diff --git a/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/manifest.yaml b/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/manifest.yaml index da2bd2e..b558a41 100644 --- a/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/manifest.yaml +++ b/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/manifest.yaml @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ id: rapid7_insightidr name: Rapid7 InsightIDR -version: 1.13.1 +version: 1.13.2 description: "Rapid7 InsightIDR (REST API) — investigation ingestion and full lifecycle (list/get/search/create/update/assign/set-status/bulk-close), investigation alerts and Rapid7 product alerts, investigation comments (add/list), custom threat indicators (add/replace), log management and LEQL log/log-set queries with downloads, and user directory search." -changelog: "1.13.1 — test_connection: accept an InsightIDR Essential key. Essential answers the Investigations API with a 403 that names the package, so a valid key failed its test; the test now falls back to Log Search and says which commands that package leaves out — the LEQL feeds (query_log, query_log_set) are its way to ingest detections. | 1.13.0 — Add add_comment and list_comments: the investigation comment thread is where an analyst’s reasoning lives, and a playbook had no way to write into it or read it back. The Comments API is v1-only and addresses its target by RRN — the short investigation ID the other v1 endpoints accept is rejected with a 400 that names nothing, so both commands refuse it up front. | 1.12.0 — Make the LEQL queries ingestible: query_log and query_log_set gain an ingest block, a stable event_id for dedup, a bounded page walk and a detection_name stamp, and they now read start_time as ISO-8601, UNIX seconds or milliseconds alike. A tenant whose basic detection rules only notify (email, Slack) creates no investigation and no alert an API can read, so replaying the rule's own query on a schedule is the only way its detections reach a SOAR. | 1.11.1 — Strip the whitespace out of the comma-separated filter params (statuses, priorities, sources, tags) before the URL. \"HIGH, CRITICAL\" as typed sent \" CRITICAL\" to the API, which rejects the whole call — so a priority filter written naturally fetched nothing. | 1.11.0 —Build one evidence row per alert evidence into custom:rapid7_evidence, for the table field: sortable and filterable where the Markdown summary only reads. | 1.10.0 — Render every detection key as Markdown into custom:rapid7_summary, so a layout can show what the OCSF catalogue has no field for. Map both ends of an account action, read source_json top-level scalars, drop placeholder values, and force evidences to stay an array. | 1.9.2 — Read the evidence data in both of its shapes. A parsed source states its event flat, with no source_data/custom_data wrapper, and the parser returned {} for all of them. | 1.9.1 — get_alert_process_trees: explain the 404, which the API returns with an empty body for three different situations. | 1.9.0 — Fetch each alert process tree and flatten it into ctx.process_tree, the shape the layout Process Tree block reads. Gated on the event type by default, since an authentication alert never has one. | 1.8.0 — Fetch each alert evidence at ingestion and parse it: the log line behind the alert lives in a JSON-encoded string no mapper can reach, and it is where the source and destination addresses, the account and the device actually are. | 1.7.0 — Map source/destination assets and accounts to src_endpoint, dst_endpoint, actor.user and user. A connection rule names both ends and neither is \"the host\", so an RDP-to-DC alert produced no entity at all and nothing a layout could show. | 1.6.0 — Surface region_failures: the Alert Triage API answers HTTP 200 with a partial result when it cannot reach a region, and that list was being dropped. Also report the regions seen in the RRNs against the configured one. | 1.5.0 — Flatten the whole of rule_keys_of_interest into the context. It is an open vocabulary — a process rule and an authentication rule share no keys — so the hardcoded list only covered rules already seen and left every other alert empty. | 1.4.1 — Read the alert RRN from `rrn` before `id` and drop anything not RRN-shaped: the investigation alert list also returns bare UUIDs, and one of those rejects the entire /alerts/ops/rrns batch (HTTP 400), losing every alert in the run. | 1.4.0 — Add get_investigations_full: the investigation with its alerts inlined, so it stays the unit that becomes an incident. Drop-in for list_investigations (results_path data, dedup rrn). | 1.3.0 — Add search_investigation_alerts: ingest only the alerts that belong to an investigation, with their full detection content, in 1+N+1 calls. Filtering search_alerts on investigation_rrn does not work — the term is accepted and silently matches nothing. | 1.2.1 — search_alerts: report a malformed terms_json with the input named and echoed, instead of json's bare \"Expecting value: line 1 column 1\". | 1.2.0 — Add the search_alerts OCSF mapper: rule_keys_of_interest carries the host, the process, its command line, its parent and the file hashes, so an alert-based feed indexes entities where the investigation feed indexed none. Validated against a live ABA alert. | 1.1.1 — list_alert_fields: default path_depth to 1 and expose the search filter. The V2 fields endpoint refuses an unbounded walk of the tree (\"root path with path depth greater than 1 is not supported for V2 without a search filter\"), so the bare call returned HTTP 400. | 1.1.0 — Add the Alert Triage API (/idr/at): search alerts, get an alert, its evidence, its actors and its process trees, plus the tenant's alert field catalogue. These carry the detection content the investigation endpoints do not — MITRE T-codes, matched rule keys, assets and accounts, command lines. MDR-gated. | 1.0.0 — Initial release: investigation ingestion (list_investigations) with an exhaustive OCSF mapper, 18 commands across investigations, alerts, custom threats, logs/LEQL search and users. API v1/v2 selectable per instance and per command." +changelog: "1.13.2 — query_log and query_log_set: trim the quotes and spaces a pasted log or log set ID drags along, and explain the 404. A trailing quote was URL-encoded into the path and the API answered a bare \"HTTP 404 Not Found\" that named nothing. Also send both time bounds on every run: a scheduled run passes only the watermark, and the first run nothing — the window now ends now and, without a start, opens 24 hours back. | 1.13.1 — test_connection: accept an InsightIDR Essential key. Essential answers the Investigations API with a 403 that names the package, so a valid key failed its test; the test now falls back to Log Search and says which commands that package leaves out — the LEQL feeds (query_log, query_log_set) are its way to ingest detections. | 1.13.0 — Add add_comment and list_comments: the investigation comment thread is where an analyst’s reasoning lives, and a playbook had no way to write into it or read it back. The Comments API is v1-only and addresses its target by RRN — the short investigation ID the other v1 endpoints accept is rejected with a 400 that names nothing, so both commands refuse it up front. | 1.12.0 — Make the LEQL queries ingestible: query_log and query_log_set gain an ingest block, a stable event_id for dedup, a bounded page walk and a detection_name stamp, and they now read start_time as ISO-8601, UNIX seconds or milliseconds alike. A tenant whose basic detection rules only notify (email, Slack) creates no investigation and no alert an API can read, so replaying the rule's own query on a schedule is the only way its detections reach a SOAR. | 1.11.1 — Strip the whitespace out of the comma-separated filter params (statuses, priorities, sources, tags) before the URL. \"HIGH, CRITICAL\" as typed sent \" CRITICAL\" to the API, which rejects the whole call — so a priority filter written naturally fetched nothing. | 1.11.0 —Build one evidence row per alert evidence into custom:rapid7_evidence, for the table field: sortable and filterable where the Markdown summary only reads. | 1.10.0 — Render every detection key as Markdown into custom:rapid7_summary, so a layout can show what the OCSF catalogue has no field for. Map both ends of an account action, read source_json top-level scalars, drop placeholder values, and force evidences to stay an array. | 1.9.2 — Read the evidence data in both of its shapes. A parsed source states its event flat, with no source_data/custom_data wrapper, and the parser returned {} for all of them. | 1.9.1 — get_alert_process_trees: explain the 404, which the API returns with an empty body for three different situations. | 1.9.0 — Fetch each alert process tree and flatten it into ctx.process_tree, the shape the layout Process Tree block reads. Gated on the event type by default, since an authentication alert never has one. | 1.8.0 — Fetch each alert evidence at ingestion and parse it: the log line behind the alert lives in a JSON-encoded string no mapper can reach, and it is where the source and destination addresses, the account and the device actually are. | 1.7.0 — Map source/destination assets and accounts to src_endpoint, dst_endpoint, actor.user and user. A connection rule names both ends and neither is \"the host\", so an RDP-to-DC alert produced no entity at all and nothing a layout could show. | 1.6.0 — Surface region_failures: the Alert Triage API answers HTTP 200 with a partial result when it cannot reach a region, and that list was being dropped. Also report the regions seen in the RRNs against the configured one. | 1.5.0 — Flatten the whole of rule_keys_of_interest into the context. It is an open vocabulary — a process rule and an authentication rule share no keys — so the hardcoded list only covered rules already seen and left every other alert empty. | 1.4.1 — Read the alert RRN from `rrn` before `id` and drop anything not RRN-shaped: the investigation alert list also returns bare UUIDs, and one of those rejects the entire /alerts/ops/rrns batch (HTTP 400), losing every alert in the run. | 1.4.0 — Add get_investigations_full: the investigation with its alerts inlined, so it stays the unit that becomes an incident. Drop-in for list_investigations (results_path data, dedup rrn). | 1.3.0 — Add search_investigation_alerts: ingest only the alerts that belong to an investigation, with their full detection content, in 1+N+1 calls. Filtering search_alerts on investigation_rrn does not work — the term is accepted and silently matches nothing. | 1.2.1 — search_alerts: report a malformed terms_json with the input named and echoed, instead of json's bare \"Expecting value: line 1 column 1\". | 1.2.0 — Add the search_alerts OCSF mapper: rule_keys_of_interest carries the host, the process, its command line, its parent and the file hashes, so an alert-based feed indexes entities where the investigation feed indexed none. Validated against a live ABA alert. | 1.1.1 — list_alert_fields: default path_depth to 1 and expose the search filter. The V2 fields endpoint refuses an unbounded walk of the tree (\"root path with path depth greater than 1 is not supported for V2 without a search filter\"), so the bare call returned HTTP 400. | 1.1.0 — Add the Alert Triage API (/idr/at): search alerts, get an alert, its evidence, its actors and its process trees, plus the tenant's alert field catalogue. These carry the detection content the investigation endpoints do not — MITRE T-codes, matched rule keys, assets and accounts, command lines. MDR-gated. | 1.0.0 — Initial release: investigation ingestion (list_investigations) with an exhaustive OCSF mapper, 18 commands across investigations, alerts, custom threats, logs/LEQL search and users. API v1/v2 selectable per instance and per command." category: siem # Per-instance configuration. The Insight platform region selects the API host diff --git a/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/query_log.py b/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/query_log.py index d520593..a35173b 100644 --- a/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/query_log.py +++ b/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/query_log.py @@ -131,6 +131,13 @@ def run(): end_time = _to_ms(inp.get("end_time")) if inp.get("time_range"): start_time, end_time = _rel_ms_range(inp.get("time_range")) + # Log Search wants both bounds. A scheduled run hands over start_time alone + # (the watermark), and the very first run may hand over nothing at all. + now_ms = int(time.time() * 1000) + if end_time is None: + end_time = now_ms + if start_time is None: + start_time = end_time - 24 * 3600 * 1000 try: limit = int(inp.get("limit") or 1000) except (TypeError, ValueError): @@ -142,7 +149,11 @@ def run(): "per_page": inp.get("logs_per_page"), "sequence_number": inp.get("sequence_number"), } - log_id = inp.get("log_id", "") + # A pasted ID often drags a quote or a space along; quoted into the path it + # names no log, and the API answers a bare 404. + log_id = str(inp.get("log_id") or "").strip().strip("\"'").strip() + if not log_id: + raise ValueError("log_id is required (list_log_sets gives it)") first = request("GET", "log_search/query/logs/" + urllib.parse.quote(log_id, safe=""), params=params) events = _identify(_collect(first, limit), log_id, inp.get("detection_name")) print(json.dumps({"events": events, "count": len(events), "from": start_time, "to": end_time})) @@ -151,7 +162,10 @@ def run(): try: run() except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: - print(json.dumps({"error": "HTTP " + str(e.code), "detail": e.read().decode("utf-8", "replace")})) + out = {"error": "HTTP " + str(e.code), "detail": e.read().decode("utf-8", "replace")} + if e.code == 404: + out["hint"] = "No log with this log_id in the configured region. Check the ID against list_log_sets, and the instance region." + print(json.dumps(out)) sys.exit(1) except Exception as e: print(json.dumps({"error": str(e)})) diff --git a/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/query_log_set.py b/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/query_log_set.py index 8ef9586..f66caea 100644 --- a/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/query_log_set.py +++ b/integrations/rapid7-insightidr/scripts/query_log_set.py @@ -131,6 +131,13 @@ def run(): end_time = _to_ms(inp.get("end_time")) if inp.get("time_range"): start_time, end_time = _rel_ms_range(inp.get("time_range")) + # Log Search wants both bounds. A scheduled run hands over start_time alone + # (the watermark), and the very first run may hand over nothing at all. + now_ms = int(time.time() * 1000) + if end_time is None: + end_time = now_ms + if start_time is None: + start_time = end_time - 24 * 3600 * 1000 try: limit = int(inp.get("limit") or 1000) except (TypeError, ValueError): @@ -142,7 +149,11 @@ def run(): "per_page": inp.get("logs_per_page"), "sequence_number": inp.get("sequence_number"), } - log_set_id = inp.get("log_set_id", "") + # A pasted ID often drags a quote or a space along; quoted into the path it + # names no log set, and the API answers a bare 404. + log_set_id = str(inp.get("log_set_id") or "").strip().strip("\"'").strip() + if not log_set_id: + raise ValueError("log_set_id is required (list_log_sets gives it)") first = request("GET", "log_search/query/logsets/" + urllib.parse.quote(log_set_id, safe=""), params=params) # No fallback log id: a log set spans several logs and every event names its own. events = _identify(_collect(first, limit), "", inp.get("detection_name")) @@ -152,7 +163,10 @@ def run(): try: run() except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: - print(json.dumps({"error": "HTTP " + str(e.code), "detail": e.read().decode("utf-8", "replace")})) + out = {"error": "HTTP " + str(e.code), "detail": e.read().decode("utf-8", "replace")} + if e.code == 404: + out["hint"] = "No log set with this log_set_id in the configured region. Check the ID against list_log_sets, and the instance region." + print(json.dumps(out)) sys.exit(1) except Exception as e: print(json.dumps({"error": str(e)}))