") or {})
|
||||
for key in ("alerts", "network_artifacts", "file_artifacts"):
|
||||
block = item.get(key)
|
||||
if not isinstance(block, dict):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
incident[key] = block.get("data") or []
|
||||
if block.get("total_count") is not None:
|
||||
# The tenant caps alerts per incident (50 by default), so the count
|
||||
# says when the list is a sample rather than the whole set.
|
||||
incident[key + "_total_count"] = block["total_count"]
|
||||
# The producing sensor is a list here, and the incident-field mapper reads
|
||||
# dotted paths only — no array indexing — so the first source is lifted out
|
||||
# for it. The list itself stays, for expressions that can index.
|
||||
sources = incident.get("incident_sources")
|
||||
if isinstance(sources, list) and sources:
|
||||
incident["incident_source"] = sources[0]
|
||||
return incident
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
inputs = json.loads(os.environ.get("INTEGRATION_INPUTS", "{}"))
|
||||
limit = max(1, int(inputs.get("limit") or 50))
|
||||
filters = []
|
||||
if inputs.get("status"):
|
||||
statuses = csv(inputs["status"])
|
||||
filters.append({"field": "status", "operator": "in", "value": statuses})
|
||||
created_ms = to_ms(inputs.get("created_after"))
|
||||
if created_ms is not None:
|
||||
filters.append({"field": "creation_time", "operator": "gte", "value": created_ms})
|
||||
# Oldest first on an incremental fetch, so that a window holding more
|
||||
# incidents than `limit` drops its most RECENT ones — the only ones the next
|
||||
# poll can still see. Newest first otherwise, for a hand-run command.
|
||||
keyword = "asc" if created_ms is not None else "desc"
|
||||
exclude = str(inputs.get("exclude_artifacts") or "").lower() in ("1", "true", "yes")
|
||||
|
||||
incidents, total = [], None
|
||||
while len(incidents) < limit:
|
||||
rd = {
|
||||
"search_from": len(incidents),
|
||||
"search_to": min(len(incidents) + PAGE, limit),
|
||||
"sort": {"field": "creation_time", "keyword": keyword},
|
||||
# Without this the nested alerts come back trimmed to a handful of
|
||||
# fields — the very thing this command exists to avoid.
|
||||
"full_alert_fields": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if filters:
|
||||
rd["filters"] = filters
|
||||
if exclude:
|
||||
rd["fields_to_exclude"] = ARTIFACT_BLOCKS
|
||||
reply = (post("/incidents/get_multiple_incidents_extra_data/", rd) or {}).get("reply") or {}
|
||||
page = reply.get("incidents") or []
|
||||
if total is None:
|
||||
total = reply.get("total_count")
|
||||
incidents.extend(flatten(i) for i in page)
|
||||
if len(page) < PAGE:
|
||||
break
|
||||
|
||||
out = {"result_count": len(incidents), "incidents": incidents}
|
||||
if total is not None:
|
||||
out["total_count"] = total
|
||||
# Say it when the window held more than the limit: those incidents are
|
||||
# not coming back on the next poll.
|
||||
out["truncated"] = total > len(incidents)
|
||||
print(json.dumps({"reply": out}))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
main()
|
||||
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
|
||||
print(json.dumps({"error": "HTTP " + str(e.code), "detail": e.read().decode("utf-8", "replace")}))
|
||||
sys.exit(1)
|
||||
except Exception as e:
|
||||
print(json.dumps({"error": str(e)}))
|
||||
sys.exit(1)
|
||||
@@ -76,19 +76,121 @@ def to_ms(v):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# This endpoint speaks the alerts-grid dialect, NOT the incidents one: a body of
|
||||
# {filters, search_from, search_to, sort} — what incidents/get_incidents/ takes —
|
||||
# is answered with a bare HTTP 500. It wants request_data.filter_data with
|
||||
# SEARCH_FIELD/SEARCH_TYPE/SEARCH_VALUE blocks, paging.from/to and a sort LIST.
|
||||
# Shape taken from the reference client (demisto/content,
|
||||
# Packs/ApiModules/Scripts/CoreIRApiModule — get_alerts_by_filter_command).
|
||||
PAGE = 100
|
||||
|
||||
# Severity travels as an enum code both ways. Riposte reads plain names onto its
|
||||
# 1-5 scale, so alerts carry `severity_name` alongside the raw code.
|
||||
SEVERITY_CODE_TO_NAME = {
|
||||
"SEV_010_INFO": "informational",
|
||||
"SEV_020_LOW": "low",
|
||||
"SEV_030_MEDIUM": "medium",
|
||||
"SEV_040_HIGH": "high",
|
||||
"SEV_050_CRITICAL": "critical",
|
||||
}
|
||||
SEVERITY_NAME_TO_CODE = dict((v, k) for k, v in SEVERITY_CODE_TO_NAME.items())
|
||||
SEVERITY_NAME_TO_CODE["info"] = "SEV_010_INFO"
|
||||
|
||||
# Our clock and the tenant's are not the same clock. A range that ends exactly
|
||||
# now silently drops alerts the tenant stamped a few seconds ahead of us.
|
||||
SKEW_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000
|
||||
|
||||
# Window applied when the caller passes no filter at all — see main().
|
||||
DEFAULT_LOOKBACK_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def severity_block(value):
|
||||
"""One EQ block per severity, OR'd together (the reference client's array rule)."""
|
||||
blocks = [
|
||||
{"SEARCH_FIELD": "severity", "SEARCH_TYPE": "EQ",
|
||||
"SEARCH_VALUE": SEVERITY_NAME_TO_CODE.get(s.lower(), s.upper())}
|
||||
for s in csv(value)
|
||||
]
|
||||
if not blocks:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return blocks[0] if len(blocks) == 1 else {"OR": blocks}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def flatten(item):
|
||||
"""One grid row -> one flat alert.
|
||||
|
||||
The API wraps every row as {alert_fields, incident_fields}. Mapping through
|
||||
that wrapper would put an `alert_fields.` prefix on every expression an
|
||||
operator writes, so the row is unwrapped here and the two fields Riposte
|
||||
cannot express are derived: `status.progress` carries a dot INSIDE the key
|
||||
(unusable as a mapping path) and severity is an enum code.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
fields = item.get("alert_fields")
|
||||
alert = dict(fields) if isinstance(fields, dict) else dict(item)
|
||||
alert.pop("incident_fields", None)
|
||||
if "status.progress" in alert:
|
||||
alert["status_progress"] = alert.pop("status.progress")
|
||||
name = SEVERITY_CODE_TO_NAME.get(alert.get("severity"))
|
||||
if name:
|
||||
alert["severity_name"] = name
|
||||
incident = item.get("incident_fields")
|
||||
if isinstance(incident, dict):
|
||||
alert["incident_fields"] = incident
|
||||
return alert
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def main():
|
||||
inputs = json.loads(os.environ.get("INTEGRATION_INPUTS", "{}"))
|
||||
limit = int(inputs.get("limit") or 100)
|
||||
filters = []
|
||||
if inputs.get("severity"):
|
||||
filters.append({"field": "severity", "operator": "in", "value": csv(inputs["severity"])})
|
||||
limit = max(1, int(inputs.get("limit") or 100))
|
||||
conditions = []
|
||||
sev = severity_block(inputs.get("severity"))
|
||||
if sev:
|
||||
conditions.append(sev)
|
||||
created_ms = to_ms(inputs.get("created_after"))
|
||||
if created_ms is not None:
|
||||
filters.append({"field": "source_insert_ts", "operator": "gte", "value": created_ms})
|
||||
rd = {"search_from": 0, "search_to": limit, "sort": {"field": "source_insert_ts", "keyword": "desc"}}
|
||||
if filters:
|
||||
rd["filters"] = filters
|
||||
print(json.dumps(post("/alerts/get_alerts_by_filter_data/", rd)))
|
||||
conditions.append({
|
||||
"SEARCH_FIELD": "source_insert_ts",
|
||||
"SEARCH_TYPE": "RANGE",
|
||||
"SEARCH_VALUE": {"from": created_ms, "to": int(time.time() * 1000) + SKEW_MS},
|
||||
})
|
||||
if not conditions:
|
||||
# The reference client refuses a filterless query outright, and an
|
||||
# unbounded scan of the whole alerts grid is not what the API is for.
|
||||
# A recent window is a better default than an empty filter the tenant
|
||||
# may well answer with a 500.
|
||||
now_ms = int(time.time() * 1000)
|
||||
conditions.append({
|
||||
"SEARCH_FIELD": "source_insert_ts",
|
||||
"SEARCH_TYPE": "RANGE",
|
||||
"SEARCH_VALUE": {"from": now_ms - DEFAULT_LOOKBACK_MS, "to": now_ms + SKEW_MS},
|
||||
})
|
||||
# Oldest first on an incremental fetch, so that a window holding more alerts
|
||||
# than `limit` drops its most RECENT ones — the only ones the next poll can
|
||||
# still see. Newest first otherwise, which is what an operator running the
|
||||
# command by hand is asking for.
|
||||
order = "ASC" if created_ms is not None else "DESC"
|
||||
|
||||
alerts, truncated = [], False
|
||||
while len(alerts) < limit:
|
||||
rd = {"filter_data": {
|
||||
"sort": [{"FIELD": "source_insert_ts", "ORDER": order}],
|
||||
"paging": {"from": len(alerts), "to": min(len(alerts) + PAGE, limit)},
|
||||
"filter": {"AND": conditions},
|
||||
}}
|
||||
reply = (post("/alerts/get_alerts_by_filter_data/", rd) or {}).get("reply") or {}
|
||||
page = reply.get("alerts") or []
|
||||
alerts.extend(flatten(a) for a in page)
|
||||
if len(page) < PAGE:
|
||||
break
|
||||
# Stopped on the ceiling rather than on an exhausted window: whatever is
|
||||
# left is not coming back on the next poll, and a silent cap reads like
|
||||
# a quiet feed.
|
||||
truncated = len(alerts) >= limit
|
||||
|
||||
out = {"result_count": len(alerts), "alerts": alerts}
|
||||
if truncated:
|
||||
out["truncated"] = True
|
||||
print(json.dumps({"reply": out}))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user