diff --git a/integrations/sentinelone/manifest.yaml b/integrations/sentinelone/manifest.yaml index 0a7a101..936b652 100644 --- a/integrations/sentinelone/manifest.yaml +++ b/integrations/sentinelone/manifest.yaml @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ id: sentinelone name: SentinelOne -version: 1.2.4 +version: 1.3.0 description: "SentinelOne Singularity (API v2.1) — endpoint detection & response: triage threats, enrich, isolate/reconnect hosts, mitigate, scan." -changelog: "1.2.4 — Re-modelled the OCSF mappers to OCSF actor/target semantics: the initiating process maps to actor.* (actor.process, actor.user), and the process/file acted upon maps to the target (process.*, file.*, user.*). 1.2.3 — Expanded the OCSF mappers (get_threats, get_alerts) with more fields: file hashes (sha1/md5), file ext/size, finding/rule ids, confidence, status, parent process and device/user identity. 1.2.2 — Added pre-built OCSF mappers (get_threats, get_alerts) for the mapper library. 1.2.1 — Added test_connection for the instance Test button. 1.2.0 — Added 13 commands: threat-analysis, threat-download-from-cloud, abort-endpoint-scan, endpoint-fetch-logs, fetch-file, get-remote-script-task-status/results, get-service-users, list-installed-singularity-marketplace-applications, update-uam-alert-status/verdict, run-powerquery and create-tag-rule (83 commands total). 1.1.0 — Command names prefixed with 'sentinelone-' (e.g. sentinelone-isolate-agent) for easier toolbox search; command IDs unchanged. 1.0.0 — Initial release: 70 commands covering agents, threats, alerts, blocklist/exclusions, IOCs, STAR rules, Deep Visibility, remote scripts, tags, firewall and network discovery based on the SentinelOne API v2.1." +changelog: "1.3.0 — Exhaustive OCSF mappers: get_threats (38 fields) and get_alerts (58 fields) now cover device, finding, malware, actor/target process, file, registry, network, indicators and container. 1.2.4 — Re-modelled the OCSF mappers to OCSF actor/target semantics: the initiating process maps to actor.* (actor.process, actor.user), and the process/file acted upon maps to the target (process.*, file.*, user.*). 1.2.3 — Expanded the OCSF mappers (get_threats, get_alerts) with more fields: file hashes (sha1/md5), file ext/size, finding/rule ids, confidence, status, parent process and device/user identity. 1.2.2 — Added pre-built OCSF mappers (get_threats, get_alerts) for the mapper library. 1.2.1 — Added test_connection for the instance Test button. 1.2.0 — Added 13 commands: threat-analysis, threat-download-from-cloud, abort-endpoint-scan, endpoint-fetch-logs, fetch-file, get-remote-script-task-status/results, get-service-users, list-installed-singularity-marketplace-applications, update-uam-alert-status/verdict, run-powerquery and create-tag-rule (83 commands total). 1.1.0 — Command names prefixed with 'sentinelone-' (e.g. sentinelone-isolate-agent) for easier toolbox search; command IDs unchanged. 1.0.0 — Initial release: 70 commands covering agents, threats, alerts, blocklist/exclusions, IOCs, STAR rules, Deep Visibility, remote scripts, tags, firewall and network discovery based on the SentinelOne API v2.1." category: endpoint # Per-instance configuration. The scripts build the API base as /web/api/v2.1. diff --git a/integrations/sentinelone/mappers/get_alerts.yaml b/integrations/sentinelone/mappers/get_alerts.yaml index 213e5e2..8d74868 100644 --- a/integrations/sentinelone/mappers/get_alerts.yaml +++ b/integrations/sentinelone/mappers/get_alerts.yaml @@ -1,24 +1,50 @@ name: "SentinelOne Alerts → OCSF" -description: "Maps a SentinelOne v2.1 cloud-detection alert object (data[]) to OCSF. The initiating (source) process is the actor (actor.*); the process/file acted upon is the target (process.*/file.*)." +description: "Exhaustive map of a SentinelOne v2.1 cloud-detection alert object (data[]) to OCSF. Initiating (source) process = actor (actor.*); the process/file acted upon = target (process.*/file.*); registry, network, indicators and container included." field_mappings: title: "ruleInfo.name" severity: "ruleInfo.severity = 'Critical' ? 5 : (ruleInfo.severity = 'High' ? 4 : 3)" description: "alertInfo.eventType" -# source_path is evaluated against ONE alert object (alert rule results_path = data). +# source_path is JSONata over ONE alert object (alert rule results_path = data). # Paths absent from a given alert are skipped at ingestion, so extra entries are safe. ocsf: - # Endpoint + # ── Endpoint / device ───────────────────────────────────────────── - { source_path: "agentDetectionInfo.name", ocsf_field: "src_endpoint.hostname" } - { source_path: "agentDetectionInfo.osName", ocsf_field: "src_endpoint.os.name" } + - { source_path: "agentDetectionInfo.osFamily", ocsf_field: "src_endpoint.os.type" } - { source_path: "agentDetectionInfo.osRevision", ocsf_field: "device.os.build" } - { source_path: "agentDetectionInfo.uuid", ocsf_field: "device.uid" } - # Rule / finding + - { source_path: "agentDetectionInfo.machineType", ocsf_field: "device.type" } + - { source_path: "agentDetectionInfo.version", ocsf_field: "metadata.product.version" } + - { source_path: "agentDetectionInfo.accountId", ocsf_field: "cloud.account.uid" } + # ── Network (alertInfo) ─────────────────────────────────────────── + - { source_path: "alertInfo.srcIp", ocsf_field: "src_endpoint.ip" } + - { source_path: "alertInfo.dstIp", ocsf_field: "dst_endpoint.ip" } + - { source_path: "alertInfo.dstPort", ocsf_field: "dst_endpoint.port" } + - { source_path: "alertInfo.netEventDirection", ocsf_field: "connection_info.direction" } + - { source_path: "alertInfo.dnsRequest", ocsf_field: "dns_query.hostname" } + # ── Affected login user (alertInfo) ─────────────────────────────── + - { source_path: "alertInfo.loginsUserName", ocsf_field: "user.name" } + - { source_path: "alertInfo.loginAccountDomain", ocsf_field: "user.domain" } + - { source_path: "alertInfo.loginAccountSid", ocsf_field: "user.uid" } + # ── Rule / finding ──────────────────────────────────────────────── - { source_path: "ruleInfo.name", ocsf_field: "rule.name" } - { source_path: "ruleInfo.id", ocsf_field: "rule.uid" } - { source_path: "ruleInfo.description", ocsf_field: "rule.desc" } - { source_path: "alertInfo.alertId", ocsf_field: "finding_info.uid" } - { source_path: "alertInfo.dvEventId", ocsf_field: "metadata.original_event_uid" } - # Initiating (source) process — the actor + - { source_path: "alertInfo.createdAt", ocsf_field: "finding_info.created_time" } + - { source_path: "alertInfo.updatedAt", ocsf_field: "finding_info.modified_time" } + - { source_path: "alertInfo.hitType", ocsf_field: "finding_info.analytic.type" } + - { source_path: "alertInfo.incidentStatus", ocsf_field: "status" } + - { source_path: "alertInfo.analystVerdict", ocsf_field: "status_detail" } + # ── Threat-intel indicator (observables) ────────────────────────── + - { source_path: "alertInfo.indicatorName", ocsf_field: "observables.name" } + - { source_path: "alertInfo.indicatorCategory", ocsf_field: "observables.type" } + - { source_path: "alertInfo.tiIndicatorValue", ocsf_field: "observables.value" } + # ── Registry (alertInfo) ────────────────────────────────────────── + - { source_path: "alertInfo.registryPath", ocsf_field: "reg_key.path" } + - { source_path: "alertInfo.registryValue", ocsf_field: "reg_value.data" } + # ── Initiating (source) process — the actor ─────────────────────── - { source_path: "sourceProcessInfo.name", ocsf_field: "actor.process.name" } - { source_path: "sourceProcessInfo.pid", ocsf_field: "actor.process.pid" } - { source_path: "sourceProcessInfo.filePath", ocsf_field: "actor.process.file.path" } @@ -28,18 +54,25 @@ ocsf: - { source_path: "sourceProcessInfo.fileHashSha256", ocsf_field: "actor.process.file.hashes.sha256" } - { source_path: "sourceProcessInfo.fileHashSha1", ocsf_field: "actor.process.file.hashes.sha1" } - { source_path: "sourceProcessInfo.fileHashMd5", ocsf_field: "actor.process.file.hashes.md5" } - # Parent of the source process + # ── Parent of the source process ────────────────────────────────── - { source_path: "sourceParentProcessInfo.name", ocsf_field: "actor.process.parent_process.name" } - { source_path: "sourceParentProcessInfo.pid", ocsf_field: "actor.process.parent_process.pid" } - { source_path: "sourceParentProcessInfo.commandline", ocsf_field: "actor.process.parent_process.cmd_line" } - # Target process — the process acted upon - - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtProcName", ocsf_field: "process.name" } - - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtProcPid", ocsf_field: "process.pid" } - - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtProcCmdLine", ocsf_field: "process.cmd_line" } - - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtProcImagePath", ocsf_field: "process.file.path" } - - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtProcUid", ocsf_field: "process.uid" } - # Target file — the file acted upon - - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtFilePath", ocsf_field: "file.path" } - - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtFileId", ocsf_field: "file.uid" } + # ── Target process — the process acted upon ─────────────────────── + - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtProcName", ocsf_field: "process.name" } + - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtProcPid", ocsf_field: "process.pid" } + - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtProcCmdLine", ocsf_field: "process.cmd_line" } + - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtProcImagePath", ocsf_field: "process.file.path" } + - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtProcUid", ocsf_field: "process.uid" } + - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtProcIntegrityLevel", ocsf_field: "process.integrity" } + # ── Target file — the file acted upon ───────────────────────────── + - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtFilePath", ocsf_field: "file.path" } + - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtFileId", ocsf_field: "file.uid" } - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtFileHashSha256", ocsf_field: "file.hashes.sha256" } - - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtFileHashSha1", ocsf_field: "file.hashes.sha1" } + - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtFileHashSha1", ocsf_field: "file.hashes.sha1" } + - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtFileCreatedAt", ocsf_field: "file.created_time" } + - { source_path: "targetProcessInfo.tgtFileModifiedAt", ocsf_field: "file.modified_time" } + # ── Container ───────────────────────────────────────────────────── + - { source_path: "containerInfo.name", ocsf_field: "container.name" } + - { source_path: "containerInfo.id", ocsf_field: "container.uid" } + - { source_path: "containerInfo.image", ocsf_field: "container.image.name" } diff --git a/integrations/sentinelone/mappers/get_threats.yaml b/integrations/sentinelone/mappers/get_threats.yaml index 534fb4d..c5cee22 100644 --- a/integrations/sentinelone/mappers/get_threats.yaml +++ b/integrations/sentinelone/mappers/get_threats.yaml @@ -1,35 +1,52 @@ name: "SentinelOne Threats → OCSF" -description: "Maps a SentinelOne v2.1 threat object (data[]) to OCSF. The malicious file is the subject (file.*); the process that ran it is the actor (actor.*); the host's logged-in user is the affected user (user.*)." +description: "Exhaustive map of a SentinelOne v2.1 threat object (data[]) to OCSF. Malicious file = subject (file.*/malware.*); originating process = actor (actor.*); host's logged-in user = affected user (user.*)." field_mappings: title: "threatInfo.threatName" severity: "threatInfo.confidenceLevel = 'malicious' ? 4 : 3" description: "threatInfo.classification" -# source_path is evaluated against ONE threat object (alert rule results_path = data). +# source_path is JSONata over ONE threat object (alert rule results_path = data). # Paths absent from a given threat are skipped at ingestion, so extra entries are safe. ocsf: - # Endpoint (where it was seen) + # ── Endpoint / device ───────────────────────────────────────────── - { source_path: "agentRealtimeInfo.agentComputerName", ocsf_field: "src_endpoint.hostname" } - { source_path: "agentRealtimeInfo.agentDomain", ocsf_field: "src_endpoint.domain" } - { source_path: "agentRealtimeInfo.agentOsType", ocsf_field: "src_endpoint.os.type" } + - { source_path: "agentRealtimeInfo.agentMachineType", ocsf_field: "device.type" } - { source_path: "agentRealtimeInfo.agentUuid", ocsf_field: "device.uid" } + - { source_path: "agentRealtimeInfo.agentId", ocsf_field: "device.uid_alt" } - { source_path: "agentDetectionInfo.externalIp", ocsf_field: "src_endpoint.ip" } + - { source_path: "agentDetectionInfo.agentIpV4", ocsf_field: "device.ip" } - { source_path: "agentDetectionInfo.agentOsName", ocsf_field: "src_endpoint.os.name" } - # Affected user (logged in on the host) + - { source_path: "agentDetectionInfo.agentOsRevision", ocsf_field: "device.os.build" } + - { source_path: "agentDetectionInfo.agentVersion", ocsf_field: "metadata.product.version" } + - { source_path: "agentDetectionInfo.agentRegisteredAt", ocsf_field: "device.first_seen_time" } + - { source_path: "agentDetectionInfo.accountName", ocsf_field: "cloud.account.name" } + - { source_path: "agentDetectionInfo.accountId", ocsf_field: "cloud.account.uid" } + # ── Affected user (logged in on the host) ───────────────────────── - { source_path: "agentDetectionInfo.agentLastLoggedInUserName", ocsf_field: "user.name" } - # Finding / malware + # ── Finding / malware ───────────────────────────────────────────── - { source_path: "threatInfo.threatName", ocsf_field: "malware.name" } - { source_path: "threatInfo.classification", ocsf_field: "malware.classifications" } - { source_path: "threatInfo.threatId", ocsf_field: "finding_info.uid" } + - { source_path: "threatInfo.createdAt", ocsf_field: "finding_info.created_time" } + - { source_path: "threatInfo.identifiedAt", ocsf_field: "finding_info.first_seen_time" } + - { source_path: "threatInfo.updatedAt", ocsf_field: "finding_info.modified_time" } + - { source_path: "threatInfo.detectionType", ocsf_field: "finding_info.analytic.type" } - { source_path: "threatInfo.confidenceLevel", ocsf_field: "confidence" } - - { source_path: "threatInfo.mitigationStatus", ocsf_field: "status" } - # Acting (malicious) process — the actor + - { source_path: "threatInfo.incidentStatus", ocsf_field: "status" } + - { source_path: "threatInfo.analystVerdict", ocsf_field: "status_detail" } + - { source_path: "threatInfo.mitigationStatus", ocsf_field: "status_code" } + - { source_path: "threatInfo.storyline", ocsf_field: "metadata.correlation_uid" } + # ── Acting (malicious) process — the actor ──────────────────────── - { source_path: "threatInfo.originatorProcess", ocsf_field: "actor.process.name" } - { source_path: "threatInfo.maliciousProcessArguments", ocsf_field: "actor.process.cmd_line" } - { source_path: "threatInfo.processUser", ocsf_field: "actor.user.name" } - # Malicious file — the subject + # ── Malicious file — the subject ────────────────────────────────── - { source_path: "threatInfo.filePath", ocsf_field: "file.path" } - { source_path: "threatInfo.fileExtension", ocsf_field: "file.ext" } + - { source_path: "threatInfo.fileExtensionType", ocsf_field: "file.type" } - { source_path: "threatInfo.fileSize", ocsf_field: "file.size" } + - { source_path: "threatInfo.publisherName", ocsf_field: "file.company_name" } - { source_path: "threatInfo.sha256", ocsf_field: "file.hashes.sha256" } - { source_path: "threatInfo.sha1", ocsf_field: "file.hashes.sha1" } - { source_path: "threatInfo.md5", ocsf_field: "file.hashes.md5" }