diff --git a/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/manifest.yaml b/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/manifest.yaml
index 6206db4..27c49be 100644
--- a/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/manifest.yaml
+++ b/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/manifest.yaml
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 id: rapid7_insightidr
 name: Rapid7 InsightIDR
-version: 1.14.8
+version: 1.14.9
 description: "Rapid7 InsightIDR (REST API) — investigation ingestion and full lifecycle (list/get/search/create/update/assign/set-status/bulk-close), investigation alerts and Rapid7 product alerts, investigation comments (add/list), custom threat indicators (add/replace), log management and LEQL log/log-set queries with downloads, and user directory search."
 changelog: "1.13.2 — query_log and query_log_set: trim the quotes and spaces a pasted log or log set ID drags along, and explain the 404. A trailing quote was URL-encoded into the path and the API answered a bare \"HTTP 404 Not Found\" that named nothing. Also send both time bounds on every run: a scheduled run passes only the watermark, and the first run nothing — the window now ends now and, without a start, opens 24 hours back. | 1.13.1 — test_connection: accept an InsightIDR Essential key. Essential answers the Investigations API with a 403 that names the package, so a valid key failed its test; the test now falls back to Log Search and says which commands that package leaves out — the LEQL feeds (query_log, query_log_set) are its way to ingest detections. | 1.13.0 — Add add_comment and list_comments: the investigation comment thread is where an analyst’s reasoning lives, and a playbook had no way to write into it or read it back. The Comments API is v1-only and addresses its target by RRN — the short investigation ID the other v1 endpoints accept is rejected with a 400 that names nothing, so both commands refuse it up front. | 1.12.0 — Make the LEQL queries ingestible: query_log and query_log_set gain an ingest block, a stable event_id for dedup, a bounded page walk and a detection_name stamp, and they now read start_time as ISO-8601, UNIX seconds or milliseconds alike. A tenant whose basic detection rules only notify (email, Slack) creates no investigation and no alert an API can read, so replaying the rule's own query on a schedule is the only way its detections reach a SOAR. | 1.11.1 — Strip the whitespace out of the comma-separated filter params (statuses, priorities, sources, tags) before the URL. \"HIGH, CRITICAL\" as typed sent \" CRITICAL\" to the API, which rejects the whole call — so a priority filter written naturally fetched nothing. | 1.11.0 —Build one evidence row per alert evidence into custom:rapid7_evidence, for the table field: sortable and filterable where the Markdown summary only reads. | 1.10.0 — Render every detection key as Markdown into custom:rapid7_summary, so a layout can show what the OCSF catalogue has no field for. Map both ends of an account action, read source_json top-level scalars, drop placeholder values, and force evidences to stay an array. | 1.9.2 — Read the evidence data in both of its shapes. A parsed source states its event flat, with no source_data/custom_data wrapper, and the parser returned {} for all of them. | 1.9.1 — get_alert_process_trees: explain the 404, which the API returns with an empty body for three different situations. | 1.9.0 — Fetch each alert process tree and flatten it into ctx.process_tree, the shape the layout Process Tree block reads. Gated on the event type by default, since an authentication alert never has one. | 1.8.0 — Fetch each alert evidence at ingestion and parse it: the log line behind the alert lives in a JSON-encoded string no mapper can reach, and it is where the source and destination addresses, the account and the device actually are. | 1.7.0 — Map source/destination assets and accounts to src_endpoint, dst_endpoint, actor.user and user. A connection rule names both ends and neither is \"the host\", so an RDP-to-DC alert produced no entity at all and nothing a layout could show. | 1.6.0 — Surface region_failures: the Alert Triage API answers HTTP 200 with a partial result when it cannot reach a region, and that list was being dropped. Also report the regions seen in the RRNs against the configured one. | 1.5.0 — Flatten the whole of rule_keys_of_interest into the context. It is an open vocabulary — a process rule and an authentication rule share no keys — so the hardcoded list only covered rules already seen and left every other alert empty. | 1.4.1 — Read the alert RRN from `rrn` before `id` and drop anything not RRN-shaped: the investigation alert list also returns bare UUIDs, and one of those rejects the entire /alerts/ops/rrns batch (HTTP 400), losing every alert in the run. | 1.4.0 — Add get_investigations_full: the investigation with its alerts inlined, so it stays the unit that becomes an incident. Drop-in for list_investigations (results_path data, dedup rrn). | 1.3.0 — Add search_investigation_alerts: ingest only the alerts that belong to an investigation, with their full detection content, in 1+N+1 calls. Filtering search_alerts on investigation_rrn does not work — the term is accepted and silently matches nothing. | 1.2.1 — search_alerts: report a malformed terms_json with the input named and echoed, instead of json's bare \"Expecting value: line 1 column 1\". | 1.2.0 — Add the search_alerts OCSF mapper: rule_keys_of_interest carries the host, the process, its command line, its parent and the file hashes, so an alert-based feed indexes entities where the investigation feed indexed none. Validated against a live ABA alert. | 1.1.1 — list_alert_fields: default path_depth to 1 and expose the search filter. The V2 fields endpoint refuses an unbounded walk of the tree (\"root path with path depth greater than 1 is not supported for V2 without a search filter\"), so the bare call returned HTTP 400. | 1.1.0 — Add the Alert Triage API (/idr/at): search alerts, get an alert, its evidence, its actors and its process trees, plus the tenant's alert field catalogue. These carry the detection content the investigation endpoints do not — MITRE T-codes, matched rule keys, assets and accounts, command lines. MDR-gated. | 1.0.0 — Initial release: investigation ingestion (list_investigations) with an exhaustive OCSF mapper, 18 commands across investigations, alerts, custom threats, logs/LEQL search and users. API v1/v2 selectable per instance and per command."
 category: siem
diff --git a/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/user_authentications.py b/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/user_authentications.py
index ca84f92..5ebcf3f 100644
--- a/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/user_authentications.py
+++ b/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/user_authentications.py
@@ -268,6 +268,39 @@ def _norm_account(v):
     return v
 
 
+# The fields an authentication question is answered from, matched by name so a
+# source that prefixes or nests them still lands here. Everything else — event
+# ids, timestamps, SIDs, the vendor payload — is left out: Riposte gives one
+# tool result 8000 characters, and the first version of this answer, two full
+# summaries, was cut at 3903 of 11903 with the asset list half gone.
+_KEY_FIELDS = ("destination_asset", "source_asset", "destination_domain", "result", "logon_type", "service")
+
+
+def _compact(events, top_assets):
+    """Counts for the key fields only; destination assets listed in full."""
+    counts = {}
+    first_ts, last_ts = None, None
+    for e in events:
+        ts = e.get("timestamp")
+        if isinstance(ts, (int, float)):
+            first_ts = ts if first_ts is None or ts < first_ts else first_ts
+            last_ts = ts if last_ts is None or ts > last_ts else last_ts
+        for k, v in _fields(e).items():
+            kl = k.lower()
+            if any(f in kl for f in _KEY_FIELDS) and "sid" not in kl:
+                counts.setdefault(k, {})
+                key = str(v)[:120]
+                counts[k][key] = counts[k].get(key, 0) + 1
+    out = {"count": len(events),
+           "first_event": _iso(first_ts) if first_ts is not None else None,
+           "last_event": _iso(last_ts) if last_ts is not None else None}
+    for k, vals in sorted(counts.items()):
+        ranked = sorted(vals.items(), key=lambda x: -x[1])
+        n = top_assets if "destination_asset" in k.lower() and "address" not in k.lower() else 5
+        out[k] = {"distinct": len(vals), "top": [[v, c] for v, c in ranked[:n]]}
+    return out
+
+
 def _is_users(fields, user):
     """The event is this user's: an account or user field holds the account.
 
@@ -331,8 +364,8 @@ def run():
         "user_matches": len(events),
         "truncated": len(matched) >= limit,
         "window": "%s to %s" % (_iso(start_time), _iso(end_time)),
-        "all": _summarize(events, limit),
-        "new_authentications": _summarize(new, limit),
+        "all": _compact(events, 10),
+        "new_authentications": _compact(new, 40),
         "note": ("all and new_authentications hold only this user's events (an account field equals "
                  "the user): keyword_matches counts every line the text appeared in, other accounts "
                  "included. new_authentications holds the events Rapid7 marked as a first "