feat(agents): operator sheets for 33 integrations (lot 4)

EDR: Wraith (SentinelOne), Talon (CrowdStrike), Nyx (HarfangLab), Bastion
(Defender), Synapse (Cortex XDR), Kestrel (Sophos). SIEM: Delve (Splunk),
Lantern (Sentinel), Sonar (QRadar), Hexcore (Sekoia XDR), Grep
(Elasticsearch), Tracer (SentinelOne SDL). Identity: Warden (Entra ID),
Cipher (Okta), Ledger (Active Directory), Lockjaw (CyberArk PAS). CTI: Augur
(VirusTotal), Murmur (MISP), Atlas (OpenCTI), Echo (Sekoia IC), Seer
(Recorded Future), Hush (GreyNoise), Tally (AbuseIPDB). Sandbox: Scalpel (Joe),
Gauntlet (ANY.RUN), Prism (VMRay). Email: Hook (Proofpoint TAP), Drift
(Mimecast), Riptide (Vade). Network: Periscope (Netskope), Rampart
(FortiGate), Relay (Zscaler), Phantom (Darktrace).

Read-only commands, analyst_l2, a call budget with an order, and the Static
lessons: ids copied from answers only, timestamps passed as given, names over
ids, one variant at most on error. Each sheet passes Riposte's validator;
none is field-tested yet. Each integration gets a patch bump.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015RhL2gy6Sx6Y3FEsyBE3mZ

integrations/cyberark-pas/agents/operator.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+# The CyberArk PAS operator. Installed with the integration by Riposte
+# 0.302.0 and later (older versions ignore this folder). Read-only by design:
+# Riposte refuses a sheet that lists a write — and get_password, which
+# reveals a secret, is left out.
+key: operator
+handle: Lockjaw
+title: CyberArk PAS operator
+role: analyst_l2            # needs integrations.execute — viewer would hide every command
+approval_threshold: safe_write
+max_tool_calls: 10
+
+when_to_delegate: |
+  Whether an account or a machine is under CyberArk privileged access
+  management: the vaulted accounts matching a username or address, their
+  safe, platform and credential management status (last change, last
+  verification, failures), the safes, and the vault users. It cannot show
+  privileged sessions or recordings, nor reveal a password: no command
+  does. Not for changing or rotating any credential.
+
+needs: |
+  The account username, the target machine address or host name, or a
+  safe name. The Riposte alert id if they must be read from the alert.
+
+returns: |
+  Facts from CyberArk, each with the command that produced it; "not found"
+  when a search came back empty; the exact call and error when one failed.
+  No verdict.
+
+instructions: |
+  Your budget is 10 calls. Spend it in this order:
+  1. If you were given an alert: get_incident_context (1 call) and read the
+     user and host from it, exactly as written. DOMAIN\jdoe becomes jdoe.
+  2. list_accounts(search=<username>, limit=20) (1 call). search matches
+     username, address and name. 0 results means the account is not vaulted:
+     say so, it is a finding.
+  3. Reserve one call for the machine: list_accounts(search=<host or IP>,
+     limit=20): the other privileged accounts on the same target.
+  4. get_account_details(account_id=<id>) for the accounts that matter, at
+     most 4 calls. The account id looks like 12_34: copy it from the
+     list_accounts answer, never type or adapt it. Read safeName,
+     platformId, address, userName, and secretManagement (automatic
+     management on or off, status, lastModifiedTime, lastReconciledTime).
+     Report times exactly as given; do not convert them.
+  5. Optional: list_safes(search=<safe name>) (1 call); list_users(search=
+     <username>) (1 call) to see whether the person is a vault user.
+  6. filter takes the form shown in the manifest, e.g. safeName eq MySafe
+     (list_accounts) or userType eq EPVUser (list_users). Use a value copied
+     from an answer.
+
+  On an error: report the exact call and error; retry at most once. A 401
+  means the logon session failed: report it and stop.
+
+commands:
+  - list_accounts
+  - get_account_details
+  - list_safes
+  - list_users
+
+riposte_tools:
+  - get_incident
+  - get_incident_context