diff --git a/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/manifest.yaml b/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/manifest.yaml
index a8314e5..59a35f7 100644
--- a/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/manifest.yaml
+++ b/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/manifest.yaml
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 id: rapid7_insightidr
 name: Rapid7 InsightIDR
-version: 1.4.0
+version: 1.4.1
 description: "Rapid7 InsightIDR (REST API) — investigation ingestion and full lifecycle (list/get/search/create/update/assign/set-status/bulk-close), investigation alerts and Rapid7 product alerts, custom threat indicators (add/replace), log management and LEQL log/log-set queries with downloads, and user directory search."
-changelog: "1.4.0 — Add get_investigations_full: the investigation with its alerts inlined, so it stays the unit that becomes an incident. Drop-in for list_investigations (results_path data, dedup rrn). | 1.3.0 — Add search_investigation_alerts: ingest only the alerts that belong to an investigation, with their full detection content, in 1+N+1 calls. Filtering search_alerts on investigation_rrn does not work — the term is accepted and silently matches nothing. | 1.2.1 — search_alerts: report a malformed terms_json with the input named and echoed, instead of json's bare \"Expecting value: line 1 column 1\". | 1.2.0 — Add the search_alerts OCSF mapper: rule_keys_of_interest carries the host, the process, its command line, its parent and the file hashes, so an alert-based feed indexes entities where the investigation feed indexed none. Validated against a live ABA alert. | 1.1.1 — list_alert_fields: default path_depth to 1 and expose the search filter. The V2 fields endpoint refuses an unbounded walk of the tree (\"root path with path depth greater than 1 is not supported for V2 without a search filter\"), so the bare call returned HTTP 400. | 1.1.0 — Add the Alert Triage API (/idr/at): search alerts, get an alert, its evidence, its actors and its process trees, plus the tenant's alert field catalogue. These carry the detection content the investigation endpoints do not — MITRE T-codes, matched rule keys, assets and accounts, command lines. MDR-gated. | 1.0.0 — Initial release: investigation ingestion (list_investigations) with an exhaustive OCSF mapper, 18 commands across investigations, alerts, custom threats, logs/LEQL search and users. API v1/v2 selectable per instance and per command."
+changelog: "1.4.1 — Read the alert RRN from `rrn` before `id` and drop anything not RRN-shaped: the investigation alert list also returns bare UUIDs, and one of those rejects the entire /alerts/ops/rrns batch (HTTP 400), losing every alert in the run. | 1.4.0 — Add get_investigations_full: the investigation with its alerts inlined, so it stays the unit that becomes an incident. Drop-in for list_investigations (results_path data, dedup rrn). | 1.3.0 — Add search_investigation_alerts: ingest only the alerts that belong to an investigation, with their full detection content, in 1+N+1 calls. Filtering search_alerts on investigation_rrn does not work — the term is accepted and silently matches nothing. | 1.2.1 — search_alerts: report a malformed terms_json with the input named and echoed, instead of json's bare \"Expecting value: line 1 column 1\". | 1.2.0 — Add the search_alerts OCSF mapper: rule_keys_of_interest carries the host, the process, its command line, its parent and the file hashes, so an alert-based feed indexes entities where the investigation feed indexed none. Validated against a live ABA alert. | 1.1.1 — list_alert_fields: default path_depth to 1 and expose the search filter. The V2 fields endpoint refuses an unbounded walk of the tree (\"root path with path depth greater than 1 is not supported for V2 without a search filter\"), so the bare call returned HTTP 400. | 1.1.0 — Add the Alert Triage API (/idr/at): search alerts, get an alert, its evidence, its actors and its process trees, plus the tenant's alert field catalogue. These carry the detection content the investigation endpoints do not — MITRE T-codes, matched rule keys, assets and accounts, command lines. MDR-gated. | 1.0.0 — Initial release: investigation ingestion (list_investigations) with an exhaustive OCSF mapper, 18 commands across investigations, alerts, custom threats, logs/LEQL search and users. API v1/v2 selectable per instance and per command."
 category: siem
 
 # Per-instance configuration. The Insight platform region selects the API host
diff --git a/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/get_investigations_full.py b/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/get_investigations_full.py
index 947f2aa..e18d7cf 100644
--- a/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/get_investigations_full.py
+++ b/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/get_investigations_full.py
@@ -61,6 +61,27 @@ DEFAULT_BUDGET_S = 60
 # plain investigation feed. Only the command changes.
 
 
+def _alert_rrn(a):
+    """The alert's RRN, or None when this alert has none.
+
+    The investigation alert list is not consistent about where the RRN sits.
+    Some entries carry it in `id` (rrn:alerts:eu:<org>:alert:1:<hex>); others put
+    a plain UUID there and the RRN, if any, in `rrn`. `rrn` is therefore read
+    first, and anything that is not RRN-shaped is dropped rather than sent on.
+
+    That last part is not defensive habit. /alerts/ops/rrns validates the whole
+    list and rejects the entire request when one entry is malformed, so a single
+    UUID slipping through costs every alert in the batch — which is exactly how
+    this failed: HTTP 400, eight invalid RRNs, zero alerts fetched, the whole run
+    lost. Dropping them here means the investigation still arrives, with its
+    unretrievable alerts counted rather than silently missing.
+    """
+    for v in (a.get("rrn"), a.get("id")):
+        if isinstance(v, str) and v.startswith("rrn:"):
+            return v
+    return None
+
+
 def run():
     _, _, multi = _cfg()
     inp = _inputs()
@@ -92,7 +113,7 @@ def run():
     # guards. An investigation whose alerts cannot be read keeps its place in the
     # output with an alerts_error: losing the whole run over one of them, or
     # dropping it silently, would both be worse.
-    rrns_by_inv, order, truncated = {}, [], False
+    rrns_by_inv, order, truncated, skipped = {}, [], False, 0
     for inv in investigations:
         inv_rrn = inv.get("rrn") or ""
         if not inv_rrn:
@@ -108,11 +129,13 @@ def run():
             continue
         got = []
         for a in (page.get("data") or []):
-            rrn = a.get("id") or a.get("rrn")
-            if rrn:
-                got.append(rrn)
-                if rrn not in order:
-                    order.append(rrn)
+            rrn = _alert_rrn(a)
+            if rrn is None:
+                skipped += 1
+                continue
+            got.append(rrn)
+            if rrn not in order:
+                order.append(rrn)
         rrns_by_inv[inv_rrn] = got
 
     # The alerts themselves, batched, then indexed so each investigation can be
@@ -168,6 +191,7 @@ def run():
             "investigations_returned": len(investigations),
             "alert_rrns_collected": len(order),
             "alerts_fetched": fetched,
+            "alert_ids_without_rrn": skipped,
             "truncated": truncated,
             "elapsed_seconds": round(time.monotonic() - started, 1),
         },
diff --git a/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/search_investigation_alerts.py b/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/search_investigation_alerts.py
index 58c3e42..5485458 100644
--- a/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/search_investigation_alerts.py
+++ b/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/search_investigation_alerts.py
@@ -51,6 +51,27 @@ RRN_BATCH = 100
 DEFAULT_BUDGET_S = 60
 
 
+def _alert_rrn(a):
+    """The alert's RRN, or None when this alert has none.
+
+    The investigation alert list is not consistent about where the RRN sits.
+    Some entries carry it in `id` (rrn:alerts:eu:<org>:alert:1:<hex>); others put
+    a plain UUID there and the RRN, if any, in `rrn`. `rrn` is therefore read
+    first, and anything that is not RRN-shaped is dropped rather than sent on.
+
+    That last part is not defensive habit. /alerts/ops/rrns validates the whole
+    list and rejects the entire request when one entry is malformed, so a single
+    UUID slipping through costs every alert in the batch — which is exactly how
+    this failed: HTTP 400, eight invalid RRNs, zero alerts fetched, the whole run
+    lost. Dropping them here means the investigation still arrives, with its
+    unretrievable alerts counted rather than silently missing.
+    """
+    for v in (a.get("rrn"), a.get("id")):
+        if isinstance(v, str) and v.startswith("rrn:"):
+            return v
+    return None
+
+
 def run():
     _, _, multi = _cfg()
     inp = _inputs()
@@ -82,7 +103,7 @@ def run():
 
     # 2) Their alert RRNs. One call per investigation — there is no bulk form —
     #    so this is the step the time budget guards.
-    order, by_rrn, truncated = [], {}, False
+    order, by_rrn, truncated, skipped = [], {}, False, 0
     for inv in investigations:
         if time.monotonic() - started > budget or len(order) >= max_alerts:
             truncated = True
@@ -98,8 +119,11 @@ def run():
             # alert simply does not appear; the counts below say how many did.
             continue
         for a in (page.get("data") or []):
-            rrn = a.get("id") or a.get("rrn")
-            if rrn and rrn not in by_rrn:
+            rrn = _alert_rrn(a)
+            if rrn is None:
+                skipped += 1
+                continue
+            if rrn not in by_rrn:
                 order.append(rrn)
                 by_rrn[rrn] = inv
             if len(order) >= max_alerts:
@@ -135,6 +159,7 @@ def run():
             "investigations_read": len(investigations),
             "alert_rrns_collected": len(order),
             "alerts_returned": len(alerts),
+            "alert_ids_without_rrn": skipped,
             "truncated": truncated,
             "elapsed_seconds": round(time.monotonic() - started, 1),
         },